Essays In Two-Sided Markets With Intermediaries by Xu, Jing
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2018
Essays In Two-Sided Markets With Intermediaries
Jing Xu
University of Pennsylvania, xjingupenn@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Applied Mathematics Commons, and the Economic Theory Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2775
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Xu, Jing, "Essays In Two-Sided Markets With Intermediaries" (2018). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2775.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2775
Essays In Two-Sided Markets With Intermediaries
Abstract
In this thesis, I study the two-sided marketplaces with intermediaries that can facilitate matching, search and
trades.
The first chapter considers the welfare and distributional consequences of introducing the student-proposing
deferred acceptance mechanism in a model where schools have exogenous qualities and the benefit from
attending a school is supermodular in school quality and student type. Unlike neighborhood assignment,
deferred acceptance induces non-positive assortative matching where higher-type students do not necessarily
choose neighborhoods with better schools. Student types are more heterogeneous within neighborhoods
under deferred acceptance. Assuming an elastic housing supply, deferred acceptance benefits residents in
lower-quality neighborhoods with more access to higher quality schools. Moreover, more parents will `vote
with their feet' for deferred acceptance, other things equal, than for neighborhood assignment.
The second chapter studies a search platform in a setting where buyers search for sellers directly or through a
platform with lower search costs, and the platform charges both sides for the transactions it facilitates. While
many intermediaries attract as many users as possible by lowering search cost, potential buyers also care about
how attractive the sellers available via the intermediary are, not just the number. A search platform's strategy is
determined by the coexisting positive and negative cross-group externalities: (i) while buyers appreciate more
choices of sellers available on the platform, (ii) increasing the number of available sellers makes the search for
low-priced and high-value sellers harder due to an unfavorable price dispersion. A platform optimally adopts a
threshold strategy of targeting sellers with lower costs to balance the competing externalities.
The third chapter studies intermediation in a buyer-seller network with sequential bargaining. An
intermediary matches traders connected in a network to bargain over the price of heterogeneous goods and
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS WITH INTERMEDIARIES
Jing Xu
Rakesh V. Vohra
In this thesis, I study the two-sided marketplaces with intermediaries that can facilitate
matching, search and trades.
The first chapter considers the welfare and distributional consequences of introducing the
student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in a model where schools have exogenous
qualities and the benefit from attending a school is supermodular in school quality and
student type. Unlike neighborhood assignment, deferred acceptance induces non-positive
assortative matching where higher-type students do not necessarily choose neighborhoods
with better schools. Student types are more heterogeneous within neighborhoods under
deferred acceptance. Assuming an elastic housing supply, deferred acceptance benefits resi-
dents in lower-quality neighborhoods with more access to higher quality schools. Moreover,
more parents will ‘vote with their feet’ for deferred acceptance, other things equal, than for
neighborhood assignment.
The second chapter studies a search platform in a setting where buyers search for sellers
directly or through a platform with lower search costs, and the platform charges both
sides for the transactions it facilitates. While many intermediaries attract as many users
as possible by lowering search cost, potential buyers also care about how attractive the
sellers available via the intermediary are, not just the number. A search platform’s strategy
is determined by the coexisting positive and negative cross-group externalities: (i) while
buyers appreciate more choices of sellers available on the platform, (ii) increasing the number
of available sellers makes the search for low-priced and high-value sellers harder due to an
unfavorable price dispersion. A platform optimally adopts a threshold strategy of targeting
vi
sellers with lower costs to balance the competing externalities.
The third chapter studies intermediation in a buyer-seller network with sequential bargain-
ing. An intermediary matches traders connected in a network to bargain over the price
of heterogeneous goods and has the freedom to charge each side commission. A profit-
maximizing middleman can help eliminate trading delays but limits trade executed that are
not surplus maximizing. When the middleman competes with the buyers and sellers being
matched through an exogenous search process, she matches buyer and seller pairs that are
selected less often by the exogenous search process.
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PREFACE
The thesis is centered on pricing and matching in the two-sided marketplaces with inter-
mediaries. Chapter 1 focuses on school choice, an active research area that studies the
problem of how to assign students to public schools, which has led to application in major
cities in the US like New York, Chicago, San Francisco, etc. The effectiveness of school
choice mechanisms is a different issue in practice. As parents can ‘vote with their feet’,
housing markets and student assignment to public schools are all profoundly influenced by
introducing school choice mechanisms. The question on whether school choice is effective
in improving the student assignment in practice can be fundamental to the design of school
choice.
Chapter 2 &3 focuse on the decentralized two-sided markets with intermediaries, such as
e-commerce platforms, labor markets, search platforms, dating websites, advertisement ex-
change platforms where intermediaries can create values primarily by facilitating search
and matching between two or more distinct types of customers. These marketplaces focus
on a different design problem. To internalize the network externalities and the surpluses
from bilateral transactions, the intermediaries must choose the right prices and the right
matching in a two-sided network.
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CHAPTER 1 : Housing Choices, Sorting and the Distribution of Educational
Benefits under Deferred Acceptance
1.1. Introduction
In many U.S. school districts, students are assigned to schools within the neighborhood they
reside in. This is called neighborhood assignment. As the qualities of schools vary, this is
reflected in home prices. Black (1999), for example, finds that on average, households are
willing to pay an extra $3948 for a 5% increase in the average elementary school test score.
Since aﬄuent families can afford houses in more expensive locations with higher quality
schools and poorer families can not, critics of neighborhood assignment are concerned about
the inequitable distribution of access to high quality schools.
In response, there has been a move to delink student assignment from residential location
so that students have the opportunity to attend schools outside their neighborhoods. This
is called school choice and it is widely advocated as providing more equitable access to high
quality schools, especially for disadvantaged families. In this paper I examine the effect of
school choice on residential choices and the redistribution of educational benefits. I study
the impact not just within the community that adopts school choice but on neighboring
communities that don’t.
I model school choice as being implemented by one of the most widely adopted school
choice mechanisms: the student-proposing deferred acceptance. It assigns students to pub-
lic schools based on submitted preferences subject to neighborhood priorities. Student-
proposing deferred acceptance was introduced by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) and
has been adopted in Boston, Chicago, Denver, New York City (NYC), and Washington
DC. In practice, neighborhood priorities appear in various versions: home-address-based
choice lists,1 50-50 seat split (BPS), attendance zone priority (NYC) etc. I abstract away
1For instance, Boston Public Schools (BPS) gives priority to students who live within one mile of an
elementary school, within 1.5 miles of a middle school, and within two miles of a high school in attending
those schools.
1
from these specific forms and assume that neighborhood priority refers to resident students
enjoying higher priorities at their neighborhood schools than non-residents.
The model is inspired by Avery and Pathak (2015) which examines residential choices
when one of two towns switches from neighborhood assignment to school choice. Assuming
students care only about other students with whom they attend school (pure peer effect), all
schools and neighborhoods are identical under school choice. What underlies these results
in Avery and Pathak (2015) is the equalization of peer group qualities under school choice.
Unlike them I assume: school qualities are exogenously given, and students have preferences
for school quality. While peer effects in schooling are important, the recent literature has
found little evidence on the direct causal effects of average peer group qualities on students’
academic achievements (Greenwald et al., 1996; Burke and Sass, 2013; Lavy et al., 2009;
Imberman et al., 2009; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2014).2 Moreover, there is mounting empirical
evidence that schools and teachers have significant impact on student achievement (Rivkin
et al., 2005; Barrow and Rouse, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Jackson, 2010). Rivkin et al. (2005), for
example, demonstrate the causal effects of pure teacher qualities on student achievement in
primary schools in Texas and find significant and systematic differences between schools and
teachers in their abilities to raise student achievement. Schools have exogenous qualities
that influence parental decisions on which schools to select (Hoxby, 2003; MacLeod and
Urquiola, 2009; Hatfield et al., 2015; Barseghyan et al., 2014; McMillan, 2005) and this is
what motivates this paper.
Consider a town where each family has one child of school age that differs in student type.
The benefit of attending a school is supermodular in student type and school quality. One
can interpret the student type as the ability of the child or the wealth of the family or
a combination of the two. Households interested in enrolling in one of the town’s public
2 Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2014) for example, find evidence against the importance of peer effects and racial
composition in the education production function of the students from 6 public exam high schools in New
York and Boston. In particular, they develop an empirical analysis that embeds deferred acceptance, the
school choice mechanism of interest in this paper.
2
schools have to own a house in the town. In the student-proposing deferred acceptance,
students submit their preferences over schools to the central planner and are assigned to
one of the public schools subject to neighborhood priority. Students are not required to
attend a school in the town and they have a payoff from an outside option that is monotone
in student type. Those unassigned or unwilling to accept the assigned schools can also opt
for their outside option, which can include private or home schooling.
As a benchmark, consider a multi-district town that adopts deferred acceptance. Under
neighborhood assignment, with supermodular utility that provides incentives for Positive
Assortative Matching (PAM), households self-select themselves into quality-ranked neigh-
borhoods, while residents within each neighborhood share similar types. If the town adopts
deferred acceptance with neighborhood priority, its residential distribution differs dramati-
cally.
1. Deferred acceptance can generate a non-PAM residential pattern: students of higher
types do not necessarily live in better school districts.
2. There is greater heterogeneity in student type distribution within neighborhood: stu-
dent types within the same neighborhood are more diverse and spread out.
3. Deferred acceptance increases access to higher quality schools for students living in
lower-quality school districts.
Even if deferred acceptance admits neighborhood priority, the residential pattern can still
be non-PAM because of uncertainty about what schools children are assigned to under
deferred acceptance. A top-quality school district may have more residents than its school
capacity, thus students are rationed via neighborhood priorities and random lotteries. In
this case, some students may choose a lower quality district with less rationing. This paper
is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to characterize non-PAM in residential choices
under deferred acceptance with priority when students value school quality and the benefit
3
of attending a school is supermodular in student type and school quality.3
Next, unlike neighborhood assignment under which students living in the same neighbor-
hood share similar types (Hoxby, 2003; Calsamiglia et al., 2015), under deferred acceptance,
student types within the same neighborhood are more spread out and heterogeneous. In Ex-
ample 1.2.2, neighborhood T2 under deferred acceptance accommodates students of types
from both the lowest 20 percent quantile and the highest 20 percent quantile, whereas
students with ‘in-between’ types opt for a different neighborhood. It turns out that par-
ents’ risk attitudes lead to this residential pattern. If families share the same risk attitude
towards uncertainty about student assignment, those of similar types self-select into the
same neighborhood under deferred acceptance. Otherwise if their risk attitudes vary, the
heterogeneity in student type within neighborhoods arises.
What drive the non-PAM across neighborhoods and increasing heterogeneity within each
neighborhood under deferred acceptance are the conflicts between limited school capacity
and over-demanded high-quality schools, a key issue school choice mechanisms try to resolve.
In my model this conflict arises because the supply of housing is elastic but not school
capacity. While school capacity is elastic, it changes much more slowly than housing supply.
For example, in the Greater Center City area of Philadelphia, the population has increased
19% and over 20,000 housing units have been added since 2000. About half of the schools
exceed their rated capacity, and the remainder have seen double digit growth.4 Yet, the
most recent master plan of the Philadelphia School district (2011) has focused on reducing
school capacity!5 At least two reasons account for why school capacity fails to adjust
quickly enough to changes in enrollment: some districts are chronically underfunded; and
3Calsamiglia et al. (2015) show student assignment is non-PAM under school choice with no priorities, i.e.,
higher-type students are not necessarily assigned to better schools, yet student assignment and residential
choices are always PAM under school choice with priority in their paper.
4http://www.centercityphila.org/uploads/attachments/ciz8shha90i339eqdeyw4c63n-ccr17-
housing.pdf;
http://www.openinfophilly.com/blog-1/2016/2/1/center-city-schools-may-soon-collapse-due-
to-their-own-success
5http://thenotebook.org/sites/default/files/FMP_summary_of_recommendations.pdf
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many conduct capacity plans on a very long time scale.6
Even with limited school capacity, deferred acceptance still generates more equitable access
to better schools. I find that among districts that adopt deferred acceptance, living in a
lower quality school district provides a higher chance of attending a school better than its
neighborhood school. When the residential pattern is PAM, this implies that the lowest-
type students in the town can benefit the most from the highest opportunities of attending
a public school better than their neighborhood school.
The discussion above considers a situation where there is a switch to deferred acceptance
in a single town. In reality, a student can choose to live in a town that operates deferred
acceptance or neighborhood assignment. Consider two multi-district towns with public
schooling. One town adopts deferred acceptance with neighborhood priority while the other
still implements neighborhood assignment. As households’ preferences and risk attitudes
towards uncertainty may vary, they can ‘vote with their feet’ for one town over the other.
Results 1-3 under the one town model still hold for the town that adopts deferred acceptance.
In addition, deferred acceptance impacts the town implementing neighborhood assignment
in the following ways:
4. There is more heterogeneity in student type within neighborhoods that implements
neighborhood assignment.
5. For two towns implementing different assignment rules, everything equal (distribu-
tion of school qualities and school capacities), the town adopting deferred acceptance
attracts more residents than the one implementing neighborhood assignment.
6Consider Clarksville and surrounding Montgomery County which is one of the fastest growing regions
in the state of Tennessee. Under its twenty-year enrollment and capacity analysis, capacities of public
middle schools and high schools in most of the 5 zoning regions will see a one-time capacity adjustment for
the following 20 years. See https://www.cmcss.net/documents/operations/10yearplan.pdf for further
details
5
1.1.1. Previous Literature
My work builds on the inter-district student assignment models of Epple et al. (2001) and
Epple and Romano (2003) and is close to Avery and Pathak (2015). However it differs from
prior work in the following ways.
1. Exogenous school quality.
Avery and Pathak (2015), Calsamiglia et al. (2015) assume that the quality of a
school is purely a function of the students who attend it. Assuming students only
care about other students with whom they attend school (pure peer effect), all schools
are identical under school choice without residential priority. This paper studies the
polar opposite case with empirical evidence on the importance of exogenous school
qualities (Rivkin et al., 2005; Barrow and Rouse, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Jackson, 2010).
2. Priorities.
Unlike Epple and Romano (2003), Barseghyan et al. (2014), Avery and Pathak (2015),
I incorporate school priorities in the school choice mechanism. Without priority, all
districts are equalized and all households are indifferent to living in those districts (Ep-
ple and Romano, 2003; Avery and Pathak, 2015). As emphasized by Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez (2003), student assignment mechanisms should be flexible enough to give
students different priorities at different schools and neighborhood priority is among 7
factors that student assignment decisions should be based on, especially when a town
considers shifting from neighborhood assignment to deferred acceptance.
3. More general outside option.
Calsamiglia et al. (2015) model how the availability of a private school can alter the
outcome of school choice. They assume a private school with quality yp and price
of admission p is available after students get their assignment decisions under school
choice. In other papers, the outside option is modeled as being 0 (Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al., 2015), He et al. (2012), negative infinity (Pathak and Shi, 2013; Miralles, 2009;
6
Epple and Romano, 2003) or a set of schools of all possible qualities (Avery and
Pathak, 2015). I require only that the payoff from the outside option be monotone in
student type.
4. Elastic housing supply.
Calsamiglia et al. (2015) also have a model examining the effects of deferred acceptance
with capacity constraints and priorities in a three-district single town model, but the
supply of housing is inelastic, and equal to the inelastic school capacity in each district.
In my model, the supply of housing is elastic.
5. Costless choice.
Barseghyan et al. (2014) assume a cost of exercising choice if attending an inter-district
school and the benefit of attending a school is linear in student type and school quality
in a two-district model. This paper assumes that all students are perfectly mobile with
the cost of exercising choice being zero as in Avery and Pathak (2015), and increasing
marginal utility as in most of the school choice literature (Epple and Romano, 2003;
Avery and Pathak, 2015; Hoxby, 2003).
The second strand of literature related to this paper is empirical. Black (1999), Reback
(2005), Brunner et al. (2012) explore appreciation of home values by households and the
significant effects of switching to school choice on housing values and population density.
My work also demonstrates how access to good schools are rationed by home prices under
deferred acceptance with neighborhood priority.
The sorting effect across neighborhoods and schools have been tested in a number of papers
such as Epple and Sieg (1999), Epple et al. (2001), Rothstein (2006), Bayer et al. (2007).
They find strong sorting effects in student type across neighborhoods. Calsamiglia et al.
(2015) define the concept of partial sorting where the distribution of student types in one
school first-order stochastically dominates that in another. In their model the partial sorting
appears in the school composition instead of residential choices. My paper focuses on the
7
households’ differentiation in their residential choices, and the ensuing diversity in school
composition as a consequence of residential priorities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the definition of equilibrium under
deferred acceptance with neighborhood priority and proves its existence. To characterize
equilibrium outcomes, I introduce the 2 examples that help distinguish deferred accep-
tance from neighborhood assignment. Section 3 describes the model where students choose
between one town adopting deferred acceptance and the other running neighborhood as-
signment. I formalize the analysis of PAM and heterogeneity within neighborhoods under
deferred acceptance in this section and also discuss on home prices and distribution of
educational benefits. Section 4 discusses the implications and extensions of this paper.
1.2. One Town Model
1.2.1. Setting
A town is divided into D districts. Each district has one school that offers tuition-free
education. A unit mass of households each with one school-aged child are interested in
public schools in the town. Households are distinguished by a one-dimensional type x,
which could be interpreted either as wealth of the family or ability of their child or some
combination of the two. µ is the non-atomic measure of types with support X = [x, x¯].
µ(X) = 1. Assume a unitary actor for each household, so I can refer interchangeably to
households and students as decision makers.
Each student applying to the public schools must own a house in the town. Suppose the
housing price in district d is pd. A student of type x living in district d and enrolled in a
school of quality y, receives a utility of,
u(x, y, pd) = v(x, y)− pd.
For a child of type x who does not get a seat under school choice, an outside option is
8
available with payoff denoted by pi : X → R. One can interpret pi(x) as the outside option
for type x if she attends a private school or home education. Assume that pi(x) is continuous
and non-decreasing in type x.
The following are some major assumptions that hold throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 (A1) The school in district d is of quality yd. Then school qualities are
strictly ordered: y1 < y2 < . . . < yD.
Assumption 2 (A2) v(x, y) is twice differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments
and ∂
2v
∂x∂y > 0 for all (x, y) ∈ X × [y1, yD].
(A1) assumes that schools have exogenously given qualities. (A2) requires that the utility is
supermodular in student type x and school quality y so that households with higher types
are willing to pay more for an increase in school quality.
Assume that the school capacity in district d is kd.
Housing supply is derived from profit maximization by price-taking builders, who choose
the optimal density of labor, construction cost, and quantity of houses built, subject to
certain constraints. In particular, this paper assumes the following specific form for the
elastic housing supply,
HA(ld, p) = ldp
r,
as in Epple et al. (2001), Calabrese et al. (2011), Epple and Zelenitz (1981).7 Here ld is the
land capacity of district d, p is the home price in district d, r > 0 is the price elasticity of
supply. Here I make the assumption that building densities or the persons per square mile
for school constructions are proportional to that of residential housing, therefore the land
capacity for public schools is proportional to the land use for residential constructions,8 i.e.,
ld = αkd for some α > 0.
7For example, Epple et al. (2001) assume for price-taking firms, the optimum of maximizing a constant
return-to-scale production function without local constraints is H(lj , pj , tj) = lj(
pj
1+tj
)r with tj the tax rate.
8See http://www.devon.gov.uk/education-section-106-policy-jan-2013.pdf for how land acquisi-
tion is determined for school construction.
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Denote by the tuple (y,k, µ) the economy for the one town model.
1.2.2. Deferred Acceptance Equilibrium
The timing of the model is described below.
Stage 1 Households as price takers, first choose which district to live in.
Stage 2 Students submit preferences over schools. Each school ranks its all applicants
by priority: residents from the district where the school is located are ranked higher
than applicants outside the district. Within each priority class, break ties at random.9
Apply deferred acceptance to assigning students to schools.
We implement school choice as deferred acceptance first introduced by Gale and Shapley
(1962). Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) describe the mechanism with students proposing
to schools as follows,
Step 1 Each student proposes to her first choice. Each school tentatively assigns its seats
to its proposers one at a time following their priority order. Any remaining proposers
are rejected.
Step k Each student rejected in the previous step proposes to her next favorite choice. Each
school considers the students it has been holding together with its new proposers and
tentatively assigns its seats to these students following their priority order. Remaining
proposers are rejected.
School priority in this paper follows Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003): resident students
share the same higher priority of admission to their neighborhood school, while non-resident
students share the same lower priority of admission. A student’s expected utility is therefore
9In previous papers, the coarse priority with tie breaking is implemented as follows. For each x, denote
by lx = (lx1 , l
x
2 , . . . , l
x
D) the scores for type x at all D schools. l
x ∈ [0, 1]D is i.i.d. drawn from a distribution
F for each x. Each school d ranks students by exd = l
x
d +1hd(x)=1: the higher e
x
d is, the higher the priority is.
Here hd(x) = 1 if and only if type x lives in district d. Obviously, resident students from the district enjoy
higher priorities than non-residents. The two most common tie-breaking rules are single tie-breaking (STB)
and multiple tie-breaking (MTB). My results do not depend on which one of STB and MTB is implemented.
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determined by: (1) housing prices, (2) her residential choice and submitted preference over
schools and (3) others’ residential choices and submitted preference profile. We use subgame
perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. Then deferred acceptance ensures the following.
Lemma 1.2.1. In the subgame of Stage 2, truth-telling is a dominant strategy for any
student.
From now on, we assume every applicant reports truthfully in the second stage and restrict
attention to their residential strategies only.
Let h be the mapping from student type x to her choice of districts. Each entry hd(x) is
equal to the probability that a student of type x assigns to living in district d. Given h the
residential strategies of all households, the demand for houses in district d is,
m(hd) =
∫
hd(x)dµ.
Let U(x, ed; p,h) be the expected payoff of a student of type x living in district d given
prices p and the residential choices of others h. Here ed is the vector with a 1 in the dth
coordinator and 0’s elsewhere. Then,
U(x, ed; p,h) =
∑
s≥jx
Pr(s|d,h)v(x, ys) +
(
1−
∑
s≥jx
Pr(s|d,h))pi(x)− pd,
where Pr(s|d,h) is the probability of being assigned to school s conditional on living in
district d and the strategy profile h. If v(x, yD) ≥ pi(x), denote by
jx = min{1 ≤ j ≤ D : v(x, yj) ≥ pi(x)},
the least favorite school that is acceptable to type x compared to her outside option. Oth-
erwise, let jx = D + 1. Then 1 −
∑
s≥jx Pr(s|d,h) is the probability of opting out (being
unassigned by the mechanism or unwilling to attend due to more attractive outside op-
tions). Under truthful reporting, Pr(s|d,h) can be determined explicitly by h (See A.2.2
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for detailed expression).
When a student of type x plays mixed strategy φ, her expected payoff is,
U(x, φ; p,h) =
∑
d
φd · U(x, ed; p,h).
Then the deferred acceptance equilibrium is defined as follows,
Definition 1. Given (y,k, µ), a deferred acceptance equilibrium in a town of D dis-
tricts is (p,h), where p is the vector of home prices in all districts and h is the mapping
from student types to residential strategies such that,
1. for each student of type x ∈ X,
U(x,h(x); p,h) = max
1≤d≤D
U(x, ed; p,h),
2. housing supply should match demand in each district,
HA(ld, pd) = m(hd).
Condition (1) is the incentive compatibility constraint: each household is maximizing ex-
pected utility when deciding where to live. Condition (2) is the housing market clearing
condition for each district. Based on Schmeidler (1973), I show the existence of a pure
residential strategy equilibrium.
Theorem 1.2.2. For each (y,k, µ), there always exists a pure strategy deferred acceptance
equilibrium that admits truth-telling in the second stage.
To capture the idea of what a deferred acceptance equilibrium looks like, one must under-
stand first how home prices are affected by deferred acceptance.
Proposition 1.2.3. In any deferred acceptance equilibrium (p,h), housing prices ascend
with school quality, i.e., p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pD−1 ≤ pD.
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It is interesting to note that, under elastic housing supply, Proposition 1.2.3 does not imply
that better school districts have larger housing supply, since the housing supply is also
restricted by its limited land capacity, specially in those richest ones (partly due to restricted
building density).
The ensuing question is whether h, the households’ residential choices, are monotone in x,
i.e., the higher the student type is, the better school district she lives in. In neighborhood
assignment, supermodularity in student’s payoff often implies monotone residential choices
and perfect stratification across neighborhoods. Under deferred acceptance with rationing,
supermodularity can be offset by uncertainty about the student assignment outcomes, there-
fore non-monotonicity may arise. Below is an example illustrating this difference between
deferred acceptance and neighborhood assignment.
Example 1.2.1. There are 3 school districts with qualities y1 = 0.4, y2 = 2.5y1, y3 =
13.192101y1. School capacities are k1 = 0.6399921, k2 = 0.2842510, k3 = 0.07575686. Hous-
ing prices are p1 = 0.1, p2 = 1, p3 = 3.06. The elastic housing supply is H(kd, pd) = kdp
2
d.
Student types are uniformly distributed on [0, 0.5] with unit mass. The benefit of attending
schools is v(x, y) = (x + y)2 + 4. Assume all public schools are acceptable. Below is a
deferred acceptance equilibrium.
0 x1 x2 0.5
T1 T3 T2
h(x):
Figure 1: Example of Non-monotone Residential Pattern
In the equilibrium, students of type [0, x1] live in district 1, while [x1, x2] live in district
3, and students of the highest types live in district 2 as shown in Figure 1, where x1 =
0.0032, x2 = 0.3579. The numbers of residents in each district are m(h1) = 0.01k1, m(h2) =
13
k2, m(h3) = 9.3636k3 with equilibrium payoffs,
U(x, e3; p,h) =
1
9.3636
(x+ y3)
2 + (1− 1
9.3636
)(x+ y1)
2 + 4− 3.06,
U(x, e2; p,h) = (x+ y2)
2 + 4− 1,
U(x, e1; p,h) = (x+ y1)
2 + 4− 0.1.
Figure 2: U(x, e3; p,h) − U(x, e2; p,h) for
the non-PAM matching example
Figure 3: U(x, e2; p,h) − U(x, e1; p,h) for
the non-PAM matching example
Figure 4: U(x, e3; p,h) − U(x, e1; p,h) for
the non-PAM matching example
Figure 5: U(x, ei; p,h) for x ∈ [0, 0.06], i =
1, 2, 3 for the non-PAM matching example
Figures 2, 3, 4 show how residential preferences change as student types vary and Figure 5
zooms in the equilibrium payoffs near x1. For example in Figure 2, ∆U(x) = U(x, e3; p,h)−
U(x, e2; p,h) is decreasing in student type x. When x < 0.3579,∆U(x) > 0 implies students
of type x receive higher payoff living in district 3. As x grows, living in district 2 generates
higher utility for higher types.
Obviously, living in district 3 is risky: with probability 1 − 19.3636 residents may end up in
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the worst school in the town. Yet the marginal benefit of taking the risky option is not
large enough, therefore students of highest type would rather opt for neighborhood 2 with
less rationing. On the other side, Students of type x ∈ [x1, x2] benefit from the high school
quality y3 the most thus they are willing to pay more.
In Example 1.2.1, high-risk school district 3 can drive away high-type households unwilling
to bear the risk of being unassigned to its neighborhood school. Suppose however that
v(x, y) = x2 +y2 + 4 + 100xy, one could verify that the non-monotonicity result in Example
1.2.1 no longer holds. The underlying difference between the two payoff functions is the
stronger supermodularity condition in the last term xy which offsets parents’ risk aversion to
living in an over-subscribed school district with good neighborhood school. The following
Proposition 1.2.4 extends this idea of stronger supermodualiry condition under deferred
acceptance. First let ∂+ be the operator of right derivative with respect to x.
Condition 1. ∂+(max{v(x, yd)− pi(x), 0}) ≥ 0 for all d.
Condition 1 implies that, if a student of type x prefers the school in district d to her outside
option, then so does any student with higher type x′ > x. In other words, the set of
acceptable schools grows larger as type increases. In previous literature, (i) pi(x) = 0, (ii)
pi(x) = −M for M sufficiently large, (iii) pi(x) = v(x, x) in Avery and Pathak (2015), and
(iv) pi(x) = u(x− pd) + h(x, yp) for private schools with p the price of admission and yp the
school quality in Calsamiglia et al. (2015) under their Assumption 1, are all examples of
Condition 1.
Denote by Td = {x : hd(x) = 1} the set of student types that live in district d given a pure
strategy deferred acceptance equilibrium.
Proposition 1.2.4. Assuming Condition 1, if for all x, d,
kd · ∂v
∂x
(x, yd) ≥ ∂v
∂x
(x, yd−1), (1.1)
15
then for each deferred acceptance equilibrium, there exists d∗ ≥ 1 and xd∗ ≤ xd∗+1 ≤ . . . ≤
xD, s.t.,
1. for all d ≥ d∗ + 1, Td = [xd−1, xd],
2. for all d ≤ d∗, Td ⊆ [x, xd∗ ], and pd = min{pj : 1 ≤ j ≤ D}.
Proposition 1.2.4 is a relaxed Positive Assortative Matching (PAM) result under deferred
acceptance with the presence of outside options. There are three ways of interpreting the
inequality (1.1): (a) when capacities kd in high-quality schools are large enough, top quality
schools have enough capacities to accommodate all their resident students. (b) For all x, d,
∂2v
∂x∂y (x, yd) ≥ M for some M large enough, that is if student type and school quality are
strong welfare complements, households increasingly prefer higher quality district regardless
of how small the chances of admission are. (c) School qualities are more spread out: yd 
yd−1. All these imply under deferred acceptance, higher-type students will choose better
quality school districts.
The following captures another residential pattern appeared in previous papers (Hoxby,
2003; Epple and Romano, 2003; Avery and Pathak, 2015; Calsamiglia et al., 2015). In these
papers, neighborhoods are a stratified partition of the student type space where different
intervals represent distinct neighborhoods.
Definition 2. (Connectedness) Neighborhood Td is connected in type if it is a single
interval. A town is connected if all its neighborhoods are connected.
In a connected town, neighborhoods are partitions of student type space where each interval
corresponds to a distinct neighborhood and only households of similar types live in the
same neighborhood. On the other hand, if a neighborhood is disconnected, student types
are more heterogeneous and spread out within the neighborhood. Example 1.2.2 illustrates
a disconnected neighborhood in a deferred acceptance equilibrium.
Example 1.2.2. (Disconnected Equilibrium) There are 3 school districts. y1 = 0.4,
y2 = 2y1, y3 = 3y1. School capacities are k1 = 0.452, k2 = 0.3255, k3 = 0.2225. Housing
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prices are p1 = 0.2926, p2 = 1, p3 = 1.6903. The elastic housing supply is H(kd, pd) = kdp
2
d.
Student types are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], with benefit of attending schools v(x, y) =
(8xy + y2)2 + 5. Assume that all schools are acceptable to any student. Below is a deferred
acceptance equilibrium.
0 x1 x2 x3 1
T1 T2 T3 T2
h(x):
Figure 6: Example of a Disconnected Neighborhood T2
Here x1 = 0.0387, x2 = 0.2071, x3 = 0.8431. In equilibrium, households of types [0, x1]
live in district 1, while [x1, x2] ∪ [x3, 1] live in district 2, and [x2, x3] live in district 3.
The numbers of residents in each district are respectively, m(h1) = 0.0856k1,m(h2) =
k2,m(h3) = 2.8571k3. In this example, district 2 is disconnected.
Figure 7: U(x, e3; p,h) − U(x, e2; p,h) for
the disconnected neighborhood example
Figure 8: U(x, e3; p,h) − U(x, e1; p,h) for
the disconnected neighborhood example
Figure 9: U(x, e2; p,h) − U(x, e1; p,h) for
the disconnected neighborhood example
Figure 10: U(x, ei; p,h) for x ∈ [0, 0.1] for
the disconnected neighborhood example
Figures 7, 8, 9 indicate how residential preferences change as types vary and Figure 10 zooms
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in details on equilibrium payoffs near x1. The reason for neighborhood 2 being disconnected
is shown in Figure 7. The lowest-type students prefer district 2 to 3 because of lower price.
As student types increase, risk-seeking households increasingly favor district 3 because of
supermodularity in student type and high school quality. However, as district 3 is indeed a
risky option for the highest-type students compared to the safer choice of district 2, those of
the highest types eventually choose to reside in district 2 with a guarantee to enroll in its
neighborhood school.
Notice that neighborhood T2 has widely dispersed student type distribution: half of its
student types lie below the lower 20% quantile, while the other half fall in the top 20%
quantile. Figure 7 in Example 1.2.2 captures how households make tradeoff between less
risky and lower-cost option (T2) and the risky option with higher marginal benefit from
better schools (T3), and how their residential choices vary because of that. In the next
section I will point out how heterogeneity in parents’ risk attitudes in this example leads to
disconnectedness.
1.3. Two Town Model
The one-town model paves the way for a two-town model where one town adopts deferred
acceptance and the other still runs neighborhood assignment. In the two-town model,
the outside options of one town consist of exogenous options with payoff pi(x)10 and the
other town that adopts a distinct student assignment rule. Parents can choose which town
and which assignment rule they prefer. How will they decide between school choice and
neighborhood assignment in equilibrium? Who benefits from school choice? To answer
these questions, one must understand how housing prices in both towns will be affected by
introducing school choice.
10This allows for opting out from schools in both towns when outside options are more attractive than
existing public schooling. It could be that private schools spring up when capacity is constrained.
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1.3.1. Setup
The model is similar to Avery and Pathak (2015) with major differences. Two towns A and
B each has D districts, with one public school in each district. Town A adopts deferred
acceptance while town B adopts neighborhood assignment to assign students. District d in
town t is denoted as dt, d = 1, 2, . . . , D, t = A,B. And the school in district d has exogenous
given quality yd and capacity kdt . Assume that kdt ≥ 0 and y1 < y2 < . . . < yD.11
Student of type x with partisanship for town t is denoted by xt. Partisanship denotes
households’ special (geographic) preferences to living in the town. Households with such
special preferences are ‘partisans’ of the town. The distribution of all partisans of town
t is given by a non-atomic measure µt (t = A,B) with compact support on Xt = [x, x¯].
Normalize the total mass of all partisans from both towns to be one.
As in the one town case, if a student of type x and a partisan to town t, pays the home
price pdt′ of district dt′ and enrolls in a school in down t
′ of quality y, she receives a utility
of,
u(xt, y, pdt′ ) = v(x, y) + θ · 1t=t′ − pdt′ .
If the student chooses to live in the town she prefers as a partisan, she receives a bonus
benefit of θ. The larger θ is, the more favorable it is, other things equal, to live in the town
one is a partisan of.
If a student is unassigned by the school choice mechanism, she can certainly opt for outside
options. Let pi : [x, x]→ R be the utility of her outside options.12 Assume pi(x) is continuous
and non-decreasing in type x.
11Instead of assigning ydt to each district dt, I assume that ydA = ydB = yd. Otherwise, if there is a unique
quality ydt , one could add a dummy school in the other town t
′ with the same quality ydt and 0 capacity.
12 One could also assume pit(x) the payoff of outside option that depends on town t, which does not alter
the main results of this paper.
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Similar to the one town case, the housing supply under deferred acceptance is
HA(ldA , pdA) = ldAp
r
dA
.
For town B that implements neighborhood assignment, I assume that housing supply is
in addition, subject to a local (zoning) constraint to ensure that all resident students are
guaranteed seats in their neighborhood schools,
HB(ldB , pdB ) = min{kdB , ldprdB}.
See previous literature for similar zoning constraints.13 Moreover, the main results in this
section on sorting do not depend on the housing supply functional assumption in town B as
long as it guarantees that in each neighborhood, enough slots in its neighborhood school are
reserved for the resident students. Similarly, assume that the school capacity is proportional
to the land capacity ldt = αkdt for some α > 0.
Denote the economy by (y,k, µA, µB). The timing of the two-town model is similar to the
one-town model.
Stage 1 Given housing prices, households simultaneously choose which town and which
district to live in.
Stage 2 (Town A running deferred acceptance) Students submit preferences over schools in
town A. Each school ranks all applicants by priority: residents from the district where
the school is located are ranked higher than applicants outside the district. Within
each priority class, break ties at random.14 Apply deferred acceptance to assigning
students to all schools.
13 Avery and Pathak (2015), Calsamiglia et al. (2015) model housing supply the same as school capacity
kd. Fischel (1999) explains the relationship between housing supply and local municipal constraints. In
Bunten (2015), firms maximize profits at each location subject to a local zoning constraint that restricts the
number of houses produced complying to local amenities, i.e., min{kd, H(l, p, t)} with kd the local zoning
constraints and H(l, p, t) the production function for a profit maximizer.
14 Same tie-breaking rule as in the one-town model.
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(Town B running neighborhood assignment) Assign applicants to their neighbor-
hood schools.
Applying Lemma 1.2.1 to the two-town case, one could assume that truth-telling is a Nash
equilibrium in the subgame of Stage 2.
Let h map a partisan of town t with type x to her mixed strategy h(xt) ∈ R2D. Entry
hdt′ (xt) is the probability that she assigns to living in district d in town t
′. Given h the
residential choices of all households, the housing demand in district dt is,
m(hdt) =
∫
hdt(xA)dµA +
∫
hdt(xB)dµB.
Denote by U(xt, edt′ ; p,h) the expected payoff for a student of type x with partisanship of
town t to live in district dt′ , where edt′ is the 2D-dimensional vector with a 1 in the dt′th
coordinator and 0’s elsewhere. Then,
U(xt, edA ; p,h) =
∑
s≥jx
Pr(s|dA,h)v(x, ys) +
(
1−
∑
s≥jx
Pr(s|dA,h)
)
pi(x) + θ · 1t=A − pdA ,
where Pr(s|dA,h) is the probability of being assigned to school s in town A conditional
on living in district dA. 1−
∑
s≥jx Pr(s|dA,h) is the probability of opting out (unassigned
under school choice or unwilling to attend the assigned school). jx is the same as in the
one-town model.
Student xt applies to her neighborhood school in town B if and only if attending her
neighborhood school yields higher benefit than her outside option, i.e.,
U(xt, edB ; p,h) = max{v(x, yd), pi(x)}+ θ · 1t=B − pdB .
If student xt plays mixed residential strategy φ and submits truthful preference in the school
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choice process, her expected payoff is,
U(xt, φ; p,h) =
∑
dt′
φdt′ (xt) · U(xt, edt′ ; p,h).
Definition 3. A two-town school choice equilibrium consists of (p,h), where p is the
vector of housing prices of all district dt, h is the mapping from student type and partisanship
to her residential strategy, such that,
(1) for each student of type xt,
U(xt,h(xt); p,h) = max
dt′
U(xt, edt′ ; p,h),
(2) housing supply should match demand in each district,
m(hdt) = H
t(ldt , pdt), for all dt.
Condition (1) is the incentive compatibility constraint. In the two town model, the outside
options of each town include: the exogenous option pi(x) and the endogenous option of
living in the other town implementing a different student assignment rule. Condition (2) is
the housing market clearing condition.
Theorem 1.3.1. For any (y,k, µA, µB), there exists a pure strategy two-town school choice
equilibrium that admits truth-telling.
1.3.2. Residential Pattern under School Choice
Now we only focus on pure strategy two-town school choice equilibria that admit truth-
telling. Let Td = {xt ∈ XA ∪XB|hdT (xt) = 1} the set of households that live in district dT
in the two-town school choice equilibrium with strategy profile h.
To understand how households redistribute themselves in equilibrium, one must understand
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equilibrium home prices in both towns.
Proposition 1.3.2. (Home Prices) In any two-town school choice equilibrium, housing
prices in each town increase in school quality, i.e. for t = A,B, p1t ≤ p2t ≤ . . . ≤ pDt .
The following definition of positive assortative matching (PAM) extends the sorting results
in Proposition 1.2.4 to a two-town case.
Definition 4. (PAM) Given town T, let d˜ = max{d : pdT = p1T }. Then town T is PAM
in residential pattern if the following two conditions hold,
1. For d1 > d2 > d˜, x
′
t′ ∈ Td1 , xt ∈ Td2 ⇒ x′ ≥ x.
2. For d1 > d˜ ≥ d2, x′t′ ∈ Td1 , xt ∈ Td2 ⇒ x′ ≥ x.
Definition 4 implies that students of higher types live in more expensive neighborhoods.
In particular, student type space can be partitioned into 2 groups: one subset corresponds
to those of lowest types that live in the cheapest school districts Td where d ≤ d˜, and a
subset of higher-type households in Td where d > d˜ that match assortatively with districts
of increasing school qualities. This is a generalization of PAM between student types and
school districts in the presence of outside options. Moreover, the monotonicity of residential
choices does not depend on partisanship (t is not necessarily equal to t′ in the statement of
the definition).
Proposition 1.3.3. Assuming Condition 1, town B is PAM in any two-town school choice
equilibrium. Moreover, if for any x, d,
kdA ·
∂v
∂x
(x, yd) >
∂v
∂x
(x, yd−1),
then town A is also PAM in any two-town school choice equilibrium.
Notice that PAM may not hold in general (see Example 1.2.1, 1.2.2 from the previous
section) except for some strong complementarity condition such as those in Proposition
1.3.3. In non-PAM equilibria, neighborhoods are less stratified by student type. Medium-
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type students opt for a top quality school district while the highest types choose a medium-
quality school district. As a consequence of neighborhood priority, the composition of
student body at each school is less stratified as well.
The following is the second characterization of the residential patterns after adopting school
choice, analogous to Definition 2 in the one-town case.
Definition 5. (Connected Neighborhood) Given (p,h) a pure strategy two-town school
choice equilibrium, neighborhood Td is connected if each of Td
⋂
XA, Td
⋂
XB is a single
interval. A town t is connected if all its neighborhoods are connected.
The definition of connected neighborhoods attempts to capture the homogeneity of a neigh-
borhood: students of similar types live in the same neighborhood. Notice that in any
equilibrium, the set of non-partisan student types x who live in Td is a subset of its parti-
san student types in Td. Therefore, the partisans and non-partisans who live in the same
neighborhood must share similar types in a connected neighborhood based on Definition 5.
The connectedness property is a major difference distinguishing deferred acceptance from
neighborhood assignment. Unlike neighborhood assignment where seats are guaranteed
to resident students, students are subject to randomized assignments under school choice.
Therefore, attitude towards risk and uncertainty about student assignment matters. The
following proposition shows that if students share the same risk attitudes, neighborhoods
are always connected under school choice.
Proposition 1.3.4. If households’ preferences satisfy,
(i) there exists some g(x), c(x), q(y) ≥ 0,s.t. v(x, y) = g(x)q(y) + c(x).
(ii) pi(x) = Ev(x, Y ), for some random variable Y,
then in any two-town school choice equilibrium (p,h), U(xt, ed′
t′
; p,h)−U(xt, ed′′
t′′
; p,h), the
difference in equlibrium payoffs between any pair of residential choices d′t′ and d
′′
t′′, crosses
each type space Xt at most once.
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Condition (i) in Proposition 1.3.4 is equivalent to the fact that the Arrow-Pratt measure of
absolute risk aversion r(x, y) =
− ∂2v
∂y2
(x,y)
∂v
∂y
(x,y)
= r(y) is constant in x, i.e., all households share
the same absolute risk aversion. Cobb-Douglas utility function in Epple and Romano (2003)
is an example of condition (i). Condition (ii) implies that students also share the same jx = j
for all xt, that is, their least acceptable local school is the same, which also implies that
their risk aversion to being unassigned by the school choice mechanism is the same. Under
those assumptions, Proposition 1.3.4 states that U(xt, edt ; p,h) satisfies a single crossing
condition, which ensures that all neighborhoods to be connected except for some indifferent
cases where two districts generate identical expected payoffs for all households.
Suppose however that households are increasingly absolute risk averse towards uncertainty
about student assignment, the following result guarantees that town A is connected in any
two-town school choice equilibrium.
Denote by CE(x, P ) : X ×∆2D−1 → R the certainty equivalent of any random variable Y
with CDF P , i.e., v(x,CE(x, P )) = EP [v(x, Y )].
Proposition 1.3.5. Assuming Condition 1, if θ > 0, and
(i) kdA
∂v
∂x(x, yd) >
∂v
∂x(x, yd−1) for all d,
(ii) ∂
2v
∂y2
< 0, ∂
3v
∂x2∂y
< 0, and certainty equivalent CE(x, P ) is a decreasing and concave
function of x for all P ,
then in any two-town school choice equilibrium, all neighborhoods in town A are connected
except for those with the lowest home price in town A. When θ = 0, Condition 1 and (i)-(ii)
guarantee that all neighborhoods in town A are connected except for those with the lowest
price, and neighborhood d for which pdB = pdA.
Proposition 1.3.5 investigates the case where households are increasingly absolute risk
averse. Condition 1 states that the set of acceptable schools is expanding as student type
increases, which suggests that students of higher types are increasingly risk averse to being
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unassigned. Condition (i) can be interpreted as strong complements of student type and
school quality or widely dispersed school qualities in town A, thus students of higher types
are more risk averse to be assigned to schools of low qualities.
Condition (ii) eliminates the scenario where two extreme types prefer risky options in town
A, but the ‘in-between’ types favor safer choices in town B, thus implying connectedness
in town A. Consider some risky option in town A implementing deferred acceptance with
an attractive school quality equivalent CE(x, P ). Non-increasing CE(x, P ) implies that for
students with higher types, the school quality equivalent becomes less attractive. Moreover,
∂
∂x [
∂2
∂x∂yv(x, y)] ≤ 0 suggests that the supermodularity between student type and school
quality is diminishing. Under these assumptions, switching to a riskier choice with higher
CE(x, P ) which is monotone decreasing in x generates decreasing surplus for higher types.
Therefore, if some student type gains higher payoffs from the safer choice under neighbor-
hood assignment in town B than from some risky option under deferred acceptance in town,
so does anyone with higher student type. The concavity of certainty equivalent CE implies
convexity of absolute risk aversion (Gollier and Pratt, 1996), an indicator of how their risk
aversion varies as student type increases.
One class of utility functions satisfying conditions in Proposition 1.3.5 is v(x, y) = w(y+xy)
where,
(i) w′(z) > 0, w′′(z) < 0,
(ii) w′(z) + zw′′(z) > κ,
(iii) w′′′(z) ≤ (zw′′(z)−w′(z))w′′(z)zw′(z) .
For example, w(z) = z
1−η−1
1−η for some η < 1 satisfies conditions (i)-(iii). This utility
functional is derived from McElroy (2007).15
15Let MU (x) = U
−1[EU(z˜1 + xz˜2)] for all discrete-valued random variables z˜1 and z˜2 where z˜1 is non-
negative. When U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0, MU (x) is concave for all z˜1 and z˜2 if and only if U ′/U ′′ is convex. Here
we take z˜1 = z˜2 = Y .
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Suppose households are increasingly risk seeking.
Condition 2 ∂+(max{pi(x)− v(x, yd), 0}) ≥ 0 for all d.
Condition 2 implies the following preference structure: if a student of type x prefers her
outside option to the school in district d, so does any student with higher type x′ > x. In
other words, the set of acceptable schools is narrowing down as type increases. Notice that
Condition 2 is the opposite of Condition 1. Then Proposition 1.3.6 states that under risk
seeking environment, town B can be connected.
Proposition 1.3.6. Assuming Condition 2, if θ > 0, and
(i) ∂
2v
∂y2
> 0, ∂
3v
∂x2∂y
< 0 and certainty equivalent CE(x, P ) is an increasing and convex
function of x for all P ,
(ii) for each d, d
2
dx2
[pi(x)− v(x, yd)] ≥ 0 at x ∈ {x|pi(x) > v(x, yd)},
then in any two-town school choice equilibrium, all neighborhoods in town B are connected
except for those with the lowest home price. When θ = 0, Condition 2 and (i)-(ii) ensure all
neighborhoods in town B are connected except for those with the lowest price, and district
dB for which pdB = pdA.
For risk seeking households, one can interpret Condition 2 as students being increasingly
open to outside options. Condition (ii) in Proposition 1.3.6 on the convexity of the difference
pi(x)− v(x, yd) also implies that ‘risk seeking’ households are increasingly willing to opt for
outside options. A non-decreasing certainty equivalent CE(x, P ) implies that when switch-
ing to a potentially safer choices, the increment in school quality equivalent is decreasing
as student type increases, and so is the increment in expected payoff if ∂∂x [
∂2
∂x∂yv(x, y)] ≤ 0
holds. Hence for risk seeking households, conditions (i) and (ii) combined imply that risk
seeking households with higher types prefer riskier options from school choice assignment
in town A to deterministic yet less attractive options in town B.
Notice that in both cases ∂
3v
∂x2∂y
(x, y) ≤ 0, which suggests that although students increas-
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ingly favor higher quality schools ( ∂
2v
∂x∂y > 0), the supermodularity in student type and
school quality has negative impact on the local homogeneity within each neighborhood,
and restricting the growth of supermodularity (i.e., ∂
3v
∂x2∂y
(x, y) ≤ 0) can generate a more
locally ‘connected’ neighborhood. Notice that in Example 1.2.2 where T2 is disconnected,
this third-order condition fails.
To sum up, all neighborhoods are sorted not just by type but risk attitude. This paper
introduces the notion of disconnected neighborhood to characterize heterogeneity within
neighborhood, a major distinction from many previous papers that focus solely on cross-
neighborhood sorting and heterogeneity. When school choice and outside options are in-
troduced, districts in the town implementing neighborhood assignment may no longer be
connected. Recall that in Example 1.2.2, student types are more diversified and spread out
in a disconnected neighborhood. Moreover, the heterogeneity within each neighborhood
contributes to the heterogeneous student composition in each public school under deferred
acceptance as well as under neighborhood assignment implemented by the neighboring town,
a sorting effect not only across and within neighborhoods but across and within schools in
both towns.
1.3.3. Home Price and Distribution of Educational Benefits
The redistribution of residential patterns influences the redistribution of educational bene-
fits, in a good way.
Proposition 1.3.7. In the town that is implementing deferred acceptance, students living
in the lower-quality school district have higher opportunities of enrolling in schools better
than their neighborhood schools, i.e.,
∑
s>d Pr(s|d, h) are decreasing in d in any equilibrium.
∑
s>d Pr(s|d, h) is the probability of being admitted to a school better than their neighbor-
hood school by deferred acceptance. A similar assertion can be found in a field report by
the Chicago Tribune,16
16The report is available from http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-schools-choice-
neighborhood-enrollment-met-20160108-story.html
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. . . that belies a common assumption that poor kids in low-performing schools
are trapped in those schools. In fact, students who live within the boundaries of
the city’s worst schools have the highest rate of going elsewhere.
One could also prove that
∑
s≥d Pr(s|d, h) the probability of being admitted to a school
at least as good as her neighborhood schools is also decreasing in d. Indeed as advocated,
deferred acceptance provides more equitable opportunities for students living in the low-
quality school districts. When equilibrium is PAM, this implies more equitable opportunities
for low-type students since the probability of going to a school better than neighborhood
schools under neighborhood assignment is alway 0.
The following results aim to compare parental choices over the two towns and the two
assignment rules.
Proposition 1.3.8. (Home Prices) For any (y,k, µA, µB), housing prices in each town
ascend. Moreover, if θ = 0, there exists d∗, s.t. for all d > d∗, pdB ≥ pdA; pd∗B = pd∗A; and
for all d < d∗, pdB ≤ pdA.
Proposition 1.3.8 echoes Avery and Pathak (2015), who argue that introducing school choice
inflates the home prices of low-quality school districts, while deflates housing prices of high-
quality ones, thus producing incentives for types at both extremes to opt for neighborhood
assignment in town B. Nevertheless, unlike Avery and Pathak (2015) where the town im-
plementing school choice drives away low and high types and attracts only those with types
in between, in this paper, town A implementing deferred acceptance also attracts those of
low and high types, if not the very extreme ones, because of differentiated school qualities.
Next, suppose the two towns share the same school capacities and distribution of school
qualities, but adopt distinct student assignment rules, which town will the parents choose?
Proposition 1.3.9. Suppose kdA = kdB , θ = 0, that is everything equal except for distinct
assignment rules, then in any equilibrium (p,h), the numbers of residents satisfy,
m(hdA) ≥ m(hdB ), ∀d.
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To rephrase, under the same educational resources and economic environment, more house-
holds will ‘vote with their feet’ for deferred acceptance over neighborhood assignment not
just in total but in every single school district. 17
1.4. Discussion
1. Probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms.
This paper studies deferred acceptance with neighborhood priorities. We can also
apply Probabilistic Serial (PS) to student assignment with neighborhood priorities
(Che and Kojima, 2010). Since PS is strategy-proof in the large market (Azevedo
and Budish, 2013) and by the asymptotic equivalence between PS and RP (Che and
Kojima, 2010), we can apply similar argument to both RP and PS to analyze an
approximately truth-telling school choice equilibrium. For school priority, associate
PS (or RP) with {gc(t)}, where each gc : [0, 1]→ R is the eating speed of priority class
c. When gc(t) is uniform distributed, it is equivalent to PS with no residential priority;
for some specific gc(t), it is equivalent to deferred acceptance with neighborhood
priority.
2. Boston mechanism and deferred acceptance
Boston Mechanism is undeniably one of the most popular school choice mechanisms.
Calsamiglia et al. (2015) study a model of 3 school districts each has a neighborhood
school in a single town, with inelastic housing supplies equal to the school capacities.
They find that both Boston Mechanism and deferred acceptance yield the same unique
PAM equilibrium where student types are stratified into 3 groups and all students get
assigned to their neighborhood schools. The results are driven by the fact that there
are sufficient seats for resident students in every single neighborhood and no risk
of uncertainty about student assignment to bear. Results can differ when there is
potential gain from gaming the Boston Mechanism. However, Boston Mechanism is
17Proposition 1.3.9 does not imply that every school in town A is over-subscribed since not all schools in
town B are fully enrolled, which is often the case in many school districts that run neighborhood assignment.
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known not strategyproof in the large (Azevedo and Budish, 2017) which complicates
the analysis of parental reports of their preferences.
3. Combination of exogenous school quality and peer effects.
This paper considers the polar opposite case of exogenous school qualities. If students
value qualities as well as peer effects, school choice equilibrium can be imperfectly-
assortative matching as in my paper, or PAM depending on how much a student values
school quality relative to peer effects and how strong the supermodularity between
student type and school quality is. Some techniques in this paper such as proving
the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria can be adapted to the combination of
exogenous quality and peer effects, which is of future interest.
1.5. Conclusion
School choice is designed to offer more equitable access to high quality schools. As house-
holds value quality schools, I assume schools do have qualities that drive most of the results
in this paper. Compared to neighborhood assignment, deferred acceptance can provide
more equitable access to higher quality schools for low-type students.
This paper also finds how deferred acceptance reshapes neighborhoods in a PAM or a non-
PAM manner and a connected or a disconnected manner, due to households’ risk attitudes.
When equilibrium is non-PAM, there is less stratification across neighborhoods. When
neighborhoods are disconnected, student distribution within each neighborhood is more
diverse. Moreover, the heterogeneity in households’ preferences and risk aversion attitudes
redistribute the neighborhoods not just in the town that adopts deferred acceptance but
also the neighboring town that still implement neighborhood assignment.
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CHAPTER 2 : Price Dispersion in a Buyer-Seller Search Platform
2.1. Introduction
Many marketplaces, such as online platforms (eBay, Amazon), dating websites (eHar-
mony.com) and video game platforms (Nitendo) feature facilitating search and matching
for agents that would otherwise have difficulty finding each other. A common practice for
such platforms is to lower the cost of search and offer convenience in transactions to attract
as many subscribers as possible. This is driven by (positive) cross-group externalities in
multi-sided platforms, see Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006); Armstrong (2006): as the num-
ber of users on one side increases, users on the other side are more willing to join, thus
increasing the value of the platform.
However, many platforms limit participation due to two types of negative externalities: (1)
congestion effects that arise when sellers have limited capacity and users on the other side
must compete for a match partner, and (2) cross-side negative consumption externalities
such as browsers’ aversion to advertisements. Arnosti et al. (2015), for example, identify the
negative congestion externality in dating websites: while a male applicant feels he is more
likely to find an attractive match when more female candidates participating in the dating
website, he may be less likely to be accepted by his chosen match because females also have
a larger pool to choose from and profit from a higher premium. This congestion externality
incentivizes dating websites such as eHarmony.com to limit the set of candidate choices
while its customers are willing to pay a premium of 25%.1 To resolve negative consumption
externalities in advertising markets where the audience dislikes advertisements, Gomes and
Pavan (2016) show that intermediaries such as newspapers or TV stations limit participation
by matching subsets of advertisers with eyeballs.
Interestingly, limiting participation can be found in other marketplaces where both con-
gestion and cross-group negative consumption externalities are absent. One such case is a
1See Piskorski et al. (2008) for details on eHarmony.com .
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buyer-seller platform where each seller sets the prices according to its demand curve on the
platform. Dinerstein et al. (2014) investigated eBay’s redesign of limiting consideration sets
in 2011. Prior to the redesign, consumers entering a search query were shown a substantial
number of potential matches. The redesign of the search algorithm after 2011 directs buyers
to a specific match (for example, ”Space Grey iPhone 6 32GB (AT&T) ” instead of anything
relevant to ”iPhone”) and a smaller fraction of offers from low-priced and top-rated sellers.
While Dinerstein et al. (2014) estimate the effects of limiting choices on firms’ decreasing
retail prices, markup, and consumers’ browsing behavior, the reason for such a redesign is
unclear from the platform’s perspective.
The main question of the paper is the following: is it optimal for a buyer-seller search
platform to include as many buyers and sellers as possible? If not, is it better to strategically
limit choices and target participation to a smaller subset? To answer this question, one must
understand the nature of cross-group externalities in buyer-seller platforms, and that the
value of a platform not only results from the number of users but the mix of users available
on the platform.
Consider a two-sided market where buyers search for sellers directly or through a middleman
(i.e. platform). Firms with unlimited capacity decide on whether to join the platform and
set prices for both on-platform and off-platform transactions. Buyers decide whether to
subscribe to the platform and search for the optimal products through platform or directly.
Each search reveals the price and value of a firm’s product but at some cost to the buyer.
After each search, a buyer must decide whether to proceed with another search, or to stop
and purchase the best alternative observed so far, or switch to an off-platform transaction.
As a middleman who facilitates search, the platform lowers search costs for the buyers but
can charge both sides for the transactions it facilitates.
In the two-sided marketplace, absent congestion and negative consumption externalities,
this paper proposes a novel explanation for platforms to limit choices: to balance two com-
peting positive and negative cross-group externalities. Intuitively, attracting more sellers on
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the platform generates positive externalities (choice effect): buyers have more choices and
therefore, higher transaction values when the search cost is low on the platform. On the
other hand, increasing the number of subscribed sellers may impose negative externalities
on the buyers: search for low-priced and high-value sellers can be more difficult because of
the increased price dispersion, offsetting the positive externalities from having a variety of
sellers.
To formalize the idea of the negative externalities under price dispersion, I model firms as
selling horizontally differentiated goods and differing in their marginal costs, which produces
price dispersion similar to Reinganum (1979). The existence of search frictions explains
how retailers selling identical goods can enjoy positive mark-ups and why price dispersion
is ubiquitous even on online platforms.2 In the presence of price dispersion, firms with
heterogeneous marginal costs differ in the profits gained from subscribing to the platform.
I find that the optimal membership fees set by the platform satisfy a threshold structure:
only firms with marginal costs lower than a threshold are willing to join the platform.
Lowering the membership fee on the sellers’ side attracts sellers with higher posted prices,
subsequently making search for low-priced sellers less efficient. In this sense, a platform
acts as a price gatekeeper and decides on not only how many sellers but which sellers to
target, to maximize its profits.
The horizontal differentiation in buyers’ valuation for sellers, contributes to the positive
network externalities due to more sellers. In this setting where the search cost on the
platform is relatively low compared to searching directly, buyers search until they settle
on optimal alternatives using a reservation strategy introduced by Weitzman (1979); Kohn
and Shavell (1974). With horizontal differentiation for each seller’s product, there is an
incentive for buyers to search more frequently on the platform for high-value low-priced
sellers and for the platform to attract a larger variety of sellers.
2 Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) found that the variation across retailers selling books and CDs online
are significant, up to 30% of the average price. Baye et al. (2004) also found similarly large posted price
variation for consumer electronics in data obtained from a price search engine.
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The major contribution of the paper is to identify the coexistence of positive and negative
cross-group externalities due to the number of sellers subscribed, distinct from the linear
approximation of cross-group network externalities in the previous literature (Rochet and
Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006; Weyl, 2010). Moreover, I show that whether positive or
negative externalities dominate depends on the distribution of buyers’ valuation for sellers.
One could interpret the distribution of buyer’s valuation as related to the price elasticity of
demand. Under some conditions when the negative externalities from attracting additional
sellers always outweigh the choice benefit, the platform gains more profits targeting sellers
with lower marginal costs.
Another economic insight the paper offers, is the impact of lowering search costs on social
welfare. The search platform can promote efficiency in two ways. The first, which is
standard, is the lower costs of search for buyers to find satisfying deals. The second is that
when the search platform acts as a gatekeeper who restricts the set of sellers available on the
platform to those with low marginal costs, the surpluses from trades increase as demands
accrue to the firms with low production costs.
2.2. Literature Review
This paper studies the network externalities and pricing theory for a buyer-seller search
platform. As such it relates to three strands of literature: price theory of multi-sided
platforms, the theory of search and the ensuing price dispersion.
1. Pricing theory of multi-sided platform.
The model of search platforms belongs to a recent strand of two-sided markets with inter-
mediaries, pioneered by Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006); Armstrong (2006); Caillaud and
Jullien (2003); Weyl (2010). Assuming a linear approximation of network externalities and
exogenous valuation over the other side, Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006); Armstrong (2006)
derived a cross-subsidy pricing structure for platforms to attract as many users as possi-
ble and internalize the cross-group network effects. Weyl (2010) relaxed the assumptions
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of Rochet and Tirole (2006) and introduced a model of linear externalities but heteroge-
neous users. He derived platform’s imperfect internalization over heterogeneous agents in
two-sided markets. I study the coexistence of both positive and negative network effects:
buyers care about the variety of sellers; however, the price dispersion endogenized by the
size of the buyer-seller network on the platform can cause inefficient results of searching
and congestions. Gomes and Pavan (2016) studied a platform that match eyeballs with
advertisements, and intrinsic to the negative network effect in their paper is the negative
consumption externalities from eyeballs averse to too many ads. The paper closest to mine
is Wang and Wright (2016) which study a search platform with identical marginal cost
across all sellers. In this paper, the law of one price breaks down because of heterogenous
production costs.
2. Costly search and price dispersion.
This paper focuses on a particular type of platform that facilitates buyers’ search for best
products. While abundant papers have advanced the theory of price dispersion (Stigler,
1961; Reinganum, 1979), recent literature focuses on this topic in the context of e-commerce
and platforms where search cost is reduced (Bar-Isaac et al., 2012; Baye and Morgan, 2001;
Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Levin, 2011; Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012; Ellison and Ellison,
2018). Without the role of a platform, Bar-Isaac et al. (2012) studied the effect of reducing
search costs on product design and the ensuing price dispersion of firms. In Baye and
Morgan (2001), the platform can offer transparent information on low prices therefore the
cost of search is zero on the platform. Other papers focuses on platform’s techniques not
considered in this paper, such as search obfuscation (Ellison and Ellison, 2009), ordered
search engine. Rather I look into the pricing strategies of a platform and how the results
in pricing, price dispersion and efficiency differ from that of the benchmark case with no
intermediary. Finally, recent literature has drawn attention to a platform’s strategic play
of limiting choice to eliminate search friction, due to congestion and negative consumption
externalities in matching markets (Casadesus-Masanell and Ha laburda, 2014; Halaburda
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et al., 2017; Kanoria and Saban, 2017). Unlike them, this paper studies a buyer-seller search
platform where buyers have unit demand and sellers post prices, and negative consumption
externalities are negligible.
3. Search strategy for optimal alternative.
Starting with Stigler (1961); Weitzman (1979); Kohn and Shavell (1974); Rothschild (1978),
the theory of search has extended to a wide collection of problems such as sampling, switch
point, adaptive belief update etc. I model buyer-seller search as a Pandora model in Weitz-
man (1979), rather than to take at most n samples and then stop. Sequential search for
price quotes has been studied in Burdett and Judd (1983); Athey and Ellison (2011), es-
pecially when buyers can search more frequently and adaptively update their prior belief
about price distribution with low search cost. As an simplified extension, I consider the case
of non-adaptive beliefs endogenized by the price-setting firms subscribed to the platform.
2.3. Model
There is a continuum of buyers and sellers (firms) on each side with mass B and S. Each
firm j produces a horizontally differentiated product at a marginal cost of mj . For now I
assume the supply is unlimited. Suppose the marginal costs of all firms are i.i.d distributed
according to the cdf F with compact support [m,m] and pdf f . Each firm posts a sale price
for its product and can price discriminate by posting different prices for different transaction
channels.
A buyer visits each firm and decides whether or not to buy from the firm or keep looking.
Each buyer i has different values for products sold by different firms and the valuation vij
are i.i.d. distributed according to cdf G with compact support [v, v]3.
Consumer search. In the benchmark model without any intermediary, firms are ex ante
identical before buyers’ search and buyers share common belief over the value and price
3Bounded valuation is not necessary
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distribution of products sold in the marketplace. All participating buyers search sequentially
for firms and receive a price quote pj and value assessment vij each time she visits a firm
j, at a search cost of cD > 0. After each search she decides whether to proceed with search
or stop to trade with some firm she has visited so far. Assume there is no discounting on
values and consumers can perfectly recall prices they have observed as in opening Pandora’s
Box model in Weitzman (1979). If consumer i decides to purchase from firm j at a posted
price of pDj after k direct searches, she receives a utility of
vij − pDj − kcD,
i.e., the consumer surplus vij − pDj less the total search costs kcD.
A platform can facilitate search by lowering search cost to cD > cL > 0.
4 A buyer i not
subscribed to the platform can reach any seller directly with search cost cD, regardless of
whether the seller is available on the platform or not (that is, sellers can multi-home). For
buyer i subscribed to the platform, each time after sampling firm j on the platform and
observing vij and the posted price p
L
j for transaction through the platform, and p
D
j for an
off-platform transaction, the consumer has to decide whether to switch to an oﬄine purchase
and incurs a switching cost of wj . One can interpret wj as transportation costs that depends
on each individual seller. The flexibility of transactions with or without the platform reflects
the non-exclusiveness policy of the platform. If a subscribed buyer i searches k times on
the platform until she purchases from firm j, she enjoys a payoff,
Vb + vij −min{pLj , pDj + wj} − kcL − Pb,
where Vb is the fixed subscription benefit as in Weyl (2010), and Pb the membership fee set
by the platform. min{pLj , pDj + wj} is the transaction cost spent on firm j, and kcL is the
aggregate search costs on the platform.
4I do not assume cL = 0 since it is still reasonable to assume that consumers need to spend time and
some effort in investigating the quality and price of each products. For the case of cL = 0, refer to Baye and
Morgan (2001).
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Firms post prices. Any firm j not on the platform can still trade with any buyer who reach
them directly at the posted price pDj for off-line transactions. The firm’s profit from all off-
line transactions is (pDj −mj)XDj with XDj being the total demand for off-line transactions.
On the other hand, any seller j available on the platform can accept transactions both on
and off the platform at different posted prices: pDj for off-line transactions and p
L
j for on-line
transaction. A seller j with numbers of transactions XDj off the platform and X
L
j on the
platform, enjoys a profit of
Vs + (p
L
j −mj)XLj + (pDj −mj)XDj − Ps,
where Vb is the fixed subscription benefit as in Weyl (2010) and Ps is the membership fee
charged by the platform if the firm decides to register.
Platform. A platform facilitates search but incurs costs for the convenience and service
it provides. Assume that C(b, s) is the fixed cost of lowering the search costs between a
measure of b buyers and s sellers subscribed on the platform. C(b, s) is non-decreasing in
b, s. Moreover assume that VbBL ≥ C(0, BL), VsSL ≥ C(SL, 0), i.e., the platform cannot
profit by attracting only one side of the market.
The profit of the platform with BL subscribed buyers and SL subscribed sellers is
pi0 = PsSL + PbBL − C(BL, SL).
For now we only consider charging subscription fees on both sides.
The following assumption holds throughout.
Assumption 1. G is twice differentiable with pdf g, and 1−G(v)g(v) is non-increasing.
Assumption 1 is a standard monotone hazard rate condition, which ensures that the equi-
librium prices posted by the firms are uniquely determined by a first-order condition.
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Below is the timing of the search game.
Timing
Step 1 The platform announces membership fees (Pb, Ps).
Step 2 Sellers and buyers simultaneously decide whether to join the platform. Firms sub-
scribed to the platform pay the subscription fee Ps in advance while for buyers the
membership fee is Pb.
Each firm j joining the platform posts price pLj for purchases on the platform and p
D
j
for transactions off the platform. Firms subscribed to the platform pay the subscrip-
tion fee Ps in advance.
Any firm j not on the platform posts one price pDj for transactions off the platform.
Step 3 Each buyer subscribed to the platform searches sequentially for the optimal deal.
During each search, after the posted prices pLj , p
D
j and switch cost wj of the firm j
visited are observed, the buyer has to decide whether to proceed with another search
or stop and purchase from some seller visited so far. The transaction with a seller can
happen either on or off the platform. If the trade occurs on the platform, the buyer
pays pLj to the firm, and p
D
j otherwise, in addition to the switch cost wj .
Consumers who search directly also conduct sequential search until they stop and
make purchases with some seller j at price pDj . While the switch from on-the-platform
to off-the-platform transactions are available to any subscribers of the platform, I
assume that the reverse isn’t true. In other words, non-subscribers can not switch to
transactions on the platform.
If a platform makes zero or negative profit whatever membership fees it adopts, then, we
assume that it does not operate in the first place. The solution concept is Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium and all sellers and buyers are risk neutral.
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Denote by tIj the virtual price spent on firm j through channel I, then,
tLj = min{pDj + wj , pLj },
for each seller j on the platform and tDj = p
D
j for those off the platform. Since posted
prices and switching costs of each individual firm are unobservable to buyers unless they
search, sellers are assumed ex ante homogenous before the search and buyers are assumed to
hold common beliefs F˜L over the virtual prices t
L
j on the platform, as in Wang and Wright
(2016). We consider the case where beliefs are unadaptive as buyers search on the platform.
Similarly, buyers who search directly also hold some common belief F˜D over posted p
D
j off
the platform before prices are observed.
The following lemma by Weitzman (1979) characterizes the optimal sequential searching
strategies of buyers: setting a reservation price as stopping rule.
Lemma 2.3.1 (Weitzman (1979)). Each buyer choose a value zI , if zI ≥ 0 consumers starts
searching via I (I = L if search on the platform, and I = D if search directly), and stop if
the surplus vij − tj from trading with firm j exceeds zI , and continue searching otherwise.
Moreover, zI satisfies,
cI =
∫ ∫
v≥t+zI
(v − t− zI)dG(v)dF˜I(t), I = L,D.
zI is the reservation price for sequential search via I = L,D .
I consider the symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where agents of the same type adopt
the same strategies on pricing, search and entry. In this model, buyers share the same
searching strategies because of their common ex ante valuations of the product sold in each
firm and common belief over the price distribution on and off the platform. The focus is on
the seller side. After each search and inspection, the subscribed buyer i learns the value,
prices and switching cost of firm j, and decide to continue searching if vij − tj < zI or stop
and purchase from firm j.
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If the firm set prices (pLj , p
D
j ) respectively for transactions on and off the platform, its total
demand via the platform is,
XL(p
L
j , p
D
j ) =
BL
SL(1− ρL) Pr(v ≥ t
L
j + zL), (2.1)
where BL is the measure of buyers searching on the platform, SL is the number of registered
sellers, i.e., her competing peers, on the platform. Here ρL = Pr(v − t < zL) denotes
the probability that the search on the platform terminates at each time period, i.e., with
probability 1− ρL a consumer stop searching after the current search. Notice that if pLj ≤
pDj + wj , all demands from the subscribed buyers are completed on the platform.
Similarly, the demand from unsubscribed buyers who search directly is
XD(p
D
j ) =
BD
SD(1− ρD) Pr(v − p
D
j ≥ zD),
where BD are those who only search directly off the platform and ρD the probability of an
unsuccessful transaction from a direct search. Hence if firm j does not enter the platform,
its expected profit is
pid(p
D
j ;mj) = (p
D
j −mj)XD(pDj ).
If firm j decides to participate on the platform, his expected profit is
piL(p
L
j , p
D
j ;mj) =

(pLj −mj)XL(pDj , pLj ) + (pDj −mj)XD(pDj ) if pLj ≤ pDj + wj
(pDj −mj)XL(pDj , pLj ) + (pDj −mj)XD(pDj ) if pLj > pDj + wj
(2.2)
Then firm j is willing to join the platform if the benefit from subscribing exceeds that from
not, i.e.,
max
pD,pL
piL(p
L, pD;mj) + Vs − Ps ≥ max
pD
piD(p
D;mj). (2.3)
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For buyers, the expected benefit of searching on the platform is:
E[gain from the platform] =
∑
k
E[ gain from kth search]− Pb
=
∑
k
E[(v − t)1(v − t ≥ zL)](ρL)k−1 − c
L
1− ρL + Vb − Pb
=
∫ ∫
v−t≥zL(v − t)dGdF˜L − cL
1− ρL + Vb − Pb
=
∫ ∫
v−t≥zL zLdGdF˜L
1− ρL + Vb − Pb
= zL + Vb − Pb
(2.4)
Similarly, the expected benefit of searching off the platform is zD. Hence a buyer is willing
to pay the membership fee and search on the platform if,
zL + Vb − Pb ≥ zD.
2.4. Equilibrium Targeting Strategy
The equilibrium of the search model is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Search Equilibrium). For a buyer-seller search model with platform facili-
tating search, given (Ps, Pb) the membership fee announced by the platform, a search equi-
librium is (pL, pD, zL, zD), where p
L : [m,m]→ R∪{∞} is a mapping from firms’ marginal
costs to its posted prices on the platform, and pD : [m,m] → R ∪ {∞} a mapping from
firm’s marginal costs to its posted prices off the platform,5 such that
(i) Each firm with marginal production cost m who is subscribed to the platform, posts
the optimal prices to maximize its aggregate profit from transaction on and off the
platform,
(pL(m), pD(m)) = arg max
p1,p2
piL(p1, p2;mj).
5pLj =∞ if firm j is not subscribed to the platform
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For those not subscribed to the platform, the optimal prices are selected to maximize
profit from direct search, i.e.,
pD(mj) = arg max
p
piD(p;mj),
(ii) Firm j joins the platform if
max
p1,p2
piL(p1, p2;mj) + Vs − Ps ≥ max
p
piD(p;mj).
(iii) Buyers join the platform if
zL + Vb − Pb ≥ zD.
and adopt the optimal stopping rule stated in Lemma 2.3.1
One incentive for buyers to search online is lower prices. The following result confirms that
on the buyer-seller search platform, prices charged are lower than prices through direct
search, thus eliminating the showroom issues in Wang and Wright (2016) where buyers
search for sellers on the platform but complete their transaction off the platform.
Lemma 2.4.1. In any search equilibrium when the platform operates, pL(m) ≤ pD(m), ∀m.
Based on the proof of Lemma 2.4.1, in any equilibrium when the platform operates, the
equilibrium prices pDj , p
L
j posted by firm j satisfy:
pDj = mj +
1−G(pDj + zD)
g(pDj + zD)
,
pLj = mj +
1−G(pLj + zL)
g(pLj + zL)
.
with demand from on the off the platform being:
XD(p
D
j ) =
BD
SD(1− ρD)(1−G(p
D
j + zD)),
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XD(p
L
j , p
D
j ) =
BL
SL(1− ρL)(1−G(p
L
j + zL)).
Therefore, the profits for firm j from transaction on or off the platform are respectively,
piL(p
L
j , p
D
j ;mj) =
(1−G(pLj + zL))2
g(p+ zL)
BL
SL(1− ρL) +
(1−G(pDj + zD))2
g(p+ zD)
BD
S(1− ρD)
piD(p
D
j ;mj) =
(1−G(pDj + zD))2
g(p+ zD)
BD
S(1− ρD)
The incentive condition for firms’ entry thus depends on:
Bl
SL(1− ρL)
(1−G(pLj + zL))2
g(pLj + zL)
+ Vs ≥ Ps (2.5)
Since (1−G(p+z))
2
g(p+z) is non-increasing in p, the lemma above yields an upper bound for posted
prices on the platform for given Vs, Ps. The equilibrium strategy profile exhibits the follow-
ing threshold structures in any search equilibrium.
Theorem 2.4.2 (Threshold Strategy). In any buyer-seller search equilibrium,
(i) the equilibrium prices for firms with marginal costs m is pL(m) = p(m, zL), pD(m) =
p(m, zD), where p(m, z) satisfies,
p(m, z) = m+
1−G(p(m, z) + z)
g(p(m, z) + z)
(ii) there exists mL, s.t., any firms with production cost m < mL join the platform while
those with higher production cost m > mL choose to stay off the platform. Moreover,
BL
SL(1− ρL)
(1−G(p(mL, zL) + zL))2
g(p(mL, zL) + zL)
+ Vs = Ps.
(iii) SL = S · F (mL)
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(iv) zL satisfies,
cL =
1
F (mL)
∫ mL
m
∫
v≥p(m,zL)+zL
(v − p− zL)dG(v)dF (m).
The success of the platform is determined by the amount of membership fees Ps, Pb charged
on both side, which in term are determined by the optimal threshold mL. By including more
sellers with high threshold mL, buyers enjoy positive externalities of the variety of choices
and higher values of trades vij in equilibrium. On the other hand, the price dispersion on
the platform can be detrimental for the success of the platform, as buyers have to search
extensively to find sellers with low prices pLj . Therefore, it is not obvious that the middleman
should attract all sellers to the platform in equilibrium.
The following theorem characterizes the platform’s optimal choice of thresholds mL by
limiting the set of sellers available on the platform.
Theorem 2.4.3. Suppose
(i) f(m) is non-increasing in m,
(ii) ∂C∂s (BL, SL) ≥ Vs,
then the profit of the platform is a non-decreasing function of the threshold mL, i.e.,
∂pi0
∂mL
≤
0.
Condition (i) states that the density of sellers is a monotone function of its production
costs. In particular, more sellers are equipped with production technologies with lower
marginal costs. Condition (ii) implies that the cost of serving one more seller is at least
that of the subscription benefit the seller received after joining the platform. For example,
it can be satisfied if ∂C∂s (b, s) = Vs. What is non-standard is that under the two conditions,
the middleman can profit more by targeting fewer sellers. In other words, the middleman
profits by acting as a gatekeeper that only attract the set of sellers with low marginal costs.
46
2.5. Welfare Analysis
In this section, we study how limiting choice can affect the welfare of search under the
intermediary. Denote by WL(cL) the welfare from search and trade on the platform.
WL(cL) = E[welfare from the platform] =
∫ ∫
v−t≥zL v −mdGdF˜L
1− ρL −
cL
1− ρL
=
∫ ∫
v−t≥zL t−mdGdF˜L
1− ρL + zL
(2.6)
WL(cL) consists of the transaction surpluses, less the total search costs, a function of cL in
any search equilibrium. Denote by m∗L the optimal threshold selected by the platform such
that
m∗L = arg maxpi0(mL).
Then m∗L is a function of cL. The following theorem analyzes the social welfare results
under the intermediation of a search platform.
Theorem 2.5.1. Suppose that
∂m∗L
cL
≥ 0, (2.7)
then ∂W
L
∂cL
≤ 0.
Inequality (2.7) states that the optimal threshold strategy m∗L is non-increasing in cL, that
is the lower the search cost a platform offers, the fewer firms it attracts to the platform
in its optimal strategy. Theorem 2.5.1 then implies the social welfare generated by the
middleman increases with lower search costs it provides to the buyer. The middleman can
promotes efficiency in two ways. The first, which is standard, is to lower the costs of search
on the platform. The second, which is less trivial, is to accrue demands from all buyers to
the subscribed sellers with low production costs. Therefore, the surpluses from transactions
increase as the middleman acts as a gatekeeper that restricts the set of available sellers to
those more efficient ones.
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2.6. Conclusion
This paper studies the search platform that facilitates search between buyers and sellers by
lowering search costs. The price dispersion is intrinsic to the platform’s threshold strategy
that by setting membership fees, limits the set of available firms subscribed to the platform.
Buyers can then search more efficiently with fewer searches and the price competition be-
tween those low-cost sellers is more fierce, which adds the benefit of lower prices to buyers
subscribed to the platform. Moreover, the search platform can also promote social welfare
by lowering buyers’ search costs and accrues demands to sellers with lower production costs.
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CHAPTER 3 : Intermediated Bargaining In Networks with a Matchmaker
3.1. Introduction
Many goods and services (real estate, automobiles, jobs, etc) are traded in decentralized
markets where traders search or wait for their counterparties and prices are determined via
bargaining. Trading opportunities are largely restricted by social relationships, geographic
dispersion, information opportunities, technical compatibilities, etc, which can generate
considerable search costs. Traders often rely on intermediaries (brokers) to reduce the
search costs. In the U.S. labor market for example, more than 90% of companies and 40%
of employees looking for their first job (or those reentering the job market) use staffing
agencies, generating annual revenues of $129.6 billion in 2014 according to the American
Staffing Association.
Matchmaking middlemen also offer their professional expertise in proposing high-quality
matches. Wine brokerage, a poorly known yet quite regulated activity, accounts for about
60% of bulk table and local wine transactions and for about 80% of the AOC exchanges in
France. Wine is not a standardized product. A wine broker will regularly visit growers he is
in contact with to taste and collect samples and once the sample fits the needs1 of the wine
buyer who hires him, the broker will bring together the grower and the buyer for negotiation.
A broker’s expertise is based on his specialization in a specific wine production area and on
knowledge of their customers. On average, a broker maintains more or less strong ties with
158 buyers and 49 growers, according to a survey conducted on Languedoc-Roussillon wine
brokers (Baritaux et al., 2006).
In other businesses, matchmaking middlemen such as talent agents intermediate most trans-
actions. In the U.S. in 2010, 664 out of 1728 NFL professional players were represented by
top 7 sports agents in the field. Moreover, the concentration of the matchmaking business
in those fields endows the matchmaking intermediaries with significant market power. For
1Such as quality, flavor and geographic regions. In France, depending on the region where they are
situated, wine buyers don’t have the same trade practices.
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example, the distribution of footballer representations are highly skewed between interme-
diaries. In five major European championships, half of over 2400 football players from the
main European leagues are managed by 83 agents or agencies and a quarter are represented
by just 24 of them (Poli and Rossi, 2012).
Common to the examples above is an intermediary whose business is to match buyers and
sellers who subsequently negotiate the price. Unlike intermediaries in other settings, these
• do not hold inventories or set transaction prices. They profit from facilitating a match
between buyers and sellers. The sale price is determined by negotiation between the
buyer and the seller.
• They do not act as marketmakers who set bid and ask prices at which traders can
buy and sell for their own account.
In contrast to the extensive literature on intermediated bargaining or trading models where
middlemen act as traders or marketmakers, there has been little discussion on the role
of a matchmaking middleman in a decentralized bargaining setting. This paper is, to my
knowledge, the first to introduce a finite model of matchmaking middleman in a buyer-seller
bargaining network after Yavas¸ (1994, 1992a,b), which discuss a one-buyer-one-seller search
model with a middleman facilitating search.
Given the prevalence of networks in modeling bilateral bargaining, I consider a bipartie
graph that determines which pairs of buyer and seller can bargain over the prices of het-
erogeneous goods. Each seller has a single unit of an indivisible good to trade and each
buyer has unit demand. Feasible trading opportunities are represented by links. Associ-
ated with each link is a probability that corresponds to the chances of that buyer-seller
pair finding each other without an intermediary. In each time period a feasible buyer-seller
pair is selected at random (referred to as being matched by nature) or they are matched
by a middleman to negotiate a deal. Among them, one trader is designated to make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer. If the offer is accepted, the pair exit the market with the share
50
agreed, less commission fees paid to the middleman if matched by the middleman. If the
offer is rejected, the pair remain in the market for the next period without any payments
to anyone including the middleman. Moreover, a feasible buyer-seller pair can always walk
away from the middlemen’s match, and wait for trading opportunities to arrive at random.
Before the start of the next time period, the exiting pair are replaced by their clones at
the exact same positions of the network or they are never replaced in the following periods.
The two extremes are referred to as the with-replacement assumption (Manea, 2011) and
no-replacement assumption (Abreu and Manea, 2012a,b) in prior literature. This paper
generalizes both cases by allowing exiting players to be replaced by clones with positive
probability.
As is well known from prior work, bargaining outcomes largely depend on network structure
and the matching process associated with it: how many suppliers with higher quality ma-
terials are accessible to the buyer, how often an impatient landlord receive a purchase offer,
etc. In my setting with a strategic matchmaking middleman, the following questions arise:
which pairs will the middleman select and what is the impact on the surplus of buyers and
sellers; how would intermediation in network affect the efficiency of bargaining outcomes?
To answer these, one must understand what commission fees the middleman posts to both
sides and what matching processes the middleman selects under the chosen commission.
Similar to the two-sided platform literature (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong,
2006), which side should pay and how much should be paid to the middleman determine
the middlemen’s success. The mainbody of the paper assumes that the middleman has
the freedom to charge a percentage of the transaction price on both sides. That is, both
buyer and seller pay a percentage of the sale price. In labor markets, headhunters are paid a
percentage of employee’s salary by the employer (buyers) and job seekers (sellers) get access
to the recruiters’ services free of charge. In real estate, depending on whom the brokers
represent, a percentage of the sale price is paid mostly by the sellers but sometimes by
buyers if they sign a buyer broker agreement containing clauses that will compensate the
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brokerage for the fee it is due less the amount paid by the seller. In the professional sports,
payment rules to the intermediaries vary a lot (Brocard et al., 2016). For example, the
players associations in the North-American closed sport leagues have introduced Collective
Bargarining Agreements that prohibit payments from clubs to sport agents (Shropshire
et al., 2016). Thus, sport agents are paid by their principals - the players in the North
American professional leagues, such as NBA and NFL. On the other hand, a study by
the European Commission in 2009 shows that the existing mechanisms for sports agents
are fairly heterogeneous (agents paid by the player, agents paid by the club, or a mixed
commission payment)2. To sum up, a commission appears to be the most popular scheme
employed by an intermediary and it can take one of two forms.
1. “α+ β” commission fees: Charge α of the sales price to the seller and β to the buyer
for each successful transaction, denoted by “α+ β”. This includes α = 0, or β = 0 as
a special case.
2. “α or β” commission fees: Whoever makes an offer that is accepted, pays the mid-
dleman’s commission. If the seller, the commission is α of the price, if the buyer it is
β of the price.
The “α+β” pricing where middleman charges on one or both sides of the market regardless
of who makes the accepted offers are more commonly seen in pratice compared to “α or β”.
This paper focuses on the discussion of “α + β”, and compares the two pricing models at
the end.
The other critical design problem for the intermediary is which buyer-seller pairs to match.
I assume that buyer-seller links are given and not created by the intermediary. Rather, by
selecting which pair of buyers and sellers to match, a middleman can determine how quickly
or often a buyer (seller) can meet specific counter-parties. Prior work assumes exogenously
specified matching probabilities(Abreu and Manea, 2012a), or endogenously determined by
2 ”Study on sports agents in the European Union”. A study commissioned by the European Commission
(Directorate-General for Education and Culture), November 2009.
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the mass of traders of the same type (Diamond and Maskin, 1979; Gale, 1987; No¨ldeke and
Tro¨ger, 2009). In this paper, agents can choose between an exogenously specified matching
process (nature) or matches determined by an intermediary.
The analysis of bargaining games under intermediation relies on Markov Perfect Equilibria
(MPEs) introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991); Maskin and Tirole (2001), where the
strategy profile is a function of the Markov states of the game. The state in this model is
the network structure, along with the selection of a link and a proposer, and in my context,
the commission. Despite a multiplicity of MPEs under commission rates α, β, this paper
characterizes the unique MPE revenue of a monopoly matchmaking middleman with the
optimal choice of commission.
The first economic insight the paper offers is how a middlemen affects the efficiency through
redistributing the trading opportunities across agents. The efficiency of trade is the total
discounted sum of surpluses. If vbs is buyer b’s value for seller s’s good and cs the oppor-
tunity cost of s, the surplus from trade will be vbs − cs. In the benchmark case without
middlemen, efficiency is compromised by adverse selection and trading delays (Abreu and
Manea, 2012a,b). In my model the presence of a middleman reduces trading delays relative
to nature. Moreover, when exiting players are replaced with clones, the middleman always
selects the links with the highest surplus in any equilibrium without the competition from
nature. This fails to be true when the middleman competes with nature.
Relative to a middleman focused on maximizing efficiency, the profit-maximizing middle-
man distorts trades in two ways under the no-replacement setting. The first is to restrict
trading opportunities by never selecting feasible buyer-seller pairs whose “value-to-cost”
ratio vbscs is too small. The second, is among the feasible pairs with sufficiently large
vbs
cs
,
favoring those buyer-seller pairs whose vbs is large. Thus, the profit-maximizing middleman
does not necessarily favor pairs for which the gains from trade, vbs − cs, are large. The
intermediation inefficiency stems from imperfect price discrimination of the matchmaking
middleman. Under the with-replacement assumption, the monopoly middleman can per-
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fectly price discriminate by calculating the efficient links and the commission rates α, β
accordingly in order to extract all the surpluses from trade, and she is able to do so be-
cause the equilibria are stationary and the network structure remains unchanged forever.
Under the no-replacement assumption however, the middleman matches sequentially until
the market clears and charges the same percentages of sales prices to all matched pairs.
Because of her lack of ability to perfectly price discriminate, the middleman cannot extract
all surpluses from trade and can deviate from inefficient matchings to the profit-maximizing
ones.
The interplay between efficiency, matching and competition with nature is novel to the
literature on intermediation in networks. Blume et al. (2009) show the efficiency of in-
termediaries that announce bid prices for sellers and ask prices for buyers simultaneously.
Choi et al. (2017) prove the existence of efficient equilibria in a network where all nodes
along the path of intermediaries post prices simultaneously, in addition to showing exam-
ples of inefficient equilibria where trade does not occur. Polanski (2007) studies a model
in which a maximum number of pairs of connected players are selected to bargain every
period. As a consequence, efficiency is not an issue in Polanski’s model and in equilibria,
all matched pairs reach agreement immediately. In another recent paper on intermediation
in networks, Manea (2015) characterizes the intermediation inefficiency that stems from
hold-ups created by competition between layers and paths of the network where middlemen
form chains of traders. Unlike them, intrinsic to the inefficiency results of my model is the
matching technology endogenized by the profit-maximizing middleman and the imperfect
price discrimination toward the commission the middleman must commit to for all trades
before bargaining starts.
This paper also characterizes the impact of intermediation on players’ surpluses from trade.
Under the “α + β” pricing, assuming that traders have no outside options but to search
and trade through the middleman, the expected surplus of all buyers is zero in all networks.
Thus, all of the gains of trade accrue to either the middleman and the sellers. This is
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true even if supply exceeds demand or if buyers are more patient than sellers. Under the
“α or β” pricing, depending on the underlying network structures, buyers can enjoy positive
gains from intermediated bargaining.
3.1.1. Literature Reviews
My work builds on the intersection between bargaining models (Rubinstein and Wolinsky,
1985; Gale, 1987; Binmore and Herrero, 1988; Abreu and Manea, 2012b; Manea, 2015) and
two-sided marketplaces with intermediaries (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006). It differs from
prior work in the following ways.
1. Matchmaking middlemen
The literature on decentralized trade in networks has focused on the exchange of goods
without intermediation (Abreu and Manea, 2012a,b; Manea, 2011; Corominas-Bosch, 2004;
Kranton and Minehart, 2001; Polanski, 2007). In particular, the two-sided versions of
Abreu and Manea (2012a,b); Manea (2011) are special cases of my paper under the with-
replacement and no-placement assumption.
Moreover, most of the literature on intermediation in networks investigates intermediaries
as traders or resellers in the network consisting of paths where sellers are linked to buyers
directly, or indirectly via a chain of intermediaries (Manea, 2015; Kotowski and Leister,
2018; Manea, 2017a, 2015; Choi et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2016).
Brocard et al. (2016) study a sports agent facilitating the negotiation between a buyer (club)
and a seller (professional athelete) with fixed bargaining payoffs, whereas in my setting, the
middleman can facilitate searches across a network of buyers and sellers and the outcomes
of bargaining are endogenized by matching and competition with nature.
2. Matching technologies
Abreu and Manea (2012a,b) assume exogenously specified matching probabilities pij(G
′) for
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any subnetwork G′ ⊆ G with full support. In particular, the two-sided versions of Abreu
and Manea (2012a,b) are special cases of this paper when the middleman is entitled with
zero influence over the matching. Shimer and Smith (2000); Manea (2017b); No¨ldeke and
Tro¨ger (2009); Diamond and Maskin (1979); Gale (1987) assume the probability of player i
meeting a type j is given by the proportion of traders j in the market. In non-cooperative
group bargaining models, Nguyen (2015) assumes that the probability of a coalition S being
selected at random with i being the proposer is Pr(S, i) = αi · P (S).
Abreu and Manea (2012a) also introduces an alternative matching technology where each
individual is endowed with a bargaining opportunity and then proceed to contact a partner
to negotiate over a deal. In reality, the set of neighbors visible to each trader subject to
manipulation by the middleman (such as eBay, headhunters, wine brokers), which is closer
to the setting discussed in this paper.
3. Steady state and new entry
As shown in the paper, the efficiency results are profoundly different under the with-
replacement and the no-replacement assumptions. The replacement assumption is ubiq-
uitous in matching and bargaining models to main the steady states of the network struc-
ture (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985; Diamond and Maskin, 1979; Shimer and Smith,
2000; Duffie et al., 2005; Atakan, 2006; Satterthwaite and Shneyerov, 2007; Manea, 2011;
Lauermann, 2013; Lauermann and No¨ldeke, 2015). Among those, some assume players are
repalced by clones at the exact same position of networks (Manea, 2011), while some assume
an inflow of new players with costly entry (Manea, 2017b), or costless entry and the prob-
ability of being matched with counterparties is proportional to the size of her peers with
the same type (Shimer and Smith, 2000). Abreu and Manea (2012a) study the bargaining
networked game under the no-replacement assumption.
4. Heterogenous goods.
Prior worksAbreu and Manea (2012a,b); Manea (2011); Corominas-Bosch (2004) study the
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exchange of goods with unit surplus and focus on the impact of network structure on the
efficiency of bargaining (the maximum cardinality of matchings in the network) as agents
become patient. The distinguishing feature of this paper is the endogenous matching tech-
nology and distorted equilibrium matchings selected by the profit-maximizing middleman
who favors trades with higher values.
3.2. Model
3.2.1. Setup
Let B denote the set of buyers and S the set of sellers. Each seller s has a single unit of
indivisible good for sale, with opportunity cost cs ≥ 0. Each buyer b has unit demand and
her value for the good sold by seller s is vbs. If buyer b pays a price p to seller s, the payoffs
are vbs − p for the buyer and p− cs for the seller.
Buyers and sellers are linked by a network G0 = (V,E) with the set of vertices V ⊆ B ∪ S
and the set of edges (or links) E ⊆ {(b, s)|b ∈ B, s ∈ S} such that (b, s) ∈ E whenever
(s, b) ∈ E. A link (b, s) is interpreted as the feasible pair for trade. A network G′ = (V ′, E′)
is induced by V ′ if E′ = E ∩ (V ′ × V ′). We write G	 V ′′ for the subnetwork of G induced
by the vertices V \ V ′′.
Exogenous matching technologies in the benchmark. In the benchmark case, every
network has an associated probability distribution over links (pij(G)), ∀(i, j) ∈ E. Given G,
pij(G) is the probability that player i in the network G meets with one of her neighboring
traders j and propose a division over the surplus vij − cj (if i is a buyer, or vji − ci if i is a
seller) to j. The random matching technologies can be arbitrary, for example, the uniform
distribution over all links pij(G) =
1
2|E| .
Matching process with middleman. A long-lived middleman can match buyers
and sellers that would otherwise have difficulty finding each other. Consider the following
dynamic matching process. Each period t = 1, 2, . . ., with probability λ, the middleman
57
selects a buyer-seller pair from the current network Gt at time t and assigns one of them to
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other trader; with probability 1−λ, a buyer-seller pair
is selected at random according {pij(Gt)}ij∈Et . λ can be interpreted the market power of a
middleman: λ of matching and bargaining opportunities are brought by the matchmaking
middleman while 1 − λ of them are by chance. λ = 0 corresponds to the the benchmark
case without the middleman in prior literature.
Commission fees. Both the buyer and the seller matched by the middleman pay a per-
centage of the sale price to the middleman upon reaching an agreement. α is the commission
rate on the seller side and β on the buyer side, announced before any bargaining game starts.
Moreover, no one gains from no trade, including the middleman.
Replacement assumption. In prior work, two polar cases are studied: either exiting
players are replaced by clones at the exact same positions of the network, or they exit
the market without any replacement. This paper makes the following extension: with
probability 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 the exiting pair who have reached an agreement are replaced at the
end of this period, by a new pair at the same positions in the network. Otherwise, they
are never replaced by any clones in the following periods. Abreu and Manea (2012b) is a
special case of γ = 0 and Manea (2011) a special case of γ = 1.
Assume all sellers share a common discount factor 0 < δs < 1, while all buyers share a
common 0 < δb < 1. The middleman’s discount factor is 0 < δM < 1.
3.2.2. Timing
We consider the following infinite horizon bargaining game generated by the network and
the middleman’s choice of commission and matchings. Denote this pricing model by “α+β”
commission.
Stage 1 At time t = 0, the middleman announces a non-discriminating percentage commis-
sion rates α, β ≥ 0.
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Stage 2 At time t = 1, 2, . . ., if no feasible pairs exist, the game ends. Otherwise,
(i) Matching a buyer-seller pair: With probability λ, the middleman selects a feasi-
ble pair b, s and assigns one of them to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Otherwise,
a single link is selected at random according to {pij(Gt)}ij∈Et .
(ii) Bargaining: The matched pair (b, s) meet, with one of them proposing to the
other player (the responder) specifying a transfer (or price) p. If the offer is
accepted, they trade and exit the game with buyer’s payoff being vbs − (1 + β)p
and the seller’s being (1−α)p− cs if matched by the middleman. If matched by
nature, buyer b gets vbs − p and the seller p− cs.
(iii) When the pair exit the market with an agreement, with probability γ they are
replaced by clones at the same positions in the network and there are no clones
otherwise. If the offer is rejected, the matched pair dissolves and the two traders
return in the next period.
Under the “α+β” commission pricing, the middleman commits to non-discriminating com-
mission rates α, β on both sides. This includes special cases where the commission rate on
one side is set to 0: eBay charges a 3% of sale prices on seller side and 0% on buyer side; the
real estate broker mostly charges a 6.5% of the sale prices on seller side and 0% on buyer
side. For headhunters, regardless of who makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer, the commission
fee is always charged on the buyer side (the employers).
3.2.3. Markov Perfect Equilibrium
There are three types of histories for any t ≥ 2. Denote by ht a complete history of the
game up to (not including) time t, which includes: the choice of commission α and β, a
sequence of t− 1 pairs of proposers and responders in G with corresponding proposals and
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responses, payment to the middleman if applicable and whether the pair exiting the market
are replaced with clones. The history ht uniquely determines the set of buyers and sellers
V (ht) still present at time t. Denote by G(ht) the subnetwork of G0 induced by V (ht).
Let H be the set of any possible complete histories and G the set of subnetworks of G0
induced by any complete histories, i.e., G = ∪h∈H G(h). The history (ht;1M ) denotes the
history ht followed by the identity of the matching maker ( 1M = 1 if it is the middleman’s
turn to select the pair at time t and 0 otherwise). The history (ht;1M ; i → j) consists of
ht followed by nature or the middleman selecting i to propose to j, and (ht;1M ; i → j;x)
includes additionally the proposed transfer x ∈ R made by i to j.
The equilibrium analysis is restricted to Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPEs) in Stage 2. A
strategy σi for player i specifies, for all histories (ht;1M ; i→ j) the offer σi(ht;1M ; i→ j) i
makes to j conditional on the history (ht;1M ; i→ j), and the response σi(ht;1M ; j → i;x)
that i gives to j conditional on (ht;1M ; i→ j) and the offer x proposed by j. A matching
strategy σM for the middleman specifies the pair to select for bargaining given the histories
(ht;1M = 1). A Markov strategy is defined on the payoff relevant Markov states: the
subnetwork of players who did not reach agreement by that time, and announced commission
α, β, the matchmaker’s identity (nature or the middleman), the selection of a link and
the proposer as well as the offer made by the proposer. In particular, for all complete
histories ht, and (i, j) ∈ E(ht), σi(ht;1M ; i → j) only depends on the network G(ht), the
identity of the proposer i and responder j, and the identity of the matchmaker 1M , and i’s
response σi(ht;1M ; j → i;x) depends additionally on the offer x made by the proposer j. A
Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary Markov
strategies3. We first establish the existence of MPEs.
Denote by Γα+β(G) the Stage 2 bargaining and matching games under the choice of “α+β”
commission.
Theorem 3.2.1. For any α, β ≥ 0, there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium for both the
3For t, t′ = 1, 2, . . . , N , σi|ht = σi|h′
t′
if G(ht) = G(h
′
t′).
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bargaining and matching game Γα+β(G).
Since the two-sided version of Abreu and Manea (2012b) can be seen as a special case of
mine when λ = 0, MPE payoffs might not be unique and can be sensitive to the network
structure, the discount factors etc. The following proposition however, characterizes the
uniqueness of buyers’ payoffs under certain conditions.
Proposition 3.2.2. For any α+ β > 0, if
(1− λ)pbs(G) = 0,∀G ⊆ G0,
then the expected payoff of any buyer b is zero in any MPEs of Γα+β(G). In particular, if
one of the following two conditions is satisfied,
1. λ = 1, that is middleman M is the monopoly matchmaker;
2. pbs(G) = 0 for any buyers in any subnetwork of G0.
buyers gain zero surplus in any MPEs.
Proposition 3.2.2 describes a scenario when all surpluses from trades accrue to either the
middleman and the sellers: if buyers have no bargaining power under nature, neither would
they under the perfect intermediation by the middleman. This is true even if the buyers are
sufficiently patient with δb approximating 1 or buyers are on the short side of the market.
What underlies the result is the difference between prices proposed by buyers and sellers:
the ask-prices proposed by the sellers are often higher than the purchase-prices offered by
the buyers. Therefore, the middleman treats buyer and seller asymmetrically when deciding
on assigning which side to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Before jumping to the proof of
Proposition 3.2.2, we first present a description of the MPE strategy profile under λ = 1,
in particular the equilibrium transfers proposed by both sides.
Lemma 3.2.3. Given the network G, in any subgames with the initial network G, there
exist ub, us ≥ 0,∀b, s ∈ G, s.t. the MPE strategy profile is in the form of the following:
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• Buyer b offers a bid-price p = min{ cs+δsus1−α , vbs−δbub1+β } whenever chosen by the middle-
man to propose to seller s.
• Seller s proposes an ask-price p = max{ cs+δsus1−α , vbs−δbub1+β } whenever chosen by the
middleman to propose to buyer b.
• When buyer b responds to the offer p from seller s: she accepts any ask-price p <
vbs−δbub
1+β , rejects any p >
vbs−δbub
1+β , and is indifferent between accepting and rejecting a
price of p = vbs−δbub1+β .
• Similarly, when seller s responds to the purchase offer p from buyer b: he accepts any
offer s.t., p > cs+δsus1−α , rejects any p <
cs+δsus
1−α , and is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting an offer p = cs+δsus1−α .
Following Lemma 3.2.3, it is straight forward to notice that within any buyer-seller pair
(b, s), the ask-price proposed by seller s is at least the amount offered by buyer b, even
if there is less demand than supply or sellers are much more anxious to close the trade.
Moreover, no matter who is assigned as the proposer, the necessary condition for trade
between buyer b and seller s to occur is the same:
vbs − δbub ≥ 1 + β
1− α(cs + δsus), (3.1)
i.e., the value vbs is sufficiently large. Here ub, us are the expected payoffs for buyer and
seller given the network. Therefore, within any pair that can potentially reach an agreement,
assigning the seller to be the proposer generates at least the same profit to the middleman
as choosing the buyer side. Proposition 3.2.2 implies buyers gain no additional bargaining
power from the intermediary except that some of them might be selected to bargain more
often with the middleman than without. Still, their payoffs are 0 as any positive gains from
bilateral bargaining result from the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer.4
4 If a trader can only respond to a offer but is unable to make one, any equilibrium offer indifferent
between accepting and rejecting it, will eventually amount to 0 when the discount factor is strictly positive.
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3.3. Inefficiency of MPEs
This section focuses on the optimal choice of α, β at time 0 and the resulting equilibrium
matching and bargaining outcomes. Moreover, what is the impact of intermediation by a
profit-maximizing middleman on the social welfare especially when the middleman acts as
a matchmaker ?
Eficiency is defined as the optimal matching created by a welfare-maximizing central planner
who in each time period, selects the pair that maximizes the expected total discounted sum
of surpluses from trades with some discount factor δ > 0. If γ = 0 where exiting players
are never replaced by clones, the set of efficient matchings in the bargaining game is any
maximum weight matching on the entire network G0, with the weight of each link being the
transaction surplus vbs − cs (Abreu and Manea, 2012a,b; Polanski, 2007). Assuming γ = 1,
the MPEs are stationary and the efficiency of the intermediated bargaining game is defined
as the selection of efficient links with highest surplus vbs − cs (Manea, 2011).
Theorem 3.3.1. Suppose λ = 1.
1. If γ = 0 (no-replacement assumption),
• The highest possible revenue the middleman can achieve is,
max
α,β
α+ β
1 + β
Π(Gα,β),
where Gα,β = (V,Eα,β) is the subnetwork of G0 with Eα,β = {(b, s) : vbs ≥
1+β
1−αcs}. Π(Gα,β) is the maximum total discounted sum of buyers’ values vbs of
any feasible matchings in network Gα,β.
• For any  > 0, the middleman can choose α∗, β∗ at time 0, s.t., her revenue is
at least -close to the maximum possible revenue the middleman could possibly
attain, i.e.,
piα
∗+β∗(G0) ≥ max
α,β
α+ β
1 + β
Π(Gα,β)− .
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The middleman’s matching outcomes are the maximum weight bipartite matching
of Gα,β with weight of each link being vbs rather than vbs − cs.
2. If γ = 1 (with-replacement assumption), then for any  > 0, the middleman can choose
α∗, β∗ at time 0, s.t., her revenue in any MPEs of Stage 2 satisfies
piα
∗+β∗(G0) ≥ max
b,s
(vbs − cs)− ,
with the optimal matched pairs always being the most efficient links (the highest vbs−
cs). The optimal choice of α
∗, β∗ satisfies vbs − cs = α+β1+β vbs where (b, s) is the most
efficient link.
Moreover, there are no trading delays along the equilibrium paths in both scenarios.
Under the with-replacement assumption, Theorem 3.3.1 shows that for the optimal choice
of α∗, β∗, middleman promotes efficiency by selecting links with the highest surplus. This
efficiency result holds for any δM , δb, δs ∈ (0, 1), a sharp constrast to the prior work (Abreu
and Manea, 2012a,b) where efficiency of MPEs is either unattainable, or can be attained by
a modification of punishment regimes adopted by the traders. What drives the efficiency
result under the with-replacement assumption is perfect price discrimination. In the sta-
tionary world where only efficient links matters rather than the entire network structures,
the middleman can always select links with the highest surplus under the “customized”
commission rates α, β such that trade always occurs and the surplus from trade can be fully
extracted by the middleman.
When γ = 0, the middleman distorts trade in two ways. First, the middleman only targets
matchings on a subnetwork with higher “value-over-cost” ratio vbscs . vbs ≥
1+β
1−αcs is implied
by Inequality (3.1): for trades to occur under intermediation, the ratio must be high enough
for both sides to afford the two-sided “tariffs” posed by the middleman. Unlike the station-
ary network structures under the with-replacement assumption γ = 0, the network evolves
and the value of matchings feasible under the commission rates determines the success of
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the middleman. If matching pairs with large surplus vbs − cs yet small ratio vbscs (this is
possible when the production cost cs is also large), for the efficient trade to be feasible
under intermediation, the commission rates must be restrained from setting too high. As
α, β are uniform for all trades, the middleman can potentially generate less revenue from
matching pairs with lower surplus vbs − cs but high ratio vbscs than she could have earned
by setting higher commission rates α, β. Sometimes targeting fewer feasible pairs under
higher commission rates can be more profitable than enabling more trades (including the
more efficient ones) to occur under a low commission (see Example 3.3.2). What underlies
targeting a subnetwork is the inability to perfectly extract all surplus from trades. Example
3.3.2 illustrates the targeting strategy in a two-buyer-two-seller network where in equilib-
rium, only one link is selected with all of its surplus extracted by the profit-maximizing
middleman. Secondly, the middleman selects the matchings on the subnetwork with high
buyers’ values vbs rather than the transaction surplus vbs − cs. This is implicitly derived
from the fact that in MPEs with a monopoly matchmaker, the transfer of each trade is
proportional to the value vbs. Therefore among all feasible trades under intermediation,
the middleman favors those with higher transfers, i.e., higher values vbs. The  error in the
statement of Theorem 3.3.1 is due to the fact that, by sacrificing a small  in revenue, the
middleman can avoid any possible trading delays where the responder is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting an offer.
The following two examples illustrate how distorted matchings can deviate from the efficient
ones when matching pairs with higher values vbs in Example 3.3.1 and when restricting
trades in Example 3.3.2.
Example 3.3.1 (Ineffiency induced by middleman). Consider the bargaining game with
λ = 1, γ = 0 in the following two-buyer-three-seller network. The values associated with
each link are vb1s1 = 5, vb1s2 = 6, vb2s2 = 7, vb2s3 = 15. Sellers’ productions costs are
respectively cs1 = 3, cs2 = 5, cs3 = 12.5.
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s1
3
s2
5
s3
12.5
b1 b2
6 7 155
There are 3 candidates 65 ,
7
5 ,
5
3 for setting
1+β
1−α . For any subnetwork with {(b, s) : vbs ≥
6
5cs} = E, α+β1+β Π(G) = 16(6 + 15) = 3.5. With {(b, s) : vbs ≥ 75cs} = {(b1, s1), (b2, s2)}, the
surplus from its maximum weight matching is α+β1+β Π(G) =
2
7(5 + 7) ≈ 3.4. Among {(b, s) :
vbs ≥ 53cs} = {(b1, s1)}, the surplus from its maximum weight matching is α+β1+β Π(G) =
2
5(5) ≈ 2. In any profit-maximizing equilibrium outcome, (b1, s2), (b2, s3) are matched by
the middleman. However, the most efficient matching is (b1, s1), (b2, s3).
Example 3.3.2 (Ineffiency induced by middleman). Consider the bargaining game with
λ = 1, γ = 0 in the following two-buyer-two-seller network. The values associated with each
link is vb1s1 = 3, vb1s2 = 7, vb2s2 = 5. Sellers’ productions costs are respectively cs1 = 0, cs2 =
3.
s1
0
s2
3
b1 b2
7 53
There are three threshold 53 ,
7
3 ,∞( or α = 1). For any subnetwork with {(b, s) : vbs ≥
5
3cs} = E, α+β1+β Π(G) = 25(3 + 5) = 3.2. If however {(b, s) : vbs ≥ 73cs} = {(b1, s1), (b2, s2)},
and the maximum surplus extract by the middleman is α+β1+β Π(G) =
4
7(7) = 4. If setting
α = 1, the maximum surplus extract from (b1, s1) is 3. In any profit-maximizing equilibrium
outcome, (b1, s2) is matched by the middleman. However, the most efficient matching is
(b1, s1), (b2, s2). In this case, there is a tradeoff between low commission rates α, β and high
total sum of values vbs. While the aggregate buyers’ valuation of the matching (b1, s1), (b2, s2)
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is larger than that of (b1, s2), for trades in the former to occur, the middleman must commit
to lower commission rates that those necessary for trade to occur in the latter. Moreover,
setting lower commission rates does not necessarily yields higher revenue for the middleman.
Examples 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 illustrate two sources of mismatch a monopoly matchmaking mid-
dleman can introduce by intermediation under the no-replacement assumption. In contrast,
under the with-replacement assumption, a link with the highest surplus vbs− cs in the net-
work is always selected by the monopoly middleman in each time period. However, this no
longer holds when the middleman competes with nature when 0 < λ < 1. The following
example illustrates an alternative distortion the middleman introduces to matchings on a
star network when competing with nature.
Example 3.3.3 (Star-n Network). Consider a one-buyer-n-selller network. Each seller
s’s production cost is cs and buyer b values the product sold by seller s at vbs ≥ cs > 0,
with at least one pair generating positive surplus. Suppose pbs = 0,∀s, i.e., under nature
the seller proposes to the middleman and the probability of seller s meeting with buyer b is
psb. Assuming γ = 1, that is any exiting players are replaced with clones. The middleman
announces the commission rates α, β to be charged on both sides.
In the following, we will show that, the optimal choice of α, β and the stationary matching
strategy adopted by the middleman in the MPE is to select the pair (b, s∗) such that,
s∗ = arg max
1− δs
1− δs + (1− λ)δspsb (vbs − cs).
The middleman’s profit-maximization problem is to solve:
piM (G) = λmax{max
b,s
qbs
α+ β
1− α (δsus + cs),maxb,s qsb
α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)}
= λmax
b,s
qsb
α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub),
where qbs is the probability of buyer b and seller s reaching an agreement under the inter-
mediaton. Let wbs be the probability of matching s and b and assigning b to be the proposer
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by the middleman. For each pair of (b, s), if vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) > δbub, the difference ∆
between selecting b proposing to s (b→ s) and selecting s→ b is,
∆ =qbs[
α+ β
1− α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (qbsγ + 1− qbs)δMpiM (G)
− qsb[α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})]−
(
qsbγ + 1− qsb
)
δMpiM (G)
=
α+ β
1− α (δsus + cs)−
α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)
<0
Hence wbs = 0. If vbs− 1+β1−α(δsus+cs) < δbub, no trades are feasible thus qbs = 0. Therefore,
in all cases we have
wbsqbs(vbs − δbub − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs)) = 0.
It can be calculated that buyers’ and sellers’ equilibrium payoffs ub, us and the middleman’s
revenue satisfy:
(
1− δb
)
ub =
∑
s
λwbsqbs(vbs − δbub − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs))
+
∑
s
(1− λ)pbs max(vbs − δbub − (δsus + cs), 0)
=(1− λ)
∑
s
pbs max(vbs − δbub − (δsus + cs), 0)
=0,
(
1− δs
)
us =λ
∑
b
wsbqsb(
1− α
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)− cs − δsus)
+
∑
b
(1− λ)psb max(vbs − δbub − cs − δsus, 0),
piM (G) =λmax
b,s
α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub) = λmax
b,s
α+ β
1 + β
vbs.
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Moreover, for any s such that wsb = 0,
us =
(1− λ)psb(vbs − cs − δbub)+
1− δs + (1− λ)psbδs .
For s s.t. wsb > 0,
us =
λwsb(
1−α
1+β (vbs − δbub)− cs) + (1− λ)psb(vbs − cs − δbub)
1− δs + (1− λ)psbδs + λwsbδs .
And one can verify that for both cases,
1− α
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)− cs − δsus ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ 1− δs
1− δs + (1− λ)δspsb (vbs − cs) ≥
α+ β
1 + β
vbs,
which implies the middleman’s revenues in any MPEs are bounded piM (G) ≤ 1−δs1−δs+(1−λ)δspsb (vbs−
cs). We show that the upper bound can be arbitrarily approximated by the choice of α, β.
Let
s∗ = arg max
s
1− δs
1− δs + (1− λ)δspsb (vbs − cs)
For any  > 0, let α, β satisfy
1− δs
1− δs + (1− λ)δsps∗b∗ (vb
∗s∗ − cs∗)−  = α+ β
1 + β
vb∗s∗
Then from middleman’s perspective, given the choice of α, β, the optimal seller to select is:
s′ = arg max
s
qsbvbs
s.t.
1− δs
1− δs + (1− λ)δspsb (vbs − cs) ≥
α+ β
1 + β
vbs
And
1− δs
1− δs + (1− λ)δsps∗b∗ (vb
∗s∗−cs∗) ≥ 1− δs
1− δs + (1− λ)δsps′b (vbs
′−cs′) ≥
1−δs
1−δs+(1−λ)δsps∗b∗ (vb
∗s∗ − cs∗)− 
vb∗s∗
vbs′
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hence
vbs′
vbs∗
≤ 1 + 
1−δs
1−δs+(1−λ)δsps∗b∗ (vb∗s∗ − cs∗)− 
,
thus for sufficiently small  > 0, we have s′ = s∗.
As shown in Theorem 3.3.1 and Example 3.3.1, the middleman can effectively eliminate
trading delays but not necessarily select the most efficient matchings. As nature comes
into play with λ < 1 and competes with the middleman, the middleman has to take into
account the random matching technology psb implemented by nature when selecting which
pair to match more often. As shown in Example 3.3.3 of the star-n network, the matched
pair (b, s∗) is the one with the highest distorted welfare contaminated by nature’s random
matching psb,
s∗ = arg max
1− δs
1− δs + (1− λ)δspsb (vbs − cs).
When vbs = v for all s, the middleman selects the link with the smallest probability psb of
being matched under nature. In other words, the middleman profits most from matching the
disadvantageous seller in the homogenous case. When vbs is heterogenous, middleman does
not necessarily select the pair with highest vbs− cs. The distortion vanishes as middleman’s
market power λ → 1. In particular, one can prove that in the Example 3.3.3, there exists
λ∗, such that, for any λ > λ∗, i.e.,
arg max
s
1− δs
1− δs + (1− λ)δspsb (vbs − cs) = arg maxs vbs − cs.
For small λ however, the middleman can deviate from the inefficient matching.
The following corollary shows that under the “α + β” pricing, the revenues from charging
on both sides can be realized by charging on only one side of the market.
Corollary 3.3.2. Suppose λ = 1, γ = 0. Given  in Theorem 3.3.1. Let
θ = arg max θΠ(Gθ)− 
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where Gθ = (V,Eθ), Eθ = {(b, s) : vbs ≥ 11−θ cs}. Then for any α, β combination such that
θ = α+β1+β , the revenue in MPEs under α, β is -close to the maximum revenue a middleman
could attain.
Corollary 3.3.2 can be derived directly from Theorem 3.3.1 by letting θ = α+β1+β . Moreover,
it implies that, given the maximizer θ = arg max θΠ(Gθ) − , setting α = θ, β = 0 or
α′ = 0, β′ = θ1−θ generate the same revenue for the middleman. In particular, α < β
′, which
means, if deciding to charge on one side of market, the commission rate for buyer is alway
larger than the seller side. Suppose however that the middleman would announce the same
commission rate charged on either side of the market. Each buyer, in addition to paying
the price to the seller, is subject to a commission fee paid to the middleman. Therefore the
buyers are less willing to pay a higher price than he would have offered under 0 commission
rate, which in term implies that the middleman can extract lower surplus from trade.
3.4. “α or β” Pricing Model
The “α+β” pricing is implemented by many intermediaries where the commission is charged
on one or both sides of the market, regardless of who proposes the offer. In real estate,
sellers are responsible for paying the commission even though buyers submit purchase offers.
In Airbnb the accommodation sharing platform, both customers and hosts are charged com-
mission fees, at 6− 12% and 3− 5% respectively despite the fact that only sellers proposes
the accommodation prices. During salary negotiations, whenever the compensation pack-
ages are proposed by either the employers or the candidates, headhunters are paid solely
by the employers. In this model where the middleman can assign one side of the matched
pair to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, in the following I propose an alternative commission
pricing “α or β” where the middleman only charges the proposers she assigns. It is less
commonly seen in practice and to the best of my knowledge, some sports agents in Europe
are paid by whoever they are representing and proposing the offer.
Below is the timing of the “α or β” pricing model.
71
Choice 2. α or β Commission Pricing
Stage 1 At time t = 0, the middleman announces non-discriminating percentage commis-
sion rates α, β ≥ 0.
Stage 2 At time t = 1, 2, . . ., if no feasible matches exist in the currently network Gt, the
game ends. Otherwise,
(i) Matching a buyer-seller pair: With probability λ, the middleman selects a feasi-
ble pair b, s and assigns one of them to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Otherwise,
a single link is selected at random according to {pij(Gt)}ij∈Et .
(ii) Bargaining: The matched pair (b, s) meet, with one of them proposing to the
other player (the responder) specifying a transfer (or price).
If buyer b offers a bid-price p and s accepts, they trade and exit the game with
payoffs vbs − (1 + β)p, p − cs respectively if matched by the middleman and
vbs − p, p − cs if matched by nature. Here βp is the commission fee paid to the
middleman by buyer b.
If seller s proposes an ask-price p and b accepts, they trade and exit the game
with payoffs vbs− p, (1−α)p− cs respectively if matched by the middleman and
vbs − p, p− cs if matched by nature. Here αp is the commission fee paid to the
middleman by seller s.
(iii) When the pair exit the market with an agreement, with probability γ they are
replaced by clones at the same positions in the network and there are no clones
otherwise. If the offer is rejected, the matched pair dissolves and the two traders
return in the next period.
Denote by Γα/β(G) the game under the choice of “α or β” commission fees.
Theorem 3.4.1. For any α, β ≥ 0, there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium for both the
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bargaining and matching games Γα/β(G).
Unlike the “α + β choice where buyers gain 0 in any MPEs under the monopoly match-
making middleman, the “α or β” payment scheme allows for more positive gains for the
buyers even if the middleman is the monopoly matchmaker. The following example illus-
trates a MPE where buyers earns positive gains from trade.
Example 3.4.1 (Γα/β(G) ). Consider the following lefthand-side, a one-buyer-two-seller
network with values vb1s1 , vb1s2 and production costs c1 > c2 > 0. vb1s1 − c1 > vb1s2 − c2.
Consider the case where γ = 0, λ = 1. The middleman sets α = 0, that is, he is always
representing the buyer and charges him β of the sale price.
b1
s1
s2
b1
b2
s1
s2
For any β <
vb1s1−c1
c1
, the only MPE is to match (b1, s1) with revenue piM = βc1, and buyer
1’s equilibrium payoff is,
ub1 = vb1s1 − (1 + β)c1 > 0
Suppose now there is a new coming buyer b2 (in the righthand-side network), with vb2s1 > c1,
vb2s2 = 0. Then under the same β, the middleman’s revenue is still βc1. However, the MPE
payoffs for buyer 1 and 2 change:
ub1 =
wb1s1(vb1s1 − (1 + β)c1)
1− δb + δbwb1s1
,
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ub2 =
wb2s1(vb2s1 − (1 + β)c1)
1− δb + δbwb2s1
,
here wb1s1 + wb2s1 = 1, and 0 ≤ wb1s1 ≤ 1. In particular, buyer 1’s payoff has decreased
with the presence of buyer 2.
As shown in Example 3.4.1, the buyers’ payoffs are more sensitive to the network structures
under Γα/β(G) compared to Γα+β(G). In the lefthand-side network in Example 3.4.1, buyer
b1 is the monopoly buyer with positive gains from trade, whereas in the righthand-side,
buyer b1 has a competing peer b2, therefore less profit earned from bargaining under the
same commission rate. This is in sharp contrast to Proposition 3.2.2 for which regardless of
the network structure, buyers earn 0 from intermediated bargaining when the middleman
takes full control of the matchmaking (λ = 1).
Although the choice of “α+β” is most commonly adopted by the middleman, the following
Proposition 3.4.2 shows the choices of “α or β” is dominated by the choice “α+β” in terms
of revenue.
Proposition 3.4.2. For any choices of 1 > α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, let α′ = α+β1+β , β′ = α+β1−α , then the
middleman’s revenue from Γα
′/β′(G) is at least that from Γα+β(G).
In particular, Proposition 3.4.2 implies that the maximum revenue attained by “α or β”
pricing is at least that from “α+ β” pricing model.
3.5. Discussion
1. Matching technology: sequential matching.
This paper studies a decentralized sequential bargaining game where each time only one link
is chosen for bargaining. The one-match-per-period assumption is standard in decentralized
markets(Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985; Gale, 1987; Abreu and Manea, 2012a,b; Manea,
2011). A rationale is that, important economic transactions such as buying houses, trading
over-the-counter assets, and hiring employees are decentralized, in the sense that they typi-
cally involve extensive bilateral negotiations. Moreover, it also costs the middleman efforts
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and time to intermediate the negotiation, thus multiple agreements are not reached at the
same instant.
Kranton and Minehart (2001) adopt an ascending-bid auction, analogous to the fictional
Walrasian auctioneer in the buyer-seller network setting that determines unique equilibrium
payoffs. Polanski (2007) implements the simultaneous matching technology in which a
maximum number of pairs of connected players are selected to bargain every period. The
analysis in the paper can be extended to the settings where more than one link is chosen
for bargaining at each time.
2. Membership fees:
In this paper, the middleman adopts the variable fees charged upon agreement and any
traders can walk away from the intermediation without any payment to the middleman
and wait for nature to match. Some intermediaries also charge fixed membership fees upon
registration beforehand. The techniques applied in this paper can be viewed as the first
step of computing the expected payoffs from intermediated bargaining given the entry of
all the members. In particular, given the zero payoff on the buyer side when middleman is
the monopoly matchmaker, it can be inferred that the membership charges on the buyer
side should also be 0 unless other modification of the setting is made.
3.6. Conclusion
This paper investigates how intermediation through matchmaking in a bargaining network
can affect the efficiency of the matching and bargaining outcomes. We show 3 novel ways of
distortion a profit-maximizing middleman introduces to the matching: to restrain matchings
on a subnetwork; to select the maximum weight matching weighted by the buyers’ values;
and to match pairs selected less often by nature. As one of the first few attempts to
characterize the matchmaking intermediaries on a networked model, I introduce a general
framework based on a number of flexible settings such as (1) the exchange of heterogenous
goods, (2) arbitrary network structures, (3) impatient traders with arbitrary discount factor
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smaller than 1, (4) exogenous matching technology by nature with arbitrary probabilistic
distribution. Intermediated bargaining still contributes to an active area of research and
in the future, one can restrict the attention to more specific settings and derive further
interplay between the network structure and the intermediation
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1. Neighborhood Assignment
A paramount difference between neighborhood assignment and school choice is the strict
zoning constraint on student enrollment: whether outsiders of neighborhoods are allowed
to attend the neighborhood schools. Zoning and land use regulations are ubiquitous in
the United States. Many local governments will seek to limit housing development for
otherwise they must raise taxes to fund schools and other needed public services (Schill,
2005).1 Therefore in this paper, I assume that housing supply is also subject to a local
(zoning) constraint when the town runs neighborhood assignment to ensure that there are
enough slots in each neighborhood school for its resident students,
HB(ld, p) = min{kd, ldpr}.
A.1.1. Neighborhood Assignment Equilibrium
Under the neighborhood assignment rule, students are assigned to schools in the districts
they live in. Given the vector p of equilibrium prices for all school districts, student of type
x applies to her neighborhood school in district d if and only if it yields higher surplus than
her outside option. In other words, the payoff for student of type x to live in district d is,
U(x, d; p) = max{v(x, yd), pi(x)} − pd.
Definition 7 (Neighborhood Assignment Equilibrium). Given (y,k, µ), a neighborhood
assignment equilibrium is (p, {Td}), where p is the vector of equilibrium home prices,
Td ⊆ X is the set of student types that live in district d, such that,
1For example, according to the school impact fee study by Lee County in January 2012 (see https://www.
leegov.com/dcd/Documents/Studies_Reports/ImpactFees/SchoolImpactFee2012.pdf), the average total
capital cost per student of opening a new school is $25, 184, among which, $302 is covered by state funding
credit and $11, 442 by discounted future tax revenues within the next 20 years. Therefore, the net capital
cost per student would be $13, 440 on average, which will possibly be passed on to the residents.
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1. for each x ∈ Td, residential choice is optimal,
U(x, d; p) = max
1≤d′≤D
U(x, d′; p),
2. housing supply should match demand in each district,
HB(ld, pd) = µ(Td).
Condition (1) is an incentive compatibility condition, that each student is maximizing her
payoff given equilibrium prices. Condition (2) is a market clearing condition for the housing
market. µ(Td) is the measure of resident students in district d.
The supermodularity assumption on v(x, y) implies the marginal benefit for taking a higher
school quality y increases with higher student type x. When students are price takers,
households of higher types are willing to pay more on the margin for increases in school
quality. Therefore, equilibrium residential choices are assortative as a consequence of Topkis’
Monotonicity Theorem.
Lemma A.1.1. (Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem) For any pair of lattices (Y,) and (T,),
let f : Y ×T → R be a supermodular function (with coordinate-wise order). For each t ∈ T ,
let γ(t) = arg maxγ∈Γ(t) f(γ, t), where Γ(t) ⊆ Y . If t′ ≥ t and Γ(t′) ⊇ Γ(t), then γ(t′) ≥ γ(t).
Let Y = {(yd, pd)}d, T = [x, x¯]. It is easy to verify U(y, x) is supermodular on (Y, T ). Let
the choice set Γ(t) = Y for all t ∈ T . Then Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem implies the
following result appeared in a number of previous papers on neighborhood assignment.
Corollary A.1.2. Suppose pi(x) = −∞ for all x, then each Td is in the form of [xd, xd], s.t.,
x1 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xD ≤ xD, that is, in any neighborhood assignment equilibrium,
higher-type students live in higher-quality school districts.
This strict stratification result may not hold, however, for arbitrary pi(x) when the surplus
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between attending a local school and opting for the outside option does not satisfy some
single-crossing condition.
Proposition A.1.3. If Condition 1 holds, then for any (one-town) neighborhood assign-
ment equilibrium, there exists d∗ and xd∗ ≤ xd∗+1 ≤ . . . ≤ xD, s.t.
1. for all d ≥ d∗ + 1, Td = [xd−1, xd] ,
2. for all d ≤ d∗, Td ⊆ [x, xd∗ ], and pd = min{pj : 1 ≤ j ≤ D}.
Proposition A.1.3 shows a relaxed stratification result under neighborhood assignment with
outside options. Condition 1 implies that the set of acceptable schools is expanding with
higher type, which is exactly the assumption Γ(t′) ⊇ Γ(t), ∀t′ ≥ t in Topkis’ Monotonicity
Theorem ( Γ(t) is the choice set type t is optimizing over). Therefore, the optimal residential
choice is monotone in student type. The second statement in Proposition A.1.3 takes care of
the extreme cases when some local schools are unfavorable compared to the outside option.
Students are thus indifferent to any of these districts as they can always opt out.
As indicated above, neighborhood assignment is criticized for quality-ordered stratification
across neighborhoods and schools. Only students of high types live in top quality school
districts, and subsequently attend top quality schools. To offer more equitable access to
good schools, school choice is introduced.
79
A.2. Mathematical Appendix
A.2.1. Proof of Proposition 1.2.1
The argument applies to deferred acceptance with any tie breaking rule independent of
students’ reports and types. A continuum of students are matched to a finite set of schools
S = {1, 2, . . . , D}. In school choice, a student t differs in her profile (ut, et), where ut is the
vector of utilities of attending public schools and et ∈ [0, 2]D describe the school priorities
of student t, with sth entry ets indicating student t’s score at school s. e
t
s > e
t′
s if t has
higher priority than t′ at school s. Let Rt be a corresponding strict preference of student t.
Denote by R the set of strict preferences. The deferred acceptance mechanism is a stable
matching mechanism , and can be described using cutoffs P = (P1, P2, . . . , PD) ∈ [0, 2]D
such that, student t is admitted to school s if
D(R
t,et)
s (P) = 1{ets ≥ Ps, sRt∅}
∏
s′Rts
1{ets′ < Ps′} = 1,
and let η is measure over R× [0, 2]D. Then the aggregate demand for school s is Ds(P |η) =
η({t : D(Rt,et)s (P ) = 1}), satisfies Ds(P |η) ≤ ks for all s. Next we need to specify η.
Denote by H the set of {0, 1}D, each with only one non-zero entry. For ht ∈ H, htd = 1
if student t lives in district d. Denote by σ : X × H → ∆(R) households’ strategy of
preference submission. Each entry σR(t, h) is the probability of student of type t with her
choice of residence h reporting R. For each (R,h) ∈ R × H, mσ(R,h) = ∫X σR(t,h)dµ.
Since R × H is finite, and mσ is a discrete measure over student preference and priority
profiles. Each school s assigns a lottery number lts ∈ [0, 1] to student t. L is the measure on
{lts}t,s. More specifically, consider L to be the product measure on s independent Markov
processes {ls(t) : t ∈ T} with initial continuous and bounded distribution pi and transition
probabilities the same as pi. Under deferred acceptance with neighborhood priority, the
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assigned priority scores for student t is et = ht + lt. Then,
Ds(P |η) = η({t : D(Rt,et)s (P ) = 1})
= (mσ × L)({(Rt, ht, lt) : hts + lts ≥ Ps, and hts′ + lts′ < Ps′ for s′Rts}).
Suppose student of type t misreports. Denote by σ′ the new strategy profile. Then, µ({t :
σ′(t, ht) 6= σ(t, ht)}) = 0, and mσ = mσ′ . Hence the market clearing thresholds P under
σ and the market clearing threshold Pˆ under σ′ must satisfy: Pˆ = P . Then for any fixed
et and for any R ∈ R, D(Rt,et)s (P ) · ut ≥ D(R,e
t)
s (P ) · ut, by definition of D(R
t,et)
s (P ). Since
P = Pˆ , we have,
D(R
t,et)
s (P ) · ut ≥ D(R,e
t)
s (Pˆ ) · ut.
Therefore the expected utility of reporting Rt satisfies, for any R ∈ R,
Epi[D(R
t,et)
s (P ) · ut] ≥ Epi[D(R,e
t)
s (Pˆ ) · ut].
Thus we prove that truthful reporting is a Nash Equilibrium.
A.2.2. Expression and its Proof of Pr(s|d, h)
When everyone reports her preference truthfully in the second stage and admission is ra-
tioned by neighborhood priority, Pr(s|d,h) can be determined by the aggregate information
of applicants in each district, i.e.,
Pr(s|d,h) =

min{1− ∑
j>d
Pr(j|d,h), kdm˜d }, if s = d,
ks−Pr(s|s,h)m˜s
as−Pr(s|s,h)m˜s (1−
∑
j>s
Pr(j|d,h)), if s 6= d,
where m˜d is the number of residents in district d that find their neighborhood school d
acceptable. as is the aggregate number of applicants applying to school s who have been
rejected in the previous rounds. The expression incorporates two facts about deferred
acceptance: schools first assign seats to previously rejected resident students up to the school
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capacity; if there are slots left over, non-resident students are admitted up to the school
capacity. Applicants from the same priority class are equally treated by the assignment rule
regardless of their types.
Denote by Xs = {x ∈ X : v(x, ys) ≥ pi(x) > v(x, ys−1)}, then the measure of residents in
district d with school s being the least favored acceptable is msd =
∫
Xs hd(x)dµ. Denote
by Pr(s|d, h) the probability of enrolling in school s conditional on living in district d.
Pr(D|D,h) = min{ kD∑
s≤D
msD
, 1}, Pr(D|d, h) =
kD−
∑
j≤D
msD Pr(D|D,h)∑
d,s≤D
msd−
∑
s≤D
msD
, ∀d < D. For d < D,
Pr(s|s, h) = Pr(admitted to s| rejected by all j > s, s, h) · Pr(rejected by all j > s| s, h)
= min{1, ks(
1− ∑
j>s
Pr(j|s, h))m˜s } · (1−∑j>s Pr(j|s, h))
= min{1−
∑
j>s
Pr(j|s, h), ks
m˜s
}.
Here m˜s =
∑
r≤sm
r
s the measure of residents living in district s who also finds their neigh-
borhood school acceptable. The third equality is due to the fact that, the conditional prob-
ability of x being rejected to r > s depends on the event that x has lower priority scores
than those previously admitted, while the conditional probability of x being admitted to d
depends on her relative rank among those previously rejected. Here (1 − ∑
j>s
Pr(j|s, h))m˜s
is the number of applicants rejected from previous rounds. Similarly for d 6= s,
Pr(s|d, h) = Pr(admitted to s| rejected by all j > s, d, h) · Pr(rejected by all j > s| d, h)
=
ks − Pr(s|s, h)m˜s
as − Pr(s|s, h)m˜s (1−
∑
r>s
Pr(r|d, h)).
Here as =
∑
b≤D,j≤s
mjb(1−
∑
k>s
Pr(k|b, h)) the number of applicants to school s.
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A.2.3. Proof of Theorem 1.2.2
Suppose households are truth-telling in the second stage. To apply Theorem 2 from Schmei-
dler (1973), we need to modify some of the definitions.
1. X = [x, x¯] is set of student types with non-atomic measure µ.
2. h : X → {(σsd)s,d :
∑
s,d σ
s
d = 1}. Each entry hsd(x) is the probability of type x
choosing district d to live in and reporting preferences as if x ∈ Xs. H is set of all
Lebesgue integrable h with L1 weak topology.
3. p = (p1, p2, . . . , pD) :H → RD+ vector of housing prices. pd(h) = (
∫ ∑
s h
s
d(x)dµ
αkd
)
1
r .
4. uˆ : X ×H → RD2 , uˆsd(x,h) =
∑
j≥s
Pr(j|d,h)v(x, yj) +
(
1− ∑
j≥s
Pr(j|d,h))pi(x)− pd.
Then h is an equilibrium strategy if and only if, for all x and σ,h(x) · uˆ(x,h) ≥ σ · uˆ(x,h).
First by truth-telling of deferred acceptance, we restrict the attention to such equilibrium
strategy h that, for any x ∈ Xs, hjd(x) = 0, for j 6= s, and for any d. Theorem 1.2.2 then
is a direct corollary of Theorem 2 in Schmeidler (1973). To be more specific, it’s easy to
verify that (i) for all x ∈ X, uˆ(x, ·) is continuous on H , (ii) for h ∈ H and i, j, k,m, the
set {x ∈ X|uˆij(x,h) > uˆjk(x,h)} is measurable, (iii) uˆ(x,h) depends on p and Pr(s|d,h)
through msd =
∫
X h
s
d(x)dµ. Therefore by Theorem 2 in Schmeidler (1973), a pure strategy
NE exists.
A.2.4. Proof of Proposition 1.2.3
Let md =
∫
X hd(x)dµ be the number of residents in district d, m
s
d =
∫
Xs
hd(x)dµ be the
number of residents in district d with least favored acceptable school j.
Claim 1. If md ≤ kd, then ∀d′ < d, md′ ≤ kd′ , moreover md′kd′ ≤
md
kd
.
Proof of Claim 1: Proof by contradiction. Suppose ∃d′ < d, md′ > kd′ . Then pd′ > pd,
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and for any x s.t. jx ≤ d,
U(x, ed; p,h)− U(x, ed′ ; p,h) =
(
1−
∑
r>d
Pr(r|d, h))v(x, yd)− ∑
d≥r≥jx
Pr(r|d′, h)v(x, yr)
− (1−∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d′, h))pi(x) + pd′ − pd
>0.
For jx > d, U(x, ed; p,h) − U(x, ed′ ; p,h) = pd′ − pd > 0. Hence md′ = 0, contradicting
with md′ > kd′ . Moreover, the argument above proves that pd ≥ pd′ , i.e., md′kd′ ≤
md
kd
.
Letpmin = min1≤j≤D{pj} the lowest home price. m˜d =
∑
j≤dm
j
d.
Claim 2. If pd 6= pmin, then msd = 0 for all s > d.
This is obvious since for type x, the benefit of living in any district d′ < jx is the same and
she would prefer the one with the lowest home price.
Claim 3. Let d = max{1 ≤ j ≤ D : pj = pmin}, then pd′ = pmin, ∀d′ ≤ d.
Proof of Claim 3: By the definition of d, for any d′ > d, pd′ > pmin, thus md′ = m˜′d by
Claim 2. If kd ≥ m˜d, then ∀d′ < d and x s.t. jx ≤ d, U(x, ed; p,h) > U(x, ed′ ; p,h). Hence
mjd′ = 0, for all j ≤ d. By Claim 2, pd′ = pmin. If kd < m˜d, suppose pd−1 > pmin. Then
by Claim 2, m˜d−1 = md−1 > kd−1. For x s.t. jx ≥ d, U(x, ed; p,h) − U(x, ed−1; p,h) ≥
pd−1 − pd > 0. For x s.t. jx ≤ d− 1, since kd′ < md′ = m˜d′ ,
U(x, ed; p,h)− U(x, ed−1; p,h) = kd
m˜d
(v(x, yd)− w(x))− pd − kd−1
md−1
(v(x, yd−1)− w(x))
+ pd−1
>
kd
md
[v(x, yd)− w(x)]− kd−1
md−1
[v(x, yd−1)− w(x)]
>0.
Here w(x) =
∑
d−2≥r≥jx
kr−Pr(r|r,h)m˜r
ar−Pr(r|r,h)m˜r v(x, yr)+
(
1− ∑
d−2≥r≥jx
kr−Pr(r|r,h)m˜r
ar−Pr(r|r,h)m˜r
)
pi(x). Hencemd−1 =
0, contradicting with pd−1 > pmin. Apply the same argument above to show pd−2 = pd−3 =
. . . p1 = pmin, thus conclude the induction. We are ready to prove the theorem.
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Case 1. There exists d∗ = max{1 ≤ d ≤ D : md ≤ kd}.
By Claim 1, for all d ≤ d∗, md ≤ kd. For d′ < d ≤ d∗, U(x, ed; p,h) − U(x, ed′ ; p,h) ≥
pd′ − pd. Hence pd ≥ pd′ otherwise leading to a contradiction. For any d > d∗, md = m˜d,
U(x, ed+1; p,h)− U(x, ed; p,h)
=
kd+1
md+1
[v(x, yd+1)− w(x)]− pd+1 − kd
md
[v(x, yd)− w(x)] + pd,
(A.1)
where w(x) =
∑
d∗≥r≥jx
kr−Pr(r|r,h)m˜r
ar−Pr(r|r,h)m˜r v(x, yr) +
(
1 − ∑
d∗≥r≥jx
kr−Pr(r|r,h)m˜r
ar−Pr(r|r,h)m˜r
)
pi(x). Suppose
kd+1
md+1
≥ kdmd , then U(x, ed+1; p,h)− U(x, ed; p,h) > 0 for all jx ≤ d, which implies md = 0,
a contradiction. Hence pd+1 > pd for all d > d
∗. And pd∗+1 > pd∗ .
Case 2. md > kd for all d.
By Claim 3, there exists d∗ = max{1 ≤ d ≤ D : pd = pmin}, s.t. pd = pmin, ∀d < d∗. For
all d′ > d > d∗, by similar argument as in Eqn. (A.1), pd′ > pd. Therefore housing prices
ascend in quality under Case 1 and Case 2.
A.2.5. Proof of Theorem 1.3.1
Let P j = {x ∈ [x, x¯] : v(x, yj) ≥ pi(x) > v(x, yj−1)}. J = |{j : Pj 6= ∅}|. M is the simplex
in RD×J . m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mD) ∈ M , s.t. md = (mjd)j∈[J ], where mjd is the number of
residents with x ∈ P j that live in district dA .
Let ei be the 2D-dimensional unit vector with ith non-zero entry. Let V (xt, ei,m) be the
expected benefit of living in district i given m. A price vector p ∈ RD specifies housing
prices for each district in town B. The expected utility of living in district d in town A given
m is,
U(xt, edA ; m,p) = V (xt, edA ,m)− (
∑
jm
j
d
αkd
)1/r,
and the expected utility of living in district d in town B given p,
U(xt, edB ; m,p) = V (xt, edB ,m)− pd.
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Define student xt’s demand correspondence D(xt, p,m) as the set of all mixed strategies that
are best responses to p,m, i.e., D(xt,m,p) = arg maxφ∈Φ U(xt, φ; m,p). Define the aggre-
gate demand correspondence D : M×RD →→M×RD. D is a correspondence that maps a
price vector p and m the pre-assumed numbers of residents in each district of town A to num-
ber of residents who choose each district as best response. D(m,p) = {({DjdA}, {DdB}) :
h ∈H ,h(xt) ∈ D(xt,m,p), DjdA(m,p) =
∫
x∈P j hd(xA)dµA+
∫
x∈P j hd(xB)dµB, DdB (m,p) =∫
XA
hd(xA)dµA +
∫
XB
hd(xB)dµB.}. It is a correspondence since people may be indifferent
between different districts. For simplicity, for each h ∈H , denote by the vector
∫
hdµ =
(
(
∫
x∈P j
hdA(x)dµA +
∫
x∈P j
hdA(x)dµB)
j
d, (
∫
hdB (x)dµA +
∫
hdA(x)dµB)d
)
.
Define the tatonnement correspondence T : M ×RD →→M ×RD.
T (m,p) = (DA(m,p),g
r(m,p)), where DA(m,p) is the vector of house demand in town
B specifically among x ∈ Pj , r is the price elasticity of supply, gr = (gr1, gr2, . . . , grD) :
M ×RD → RD, s.t., if 0 < r < 1,
grd(m,p) =
 pd +DdB (m,p)−min{ldBp
r
d, kdB}, if pd ≥ 0,
−pd2 +DdB (m, (|pd|,p−d)), if pd < 0.
If r ≥ 1,
grd(m,p) = pd +
DdB (m, (pd,p−d))−min{ldBprd, kdB}
N
.
N is a constant to be specified later. DB(m,p) is the vector of house demand in town B,
kB the vector of capacity in town B. When p ≥ 0, p + DB(m,p) − min{lB · pr,kB} is
precisely the tatonnement process. It’s easy to verify that g is continuous function of p for
any fixed m.
Claim 1. each T (m,p) is non-empty and convex.
The set of D(m,p) is nonempty since each xt has at least one optimal district. Therefore,
there exists at least one satisfying h. To show T (m,p) is convex, it suffices to show D(m,p)
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is convex. For z, z′ ∈ D(m,p), there exists h,h′ s.t. z = ∫ hdµ and h(x) ∈ D(x,m,p) for
all x. Similarly z =
∫
h′dµ and h′(x) ∈ D(x,m,p). For any α ∈ (0, 1), since D(x,m,p)
is convex, we have αh(x) + (1 − α)h′(x) ∈ D(x,m,p) for all x. Hence αz + (1 − α)z′ =∫
αh(x) + (1− α)h′(x)dµ ∈ D(m,p).
Claim 2.1 For 0 < r < 1, there exists K > 0 such that T maps M × [−K,K]D to itself.
Pick K > 1 so that for all 1 ≤ d ≤ D, v(x, yd) − K + θ < kdBv(x, yd) − ( 1αkdA )
1/r, and
αKr ≥ 1. If 0 ≤ pd ≤ K, pd − kdB ≤ grd(m,p) ≤ pd + 1 ≤ K + 1. If K ≤ pd ≤ K + 1,
pd − kdB ≤ grd(m,p) ≤ pd − kdB . If −K ≤ pd ≤ 0, −p/2 ≤ grd(m,p) ≤ −p/2 + 1 Pick K + 1
is the bound for the domain of T .
Claim 2.2 For r ≥ 1,there exists K > 0 such that T maps M × [0,K]D to itself.
Pick the same K as Claim 2.1, then N s.t. α(K + 1)r−1 < N . If 0 ≤ pd ≤ K, grd(m,p) ≤
pd + 1 ≤ K + 1/N . If K ≤ pd ≤ K + 1, grd(m,p) ≤ pd − kdB/N . And for all p, grd(m,p) ≥
pd − αkdB p
r
d
N = pd(1−
αkdB p
r−1
d
N ) ≥ 0. Therefore K is the upper bound for the domain.
Claim 3: T (·, ·) has a closed graph.
Consider a sequence (mn,pn, zn) with zn ∈ D(mn,pn) and (mn,pn, zn) → (m,p, z) as
n → ∞. (m,p) ∈ M × RD. Need to show z ∈ D(m,p). Suppose not, we want to prove
a contradiction. Since zn ∈ D(mn,pn), there exists hn ∈ H such that zn = ∫ hndµ and
hn(x) ∈ D(x,mn,pn). Since the set of all allocation functionH is compact w.r.t. L1 norm
(Azevedo et al., 2013), {hn} has a convergent subsequence in L1 norm. Without loss of
generality, suppose that hn → h in L1 norm. h ∈H is the limit. By dominant convergence
theorem, ∫
hdµ =
∫
lim
n
hndµ = lim
n
∫
hndµ = lim
n
zn = z.
Now that z 6∈ D(m,p), µ({x ∈ X : h(x) 6∈ D(x,m,p)}) > 0. In particular, there exists
87
h′ ∈H and 0 > 0, such that
∫
V (x,h′,m)− (p˜(m),p) · h′dµ ≥
∫
V (x,h,m)− (p˜(m),p) · hdµ+ 0. (A.2)
where p˜ : M → RD s.t. p˜d(m) = (
∑
j m
j
d
αkd
)1/r. Define for each n, wn(x) ≡ mn, w(x) ≡ m.
wn → w a.e. therefore wn → w in L1 since X is compact. Then the vectors of function
(id,hn,wn) → (id,h,w) in L1, where id is identity map from X to X. Denote by fn =
(id,hn,wn), f = (id,h,w).
Since V is continuous and compactly supported, it’s uniformly continuous. the composition
V ◦ f is a continuous mapping from L1(R)2D+1 to L1(R)2D+1 by boundedness of f and
Markov inequality, i.e. for any  > 0, there exists δ > 0, s.t., for all ‖f − f ′‖1 < δ,
‖V ◦ f − V ◦ f ′‖1 < . Hence, there exists N1 s.t. ∀n > N1,
∫
|V (x,h,m)− V (x,hn,mn)|dµ < ,∫
|V (x,h′,m)− V (x,h′,mn)|dµ < ,
and since p˜ is continuous in m, there exists N2 s.t. ∀n > N2,
∫
|(p˜(m),p) · h− (p˜(mn), pn) · hn|dµ < ,∫
|(p˜(m),p) · h′ − (p˜(mn),pn) · h′|dµ < ,
From (A.2), the following must holds ∀n > max{N1, N2},
∫
V (x,h′,mn)− (p˜(mn),pn) · h′dµ ≥
∫
V (x,hn,mn)− (p˜(mn),pn) · hndµ+ 0 − 4.
In particular, ∃x ∈ X s.t.
V (x,h′,mn)− (p˜(mn),pn) · h′(x) > V (x,hn,mn)− (p˜(mn),pn) · hn(x),
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contradicting with hn(x) ∈ D(x,pn,mn). By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, there exists a
fixed point (m∗,p∗) ∈ T (m∗,p∗), in particular it must satisfy, (i) p∗ ≥ 0, (ii) DA(m∗,p∗) =
m∗, (iii) DdB (m
∗,p∗) = min{kdB , αkdB (p∗d)r} for all d. The first is due to the fact that
when 0 < r < 1, negative pd can’t be in the fixed point entry since pd = −pd/2 +DdB (p,m)
will yield 0 > pd =
2
3DdB (p,m) ≥ 0 a contradiction. For r ≥ 1 any fixed point must consist
of non-negative price vector by the domain of gr. Fix the equilibrium price p∗, and the
same argument of purification in Schmeidler (1973) Theorem 2 proves the existence of pure
strategy equilibrium.
A.2.6. Proof of Proposition 1.3.3
For town B, proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists x′ < x, x′ ∈ Bd′ , x ∈ Bd, s.t.
d′ > d. Since pd′B > p1B , j
′ = jx′ ≤ d′ and by Condition 1, jx = j ≤ j′ ≤ d′. If j ≤ j′ ≤ d,
by supermodularity of v(x, y), d ≤ d′ a contradiction. If j ≤ d < j′ ≤ d′, v(x′, yd′) −
pi(x′) ≥ pd′ − pd ≥ v(x, yd′) − v(x, yd), implies v(x′, yd′) − v(x′, yd) > v(x, yd′) − v(x, yd), a
contradiction. If d < j ≤ j′ ≤ d′, by monotonicity of v(x, yd′)− pi(x), it’s a contradiction.
For town A, we discuss by case. Let ∆V1 = V (x
′, ed′A ; p,h) − V (x′, edA ; p,h), ∆V2 =
V (x, ed′A ; p,h)− V (x, edA ; p,h). qr = Pr(r|1A,h).
Case 1. There exists d∗ = max{1 ≤ d ≤ D : mdA ≤ kdA}
Proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists x ∈ Ad, x′ ∈ Ad′ , s.t. d′ > d and x′ < x.
Denote by j = jx, j
′ = jx′ , then j′ ≥ j by Condition 1.
(i) d > d∗. By Claim 2 of Proposition 1.2.3, j ≤ d, j′ ≤ d′.
∆V2 =
kd′
md′
v(x, yd′)− kd
md
v(x, yd) + (
kd
md
− kd′
md′
)[
∑
r≥j
qrv(x, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j
qr)pi(x)].
∆V1 =
kd′
md′
v(x′, yd′)− kd
md
max{v(x′, yd), pi(x′)}
+ (
kd
md
− kd′
md′
)[
∑
r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)]
≤ kd′
md′
v(x′, yd′)− kd
md
v(x′, yd) + (
kd
md
− kd′
md′
)[
∑
r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)],
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since
kd′
md′
∂v
∂x(x, y
′
d) ≥ ∂v∂x(x, yd), kd′md′ v(x, yd′)−
kd
md
v(x, yd) >
kd′
md′
v(x′, yd′)− kdmd v(x′, yd).
Claim 5.
∑
r≥j
qrv(x, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j
qr)pi(x) ≥
∑
r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′).
Proof of Claim 5: LHS−RHS ≥∑r≥j′ qr[v(x, yr)−v(x′, yr)]+(1−∑r≥j′ qr)[pi(x)−pi(x′)] >
0, therefore ∆V2 > ∆V1, which implies x prefers d
′
A to dA, a contradiction.
(ii) d ≤ d∗ < d′. By Claim 2 of Proposition 1.2.3, j ≤ j′ ≤ d′.
(a) j ≤ j′ ≤ d.
∆V (z) =
kd′
md′
v(z, yd′)+(1− kd
′
md′
)
( ∑
r≥jz
qrv(z, yr)+(1−
∑
r≥jz
qr)pi(z)
)−∑
r>d
qrv(z, yr)−(1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(z, yd),
since ddz [
kd′
md′
v(z, yd′)−
∑
r>d
qrv(z, yr)− (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(z, yd)] > 0, ∀z ≥ x′. ∆V (x) > ∆V (x′).
(b) j ≤ d < j′ ≤ d′.
∆V2 =
kd′
md′
v(x, yd′) + (1− kd
′
md′
)
(∑
r≥j
qrv(x, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j
qr)pi(x)
)−∑
r>d
qrv(x, yr)
− (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(x, yd),
∆V1 =
kd′
md′
v(x′, yd′) + (1− kd
′
md′
)
(∑
r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)
)
−
∑
r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr)− (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)
<
kd′
md′
v(x′, yd′) + (1− kd
′
md′
)
(∑
r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)
)−∑
r>d
qrv(x
′, yr)
− (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(x
′, yd),
By part (a) of (ii), ∆V2 > ∆V1.
(c) d < j ≤ j′ ≤ d′.
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V (z, ed′ ; p,h)− V (z, ed; p,h) = kd′md′ [v(z, yd′)−
∑
r≥jz
qrv(z, yr)− (1−
∑
r≥jz
qr)pi(z)],
∆V2 −∆V1 = kd′
md′
[v(x, yd′)−
∑
r≥j
qrv(x, yr)− (1−
∑
r≥j
qr)pi(x)
− v(x′, yd′) +
∑
r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)]
>
kd′
md′
[v(x′, yd′)−
∑
r≥j
qrv(x
′, yr)− (1−
∑
r≥j
qr)pi(x
′)− v(x′, yd′)
+
∑
r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)],
since ddz [v(z, yd′)−
∑
r≥j
qrv(z, yr)− (1−
∑
r≥j
qr)pi(z)] ≥ 0, ∀z ≥ x′.
(iii) d < d′ ≤ d∗.
(a) pd′ ≥ pd > pmin. By Claim 2 of Proposition 1.2.3, j ≤ d, j ≤ j′ ≤ d′.
If j ≤ j′ ≤ d < d′,
∆V2 −∆V1 =
∑
r>d′
qrv(x, yr) + (1−
∑
r>d′
qr)v(x, yd′)−
∑
r>d
qrv(x, yr)− (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(x, yd)
−
∑
r>d′
qrv(x
′, yr)− (1−
∑
r>d′
qr)v(x
′, yd′)
+
∑
r>d
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(x
′, yd)
=(1−
∑
r>d′
qr)v(x, yd′)−
∑
d′≥r>d
qrv(x, yr)− (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(x, yd)
− (1−
∑
r>d′
qr)v(x
′, yd′) +
∑
d′≥r>d
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(x
′, yd).
Since ddz (1−
∑
r>d′
qr)v(z, yd′)−
∑
d′≥r>d
qrv(z, yr)− (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(z, yd) > 0, ∆V2−∆V1 > 0. If
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j ≤ d < j′ ≤ d′,
∆V2 −∆V1 =(1−
∑
r>d′
qr)v(x, yd′)−
∑
d′≥r>d
qrv(x, yr)− (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(x, yd)
− (1−
∑
r>d′
qr)v(x
′, yd′) +
∑
d′≥r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)
≥(1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)−
∑
j′>r>d
qrv(x
′, yr)− (1−
∑
r>d
qr)v(x
′, yd)
(b) pd′ > pd = pmin. By Claim 2 of Proposition 1.2.3, j ≤ j′ ≤ d′.
If j ≤ j′ ≤ d or j ≤ d < j′ ≤ d′, similar argument of part (a) in (iii) applies.
If d < j ≤ j′ ≤ d′,
∆V2 −∆V1 =(1−
∑
r≥d′+1
qr)v(x, yd′)−
∑
d′≥r≥j
qrv(x, yr)− (1−
∑
r≥j
qr)pi(x)
− (1−
∑
r≥d′+1
qr)v(x
′, yd′) +
∑
d′≥r≥j′
qrv(x
′, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥j′
qr)pi(x
′)
>
∑
j′>r≥j
qr[pi(x
′)− v(x′, yr)],
since ddx [v(z, yd′)− pi(z)] ≥ 0, ∀z ≥ x′.We have proved ∀d′ > d, pd′ > pmin in Case 1.
Case 2 ∀d, kd < md. Let d∗ = max{d : pd = pmin}, d˜ = max{d : m˜d ≤ kd}.
(i) d∗ < d < d′: similar argument as (i) in Case 1.
(ii) d˜ < d ≤ d∗ < d′: by Claim 2, j′ ≤ d′.If j ≤ d, apply similar argument in (i) of Case 1.
If d < j ≤ j′ ≤ d′. ∆V2 −∆V1 = kd′md′ (v(x, yd′)− pi(x))−
kd′
md′
(v(x′, yd′)− pi(x′)) > 0.
(iii) d ≤ d˜ ≤ d∗ < d′: by Claim 2, j′ ≤ d′. We can prove each scenario j ≤ j′ ≤ d,
j ≤ d < j′ ≤ d′, d < j ≤ j′ ≤ d′ by similar argument as (a) - (c) of (ii).
Therefore we have proved for ∀d′ > d, s.t. pd′ > pmin in Case 2.
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A.2.7. Proof of Proposition 1.3.4
First need to show that
∂2v
∂y2
(x,y)
∂v
∂y
(x,y)
= r(y) if and only if v(x, y) = g(x)w(y) + c(x), for some
continuous function g, w, c.
∂
∂y
[log
∂v
∂y
(x, y)] =r(y),
∂v
∂y
(x, y) = exp[
∫
r(z)dz + C(x)],
v(x, y) =
∫
exp(
∫
r(z)dz) exp[C(x)] + c(x).
For any district dA, the benefit of living is
V (x, edA ; p,h) = g(x)
(∑
r≥j
Pr(r|d, h)w(yd) + (1−
∑
d≥j
Pr(r|d, h))E[w(Y )])+ c(x),
where j is identical for all x by the assumption on pi(x). ddx [V (xt, edA ; p,h)−V (xt, ed′A ; p,h)]
has the identical sign for all x, therefore V (xt, edA ; p,h) − V (xt, ed′A ; p,h) satisfies single
crossing condition.
A.2.8. Proof of Proposition 1.3.6
Neighborhood Bd′ can be possibly disconnected by Ad as in Figure (11), where students of
x0 x1 x2 x3
Bd′ Ad Bd′
Preference x:
Figure 11: Disconnected neighborhood Bd′
types [x0, x1] ∪ [x2, x3] prefers Bd′ to Ad, students of types [x1, x2] prefers Ad to Bd′ . Since
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pd′B > pmin, jx ≤ d′ for all x ∈ [x0, x3].
D(x) =U(x, edA ; p,h)− U(x, ed′B ; p,h)
=
∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d,h)v(x, yr) +
(
1−
∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d,h))v(x, yjx−1)− v(x, yd′)
+
(
1−
∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d,h))(pi(x)− v(x, yjx−1))+ ∆p
=v(x,CE(x))− v(x, yd′) +
(
1−
∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d,h))(pi(x)− v(x, yjx−1)) + ∆p,
where ∆p = ±θ + pd′B − pdA , and CE(x) is the certainty equivalent s.t.,
v(x,CE(x)) =
∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d,h)v(x, yr) +
(
1−
∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d,h))v(x, yjx−1).
Need to show (i) CE(x) is non-decreasing function of x, (ii) CE(x) ≤ yd′ , for all x ≤
x2, (iii) ∂+D(x) is non-decreasing. Take D(x) as a piecewise twice differentiable func-
tion. Let X = X1 ∪ X2 ∪ . . . ∪ XD ∪ XD+1, where Xr = {x ∈ X : v(x, yr) ≥ pi(x) >
v(x, yr−1)}. In the interior of Xr, CE′(x) ≥ 0; at the boundeferred acceptancery ∂Xr =
{x : v(x, yr) = pi(x)}, CE(x) is non-decreasing by Condition 2. For (ii), prove by contradic-
tion. If CE(x2) > yd′ , ∂+D(x2) =
∂v
∂x(x2, CE(x2))− ∂v∂x(x2, y′d) + ∂v∂y (x,CE(x2))CE′(x2) +(
1 − ∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d,h))(pi′(x2) − ∂v∂x(x2, yjx2−1)), thus ∂+D(x2) > 0 a contradiction. Hence
CE(x2) ≤ yd′ . For (iii), in the interior of each Xr where D(x) is differentiable, and for all
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x ≤ x2,
D′(x) =
∂v
∂x
(x,CE) +
∂v
∂y
(x,CE)CE′(x)− ∂v
∂x
(x, yd′)
+
(
1−
∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d))(pi′(x)− ∂v
∂x
(x, yjx−1)),
D′′(x) =
∂2v
∂x2
(x,CE(x)) + 2
∂2v
∂x∂y
(x,CE(x))CE′(x) +
∂2v
∂y2
(x,CE(x))[CE′(x)]2
+
∂v
∂y
(x,CE(x))CE′′(x)− ∂
2v
∂x2
(x, yd′) +
(
1−
∑
r≥jx
Pr(r|d))(pi′′(x)− ∂2v
∂x2
(x, yjx−1))
>
∂2v
∂x2
(x,CE(x))− ∂
2v
∂x2
(x, yd′)
≥ 0.
On the boundeferred acceptancery, ∂+D(x)− ∂−D(x) = Pr(j|d,h)
(
pi′(x)− ∂v∂x(x, yj)
) ≥ 0.
Hence ∂+D(x) is non-decreasing and ∂+D(x2) > ∂+D(x1) ≥ 0, a contradiction.
Second, Bd′ can be possibly disconnected by Bd, d ≤ d∗ = max{d : pdB = p1B}.
x0 x1 x2 x3
Bd′ Bd Bd′
Preference x:
Figure 12: Disconnected neighborhood Bd′
By Condition 2, j3 ≤ d′. Denote by D(x) = v(x, yd′)−max{v(x, yd), pi(x)}. In the interior
of each Xr, s.t. r ≤ d, D′′(x) = ∂2v∂x2 (x, yd′)− ∂
2v
∂x2
(x, yd) < 0. In the interior of each Xr, s.t.
r > d, D′′(x) = [ ∂
2v
∂x2
(x, yd′) − ∂2v∂x2 v(x, yd)] − [pi′′(x) − ∂
2v
∂x2
(x, yd)] ≤ 0. At the discontinuous
point, ∂+D(x) − ∂−D(x) = ∂v∂x(x, yd) − pi′(x) ≤ 0. Therefore ∂+D(x2) < ∂+D(x1) ≤ 0, a
contradiction.
A.2.9. Proof of Proposition 1.3.5
Prove by contradiction. Suppose indifference curve crosses the type space at least twice, as
illustrated in Figure 13.
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x0 x1 x2 x3
Ad Bd′ Ad
Preference x
Figure 13: Disconnected Neighborhood Ad
Students of types [x0, x1] ∪ [x2, x3] prefers Ad to Bd′ , while students of types in [x2, x3]
prefers Bd′ to Ad. d
∗ = max{d : kdA ≥ mdA}.
(i) d > d∗.
Since mdA = m˜dA , assume without loss of generality [x0, x1]
⋃
[x2, x3] ⊆
⋃
r≤dXr.
D(x) =
kdA
mdA
v(x, yd)+(1− kdA
mdA
)
( ∑
r≥jx
qrv(x, yr)+(1−
∑
r≥jx
qr)pi(x)
)−max{v(x, yd′), pi(x)}+∆p.
If d′ < d, then for all x < x2, either ∂+D(x) >
kdA
mdA
∂v
∂x(x, yd)− ∂v∂x(x, yd′) ≥ 0, or ∂+D(x) =
kdA
mdA
( ∂v∂x(x, yd) − pi′(x)) + (1 −
kdA
mdA
)
(∑
r≥jx qr
∂v
∂x(x, yr) − pi′(x)
)
. By assumption of the
proposition, ∂+D(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≤ x2 and at least one non-zero right derivative. Since
D(x1) = 0, D(x) > 0 for all x > x1, a contradiction. If d
′ ≥ d, then j ≤ d ≤ d′, and
−∂+D(x) > (1− kdA
mdA
)[
∑
r≥jx
qr
(∂v
∂x
(x, yd′)− ∂v
∂x
(x, yr)
)
+(1−
∑
r≥jx
qr)
(∂v
∂x
(x, yd′)−pi′(x)] ≥ 0,
contradicting with ∂+D(x2) ≥ 0.
(ii) d ≤ d∗.
Consider d, s.t. pdA > p1A , then mdA = m˜dA . Without loss of generality, assume jx0 ≤ d,
hence jx ≤ d for all x ≥ x0 by Condition 1.
D(x) =U(x, edA ; p,h)− U(x, ed′B ; p,h)
=
∑
r≥d+1
qrv(x, yr) + (1−
∑
r≥d+1
qr)v(x, yd)−max{v(x, yd′), pi(x)}+ ∆p
=v(x,CE(x))−max{v(x, yd′), pi(x)}+ ∆p,
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If d > d′, ∂+D(x) > 0. Suppose d ≤ d′, by similar argument we can show that (i) CE(x) ≥
yd′ , for all x ≤ x2, (ii) D′′(x) ≤ 0.
D′(x) =
∂v
∂x
(x,CE(x)) +
∂v
∂y
(x,CE(x))CE′(x)− ∂v
∂x
(x, yd′),
D′′(x) =
∂2v
∂x2
(x,CE(x)) + 2
∂2v
∂x∂y
(x,CE(x))CE′(x) +
∂2v
∂y2
(x,CE(x))[CE′(x)]2
+
∂v
∂y
(x,CE(x))CE′′(x)− ∂
2v
∂x2
(x, yd′)
≤ ∂
2v
∂x2
(x,CE(x))− ∂
2v
∂x2
(x, yd′) +
∂v
∂y
(x,CE(x))CE′′(x).
Therefore D′′(x) ≤ 0,∂+D(x1) ≥ ∂+D(x2) ≥ 0 and ∂+D(x1) = 0 if and only if CE(x) = yd′
for all x ≤ x2.
A.2.10. Proof of Proposition 1.3.7
Case 1. There exists d∗ = max{1 ≤ d ≤ D : md ≤ kd}.
For d > d∗, if jx > d, U(x, ed; p,h) = pi(x)− pd. If jx ≤ d,
U(x, ed; p,h)+pd =
kd
m˜d
v(x, yd)+(1− kd
m˜d
)[
∑
d∗≥r≥jx
Pr(r|1, h)v(x, yr)+(1−
∑
d∗≥r≥jx
Pr(r|1, h))pi(x)].
For d ≤ d∗,
U(x, ed; p,h) =

∑
d∗≥r≥jx
Pr(r|1, h)v(x, yr) + (1−
∑
d∗≥r≥jx
Pr(r|1, h))pi(x)− pd, if jx > d,∑
d∗≥r>d
Pr(r|1, h)v(x, yr) + (1−
∑
d∗≥r>d
Pr(r|1, h))v(x, yd)− pd, if jx ≤ d.
Case 2. md > kd for all d.
Let pmin = min pd, d
∗ = max{1 ≤ d ≤ D, pd = pmin}.
Claim 4. If kd ≥ m˜d for some d ≤ d∗, then kd′ > m˜d′ , for all d′ < d.
Proof of Claim 4: Suppose not and there exists some d′ < d, kd′ > m˜d′ . For any jx ≤ d,
U(x, ed; p,h) > U(x, ed′ ; p,h). Therefore m˜d′ =
∑
j≤d′m
j
d′ = 0, which is a contradiction.
Let d˜ = max{1 ≤ r ≤ D : m˜d ≤ kd}. d˜ ≤ d∗, and by Claim 4, ∀d′ < d˜, m˜d′ = 0. Consider
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d ≥ d˜, if jx > d, U(x, edA ; p, h) = pi(x)− pdA . If jx ≤ d,
U(x, ed; p,h) =
kd
m˜d
v(x, yd) + (1− kd
m˜d
)[
∑
d˜≥r≥jx
qrv(x, yr) + (1−
∑
d˜≥r≥jx
qr)pi(x)]− pd.
For d < d˜,
U(x, ed; p,h) =

∑
d˜>r≥jx
Pr(r|1, h)v(x, yr) + (1−
∑
d˜>r≥jx
Pr(r|1, h))pi(x)− pd, if jx > d,∑
d˜>r>d
Pr(r|1, h)v(x, yr) + (1−
∑
d˜>r>d
Pr(r|1, h))v(x, yd)− pd, if jx ≤ d.
And pd = pmin for each d ≤ d∗.
A.2.11. Proof of Proposition 1.3.9
Only consider Case 1, since in Case 2, mdA > kdA ≥ mdB . For d > d∗, mdA > kd ≥
mdB . Suppose d ≤ d∗, for jx ≤ d, U(x, edA ; p,h) − U(x, edB ; p,h) ≥ pdB − pdA ; for
jx > d, U(x, edA ; p,h) − U(x, edB ; p,h) ≥ pdB − pdA . Hence pdB ≤ pdA , i.e.,
mdA
αkd
≥ prdB ≥
min{prdB , 1α} =
mdB
αkd
. Hence mdA ≥ mdB .
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1. Proof of Eqn (2.1)
To easily understand, consider the discrete case with infinitely many shops. Suppose there
are SL registered sellers in the platform and BL subscribed buyers. Consider the probability
of purchasing from firm j for a fixed buyer i,
Pr( a buyer purchases from firm j in kth search )
=
(k − 1)!(SL−1k−1 )
k!
(
SL
k
) (Pr(v − t < zL))k−1 Pr(v − tj ≥ zL)
=
1
SL
ρk−1L G¯(tj + zL)
where ρL = Pr(v − t < zL) is the probability of an unsuccessful shopping experience and
G¯(x) = 1−G(x). Hence the expected demand from BL consumers, by posting pDj , pLj is,
XL(p
D
j , p
L
j ) = BL[
∑
k
1
SL
ρk−1L G¯(tj + zL)]
=
BL
SL(1− ρL)G¯(tj + zL)
(B.1)
B.2. Proof of Lemma 2.4.1
Notice that if zL < zD, then subscribed buyers never search online thus SLPs = 0. In this
case, the platform does not operate in the first place.
Consider the case zL ≥ zD and will later confirm that it is an equilibrium. For firm j with
marginal cost mj ,
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Case 1 pLj ≤ pDj + wj . Then
(pLj , p
D
j ) = arg max
p1≤p2+wj
[
(p1 −mj)(1−G(p1 + zL)) BL
SL(1− ρL)
+ (p2 −mj)(1−G(p2 + zD)) BD
S(1− ρD)
]
= arg max
p1
[
(p1 −mj)(1−G(p1 + zL)) BL
SL(1− ρL)
]
+ arg max
p2
[
(p2 −mj)(1−G(p2 + zD)) Bd
S(1− ρD)
]
=(p(mj ; zL), p(mj ; zD))
The second equation is due to first-order condition,
d
dp
[(p−m)(1−G(p+ z)] = 1−G(p+ z)− g(p+ z)(p−m),
the right-hand side monotone in p, hence the unique global maximizer p = p(m, z) satisfies,
p = m+
1−G(p+ z)
g(p+ z)
,
and p(m; z) is non-increasing function of z due to Assumption 11. Hence p(mj , zL) ≤
p(mj , zD) and this holds for ∀mj .
1 ∂
∂m
p(m; z) = 1
1− ∂
∂x
(
1−G(x)
g(x)
)
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Case 2 pLj > p
D
j + wj .
piL(p
L
j , p
D
j ;mj) = maxp
[
(p−mj)(1−G(p+ zL + wj)) Bl
Sl(1− ρl)
+ (p−mj)(1−G(p+ zD)) BD
S(1− ρD)
]
≤max
p
(p−mj)(1−G(p+ zL + wj)) Bl
Sl(1− ρl)
+ max
p
(p−mj)(1−G(p+ zD)) BD
S(1− ρD)
≤max
p
(p−mj)(1−G(p+ zL)) Bl
Sl(1− ρl)
+ max
p
(p−mj)(1−G(p+ zd)) Bd
S(1− ρD)
=piL(p(mj ; zL), p(mj ; zD);mj),
which is not incentive compatible. Hence (pLj , p
D
j ) = (p(mj ; zL), p(mj ; zD)).
B.3. Proof of Theorem 2.4.3
Now let pL = p(mL, zL), p = p(m, zL). Some facts :
∂pL
∂mL
=
1 + ∂∂t
1−G
g
∂zL
∂mL
1− ∂∂t 1−Gg
∂pL
∂mL
+
∂zL
mL
=
1 + ∂zL∂mL
1− ∂∂t 1−Gg
∂p
∂mL
=
∂
∂t
1−G
g · ∂zL∂mL
1− ∂∂t 1−Gg
∂p
mL
+
∂zL
∂mL
=
∂zL
∂mL
1− ∂∂t 1−Gg
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The platform’s revenue is given by,
pi0 =PsSL + PbBL − C(BL, SL)
=(
BL
SL(1− ρL)
(1−G(pL + zL))2
g(pL + zL)
+ Vs)SL + (zL − zD + Vb)BL − C(SL, BL)
=BL[
(1−G(pL + zL))2
(1− ρL)g(pL + zL) + zL − zD + Vb] + VsSL − C(BL, SL)
=BLpi01 + VsSF (mL)− C(BL, SF (mL)).
Denote by
pi01 =
(1−G(pL + zL))2
(1− ρL)g(pL + zL) + zL − zD + Vb
=
(1−G(pL + zL))2
Pr(v − t ≥ zL)g(pL + zL) + zL − zD + Vb
=
F (mL)∫mL
m 1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)f(m)dm
(1−G(pL + zL))2
g(pL + zL)
+ zL − zD + Vb.
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Then the partial derivative is,
∂pi01
∂mL
=
f(mL)∫mL
m 1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF
(1−G(pL + zL))2
g(pL + zL)
− F (mL)
[
∫mL
m 1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF ]2
(1−G(pL + zL))2
g(pL + zL)
[(1−G(pL + zL))f(mL)
−
∫ mL
m
g(p(m, zL) + zL)(
∂
∂mL
p(m, zL) +
∂zL
∂mL
)f(m)dm]
+
F (mL)∫mL
m 1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)f(m)dm
( ∂
∂x
[
1−G
g
(x)]
· (1−G(x))− 1−G(x)
g(x)
g(x)
)|x=pL+zL( ∂pL∂mL + ∂zL∂mL ) + ∂zL∂mL
=
f(mL)(1−G(pL + zL))2
g(pL + zL)
∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF
− (1−G(pL + zL))
3F (mL)f(mL)
g(pL + zL)(
∫mL
m 1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF )2
+
(1−G(pL + zL))2F (mL)
g(pL + zL)(
∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF )2
·
∫ mL
m
g(p+ zL)
1
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dF
∂zL
∂mL
− F (mL)(1−G(pL + zL))∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF
(1 +
∂zL
∂mL
) +
∂zL
∂mL
=I1 + I2 · ∂zL
∂mL
,
where
I1 =
f(mL)(1−G(pL + zL))2
g(pL + zL)
∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF
∫mL
m G(pL + zL)−G(p+ zL)dF∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF
− F (mL)(1−G(pL + zL))∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF
,
I2 =1 +
(1−G(pL + zL))2F (mL)
∫mL
m g(p+ zL)
f(m)
1− ∂
∂x
( 1−G
g
)|x=p+zL
dm
g(pL + zL)(
∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF )2
− F (mL)(1−G(pL + zL))∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF
.
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From
cL =
1
F (mL)
∫ mL
m
∫ v¯
p(m,zL)+zL
(v − p− zL)dG(v)dF (m),
we can calculate its derivative with respect to mL,
cLf(mL) =f(mL)
∫ v¯
pL+zL
(v − pL − zL)dG(v)
+
∫ mL
m
∫ v¯
p(m,zL)+zL
−(∂p(m, zL)
∂mL
+
∂zL
∂mL
)dG(v)dF (m)
=f(mL)
∫ v¯
pL+zL
(v − pL − zL)dG
−
∫ mL
m
∫ v¯
p(m,zL)+zL
1
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dG(v)dF (m) · ∂zL
∂mL
=f(mL)
∫ v¯
pL+zL
(v − pL − zL)dG−
∫ mL
m
1−G(p+ zL)
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p+zL
dF · ∂zL
∂mL
.
The second equality is due to, ∂p(m,zL)∂mL =
∂
∂t(
1−G
g )|t=p(m,zL)+zL(∂p(m,zL)∂mL +
∂zL
∂mL
). Hence,
∂p(m, zL)
∂mL
+
∂zL
∂mL
=
1
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
∂zL
∂mL
.
To calculate the partial derivative of the second term:
∂zL
∂mL
=
f(mL)(cL −
∫ v¯
pL+zL
(v − pL − zL)dG)
− ∫mL
m
1−G(p(m,zL)+zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
=
f(mL)
F (mL)
[
∫mL
m
∫ v¯
p(m,zL)+zL
(v − p− zL)dGdF −
∫mL
m
∫ v¯
pL+zL
(v − pL − zL)dGdF ]
− ∫mL
m
1−G(p(m,zL)+zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
=
f(mL)
F (mL)
[
∫mL
m
∫ v¯
pL+zL
pL − p(m, zL)dGdF +
∫mL
m
∫ pL
p(m,zL)
(x− p)dG(x)dF ]
− ∫mL
m
1−G(p(m,zL)+zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
=
f(mL)[
∫mL
m
pL − p(m, zL)dF · (1−G(pL + zL)) +
∫mL
m
∫ pL
p(m,zL)
(x− p)dGdF ]
−F (mL)
∫mL
m
1−G(p+zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
=−
f(mL)[
∫mL
m
F (m)
1− ∂∂x ( 1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dm · (1−G(pL + zL))]
F (mL)
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m,zL)+zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
−
f(mL)
∫mL
m
∫ pL
p(m,zL)
(x− p(m, zL))dG(x)dF ]
F (mL)
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m,zL)+zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
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the last equality is due to
∫ mL
m
p(mL, zL)− p(m, zL)dF =
∫ mL
m
∫ mL
m
f(m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p(t,zL)+zL
dtdm
=
∫ mL
m
∫ t
m
f(m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p(t,zL)+zL
dmdt
=
∫ mL
m
F (m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p(m,zL)+zL
dm
And
∫ mL
m
G(p(mL, zL) + zL)−G(p+ zL)dF =
∫ mL
m
g(p(m, zL) + zL)F (m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p(m,zL)+zL
dm.
Therefore
∂pi0
∂mL
= BL(I1 + I2
∂zL
∂mL
) + VsSf(mL)− ∂C
∂y
(BL, SL)Sf(mL),
and
I1 + I2
∂zL
∂mL
=
f(mL)(1−G(pL + zL))2
∫mL
m
g(p(m,zL)+zL)F (m)
1− ∂∂x ( 1−Gg )|x=p(m,zL)+zL
dm
g(p(mL, zL) + zL)[
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)f(m)dm]2
− F (mL)(1−G(p(mL, zL) + zL))∫mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF
− [
f(mL)(1−G(pL + zL))
∫mL
m
F (m)
1− ∂∂x ( 1−Gg )|x=p(m,zL)+zL
dm
F (mL)
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m,zL)+zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
+
f(mL)
∫mL
m
∫ pL
p(m,zL)
(x− p)dG(x)dF
F (mL)
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m,zL)+zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF (m)
]
· [
(1−G(pL + zL))2F (mL)
∫mL
m
g(p(m,zL)+zL)f(m)
1− ∂∂x ( 1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dm
g(p(mL, zL) + zL)(
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF )2
+ 1− F (mL)(1−G(pL + zL))∫mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF
]
≤
f(mL)(1−G(pL + zL))2
∫mL
m
g(p(m,zL)+zL)F (m)
1− ∂∂x ( 1−Gg )|x=p(m,zL)+zL
dm
g(pL + zL)[
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)f(m)dm]2
− F (mL)(1−G(pL + zL))∫mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF
−
f(mL)(1−G(pL + zL))
∫mL
m
F (m)
1− ∂∂x ( 1−Gg )|x=p(m,zL)+zL
dm
F (mL)
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m,zL)+zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
· [
(1−G(pL + zL))2F (mL)
∫mL
m
g(p(m,zL)+zL)f(m)
1− ∂∂x ( 1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dm
g(pL + zL)(
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF )2
+
∫mL
m
g(p(m,zL)+zL)F (m)
1− ∂∂x ( 1−Gg )|x=p(m,zL)+zL
dm∫mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF
]
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where pL = p(mL, zL). The second inequality is due to
1− F (mL)(1−G(pL + zL))∫mL
m 1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF
=
∫mL
m G(pL + zL)−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF∫mL
m 1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)dF
≥ 0
Need to show that I1 + I2
∂zL
∂mL
, which suffices to show that
(1−G(pL + zL))
∫mL
m
g(p(m,zL)+zL)F (m)
1− ∂
∂x
( 1−G
g
)|x=p+zL
dm
g(pL + zL)
∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)f(m)dm
≤F (mL)
f(mL)
+
(1−G(pL + zL))2
∫mL
m
F (m)
1− ∂
∂x
( 1−G
g
)|x=p+zL
dm
∫mL
m
g(p+zL)f(m)
1− ∂
∂x
( 1−G
g
)|x=p+zL
dm
g(pL + zL)
∫mL
m
1−G(p+zL)
1− ∂
∂t
( 1−G
g
)|t=p+zL
dF
∫mL
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF
+
∫mL
m
F (m)
1− ∂
∂x
( 1−G
g
)|x=p(m,zL)+zL
dm
∫mL
m
g(p(m,zL)+zL)F (m)
1− ∂
∂x
( 1−G
g
)|x=p+zL
dm
F (mL)
∫mL
m
1−G(p(m,zL)+zL)
1− ∂
∂t
( 1−G
g
)|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
which is equivalent to
1−G(pL + zL)
g(pL + zL)
∫ mL
m
g(p+ zL)F (m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p(m,zL)+zL
dm
∫ mL
m
1−G(p+ zL)
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
≤F (mL)
f(mL)
∫ mL
m
1−G(p) + zL)
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p+zL
dF
∫ mL
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF
+
(1−G(pL + zL))2
g(pL + zL)
∫ mL
m
F (m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dm
∫ mL
m
g(p(m, zL) + zL)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dF
+
1
F (mL)
∫ mL
m
F (m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dm
·
∫ mL
m
g(p(m, zL) + zL)F (m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dm
∫ mL
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF
106
Notice under the condition f ′(m) ≤ 0, we have
1−G(pL + zL)
g(pL + zL)
∫ mL
m
g(p+ zL)F (m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dm
∫ mL
m
1−G(p+ zL)
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p+zL
dF
≤F (mL)
∫ mL
m
1−G(p+ zL)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dm
∫ mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dF
≤F (mL)
f(mL)
∫ mL
m
(1−G(p(m, zL) + zL))f(m)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dm
∫ mL
m
1−G(p+ zL)
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p+zL
dF
≤F (mL)
f(mL)
∫ mL
m
(1−G(p(m, zL) + zL))dF
∫ mL
m
1−G(p(m, zL) + zL)
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p+zL
dF
Hence I1 + I2
∂zL
∂mL
≤ 0 Therefore
∂pi0
∂mL
= BL(I1 + I2
∂zL
∂mL
) + Sf(mL)(Vs − ∂C
∂y
(BL, SL)) ≤ 0.
B.4. Proof of Theorem 2.5.1
WL(cL) =
∫ ∫
v−t≥zL v −mdGdF˜L
1− ρL −
cL
1− ρL
=
∫ ∫
v−t≥zL t−mdGdF˜L
1− ρL + zL
=
∫ 1−G(p+zL))2
g(p+zL)
dF˜L
1− ρL + zL
(B.2)
Suppose that m∗L is the optimal threshold strategy selected by the platform such that
m∗L = arg maxpi0(mL).
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Then m∗L is a function of cL, and
∂p
∂cL
=
∂
∂t(
1−G
g )|t=p(m,zL)+zL · ∂zL∂cL
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
∂p
∂cL
+
∂zL
∂cL
=
∂zL
∂cL
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
∂pL
∂cL
+
∂zL
∂cL
=
∂m∗L
∂cL
+ ∂zL∂cL
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=pL+zL
From
cLF (m
∗
L) =
∫ m∗L
m
∫ v¯
p(m,zL)+zL
(v − p− zL)dG(v)dF (m),
we can calculate its derivative with respect to cL,
cLf(m
∗
L)
∂m∗L
cL
+ F (m∗L) =
∫ m∗L
m
∫ v¯
p(m,zL)+zL
−( ∂p
∂cL
+
∂zL
∂cL
)dGdF +
∫ v¯
pL+zL
(v − pL − zL)dG · f(m∗L)
∂m∗L
∂cL
=
∫ m∗L
m
∫ v¯
p(m,zL)+zL
−
∂zL
∂cL
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|t=p(m,zL)+zL
dGdF
+
∫ v¯
pL+zL
(v − pL − zL)dG · f(m∗L)
∂m∗L
∂cL
=
∫ m∗L
m
− 1−G(x)
1− ∂∂x(1−Gg )
|x=p(m,zL)+zLdF ·
∂zL
∂cL
+
∫ v¯
pL+zL
(v − pL − zL)dG · f(m∗L)
∂m∗L
∂cL
.
Hence
∂zL
∂cL
=
(
∫ v¯
pL+zL
(v − pL − zL)dG− cL)f(m∗L)∂m
∗
L
∂cL
− F (m∗L)∫m∗L
m
1−G(x)
1− ∂
∂t
( 1−G
g
)
|x=p(m,zL)+zLdF
=−
∂m∗L
∂cL
f(m∗L)
F (m∗L)
[(1−G(pL + zL))
∫m∗L
m (pL − p)dF +
∫m∗L
m
∫ pL
p (v − p)dGdF ] + F (m∗L)∫m∗L
m
1−G(x)
1− ∂
∂x
( 1−G
g
)
|x=p(m,zL)+zLdF
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For seller registered on the platform
∂WL
∂cL
=
∂zL
∂cL
+
(1−G(pL+zL))2
g(pL+zL)
f(m∗L)∫m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF
∂m∗L
∂cL
+
∫
∂
∂x [
(1−G(x))2
g(x) ]|x=p+zL · ( ∂p∂cL + ∂zL∂cL )dF∫m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF
−
∫ (1−G(p+zL))2
g(p+zL)
dF
(
∫m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF )2
[(1−G(pL + zL))f(m∗L)
∂m∗L
∂cL
−
∫ m∗L
m
g(p+ zL)(
∂p
∂cL
+
∂zL
∂cL
)dF ]
=
∂m∗L
∂cL
[
(1−G(pL+zL))2
g(pL+zL)
f(m∗L)∫m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF
−
∫ (1−G(p+zL))2
g(p+zL)
dF
(
∫m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF )2
(1−G(pL + zL))f(m∗L)]
+
∂zL
∂cL
[
∫
∂
∂x [
(1−G(x))2
g(x) ]|x=p+zL 11− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|x=p+zL dF∫m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF
+
∫ (1−G(p+zL))2
g(p+zL)
dF
(
∫m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF )2
∫ m∗L
m
g(p+ zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dF + 1]
=
∂m∗L
∂cL
(1−G(pL + zL))f(m∗L)
(
∫m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF )2
[
1−G(pL + zL)
g(pL + zL)
∫ m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF
−
∫
(1−G(p+ zL))2
g(p+ zL)
dF ]
+
∂zL
∂cL
[
∫ (1−G(p+zL))2
g(p+zL)
dF
(
∫m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF )2
∫ m∗L
m
g(p+ zL)
1− ∂∂t ( 1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dF ]
Here, ∫ (1−G(p+zL))2
g(p+zL)
dF
(
∫m∗L
m 1−G(p+ zL)dF )2
∫ m∗L
m
g(p+ zL)
1− ∂∂t(1−Gg )|x=p+zL
dF > 0.
Moreover by monotonicity of 1−G(x)g(x) ,
1−G(pL + zL)
g(pL + zL)
∫ m∗L
m
1−G(p+ zL)dF −
∫
(1−G(p+ zL))2
g(p+ zL)
dF ≤ 0.
If
∂m∗L
∂cL
≥ 0, we have ∂zL∂cL < 0, therefore
∂WL
∂cL
≤ 0.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1. Proof of Theorem 3.2.1 under the choice “α + β”
Under α+ β commission fees:
b propose to s : (vbs − (1 + β)p, (1− α)p− cs)
s proposes to b: (vbs − (1 + β)p, (1− α)p− cs).
I provide a characterization of MPE payoffs and strategies. Suppose agent of type i has
discounting factor δi ∈ (0, 1). The Markov state in this model is the network induced by
players who did not reach agreement, and the commission fees, the matchmaker’s identity
and the selection of a link and a proposer.
Denote by ht a complete history of the game up to (not including) time t, which is the
choice of payment schemes, a sequence of t− 1 pairs of proposers and responders in G with
corresponding proposals and responses, payment to the middleman if possible and whether
the matched pair exiting the market with an agreement are replaced by an exactly new pair
of traders at the same position. The history ht uniquely determines the set of players V (ht)
still active at time t. Denote by G(ht) the subnetwork of G induced by V (ht). Denote byH
the set of any possible complete histories at t ≥ 1 and G the set of subnetworks of G induced
by any complete histories, i.e., G = ∪h∈H G(h). The history (ht;1M ) denotes the history ht
followed by the matching maker being middleman M or nature ( 1M = 1 if it’s middleman
who selects the pair at time t and 0 otherwise). The history (ht;1M ; i → j) consists of ht
followed by nature/middleman selecting i to propose to j, and (ht;1M ; i→ j;x) consists of
additionally the proposed transfer x ∈ R made by i to j.
A strategy profile {σ} is a Markov (stationary) strategy profile if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
any ht, h
′
t′ ∈H s.t. G(ht) = G(h′t′),
σα+βi (ht;1M ; i→ j) = σα+βi (h′t′ ;1M ; i→ j),
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σα+βi (ht;1M ; j → i;x) = σα+βi (h′t′ ;1M ; j → i;x)
σα+βM (ht;1M ) = σ
α+β
M (h
′
t′ ;1M )
A Markov strategy σ is Markov Perfect Equilibrium if it is Markov (stationary) strategy
and subgame perfect.
Given a set of network G , a collection of Markov strategy profile σ for the respective game
Γα+β(G) is subgame consistent if for any pair of networks G,G′ ∈ G , the Markov strategy
profiles σα+β(G) and σα+β(G′), conditional the initial state G and α+ β, induce the same
behavior in any pair of identical subgames of Γα+β(G′) and Γα+β(G). Formally, subgame
consistency of (Γα+β(G))G∈G if for any pair of networks G,G′ ∈ G , and any ht, h′t′ ∈ H ,
s.t., G(ht) = G
′(h′t′),
σi(G)(ht;1M ; i→ j) = σi(G′)(h′t′ ;1M ; i→ j),
σi(G)(ht;1M ; j → i;x) = σi(G′)(h′t′ ;1M ; j → i;x)
σM (G)(ht;1M ) = σM (G
′)(h′t′ ;1M )
I use a fixed point argument to give an non-constructive proof of the existence of MPEs.
Denote u the vector of equilibrium payoff induced by an Markov strategy profile σ of the
game Γα+β(G). By definition, any MPE σ∗ must belong to a subgame consistent collection
of MPEs σ|G′ of the respective subgames G′ ∈ G . In particular, when Γα+β(G) is played
according to MPE σ∗(G), every player i ∈ B ∪ S has ex ante payoffs ui(G, σ∗) before any
pairs are selected, and uk(G	{i, j}, σ∗) at the beginning of any subgame before which only
i and j reached an agreement (k 6= i, j).
Fix a history ht along which no agreement has been reached, that is G(ht) = G0. Suppose
now that it is middleman’s turn to select a bargaining pair e ∈ E. After the matched pair is
realized, suppose is (b, s), with b being the proposer, in the subgame following (ht; b→ s, x),
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it must be that the strategy σs(ht; b → s, x) specifies that player s accepts any offer s.t.
(1 − α)p − cs > δsus, and reject any offer s.t. (1 − α)p − cs < δsus, and may accept with
positive probability the offer p = cs+δsus1−α . Then by subgame perfection, player b does not
offer to pay a price more than cs+δsus1−α . On the other hand, the offer p proposed by b must
satisfy vbs − (1 + β)p ≥ δbus, i.e., p ≤ vbs−δbub1+β .
Let qbs be the probability ( conditional on (ht;1M = 1; b → s)) of the joint event that b
offers min{ cs+δsus1−α , vbs−δbub1+β } to s and the offer is accepted. The payoff of player k 6= b, s at
the beginning of the next period conditional on (ht;1M = 1; b→ s)) is qbs(1− γ)δkuk(G0	
{b, s}) + [qbsγ + (1− qbs)]δkuk(G0).
Case 1. vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) > δbub.
Conditional on (ht; b → s), it must be that qbs = 1 . To see this, if q˜bs < 1, then b’s
expected payoff conditional on offering p = cs+δsus1−α is qbs(vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs)) + (1 −
qbs)δbus < vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs), while it is more profitable to offer p = cs+δsus1−α +  with
payoff vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) − (1 + β), for sufficiently small  > 0. And it’s obvious that
offers p smaller than cs+δsus1−α are not optimal for i since they are rejected with certainty
and yields cs+δsus1−α < vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs). Hence s has no best response to b’s equilibrium
strategy when qij < 1, a contradiction. Hence qbs = 1. Moreover Pr(‘Y es
′|(ht;1M = 1; b→
s; p)) = qbs = 1, for p =
cs+δsus
1−α .
Case 2. vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) < δbub.
By a similar fashion, one could show that qbs = 0 = Pr(‘Y es
′|(ht; b → s; p)) since b’s offer
is no more than vbs−δbub1+β <
cs+δsus
1−α .
Case 3. vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) = δbub.
When b is chosen to propose a bid-price to s, whether they reach an agreement or not, the
payoff for both agents are respectively δbub and δsvs, i.e., any value qbs ∈ [0, 1] support the
(ht;1M = 1; b→ s; p). Since b and s are indifferent between any p ≤ cs+δsus1−α ,WOLG assume
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that qbs = Pr(‘Yes’|(ht;1M = 1; b→ s; p)).
Similarly, suppose now that it is middleman’s turn to pick a bargaining pair e ∈ E. After
the matched pair is realized, suppose is (s, b), with s being the proposer, in the subgame
following (ht;1M = 1; s → b; p), it must be that the strategy σs(G0)(ht;1M = 1; b → s; p)
specifies that player b accepts any price p s.t. vbs−(1+β)p > δbub, and reject any price p s.t.
vbs− (1 + β)p < δbub, and may accept with some probability the offer p = vbs−δbub1+β . Similar
argument can be applied to the induction of qsb, with Pr(‘Y es
′|(ht;1M = 1; b→ s; p)) = qsb
where p = max{ cs+δsus1−α , vbs−δbub1+β }.
Hence for any mixed matching strategy w by the middleman M over matched pair E, the
continuation payoff {ui(G0)} satisfy,
ub =
∑
s
λwbsqbs(vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs)) + (1− λ)pbsq˜bs(vbs − (δsus + cs))
+
∑
s
(
(λwbs(1− qbs) + (1− λ)pbs(1− q˜bs)
)
δbub
+
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δbub]
(C.1)
us =
∑
b
λwsbqsb(
1− α
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)− cs) + (1− λ)psbq˜sb(vbs − δbub − cs)
+
∑
b
(
(λwsb(1− qsb) + (1− λ)psb(1− q˜sb)
)
δsus
+
∑
b
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs)δsus
+
∑
j,k 6=s
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δsus(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δsus]
(C.2)
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where
qbs =

1 if vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) > δbub
[0, 1] if vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) = δbub,
0 if vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) < δbub.
(C.3)
And
qsb =

1 if
1− α
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)− cs > δsus
[0, 1] if
1− α
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)− cs = δsus,
0 if
1− α
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)− cs < δsus.
(C.4)
Notice that
vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) > δbub ⇐⇒
1− α
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)− cs > δsus}.
Denote by q˜ij = Pr(‘Y es
′|(ht;1M = 0; i → j; p)) where p = min{cs + δsus, vbs − δbub} if
i ∈ B and p = max{cs + δsus, vbs − δbub} if i ∈ S, then by similar arguments,
q˜sb =

1 if vb − cs > δbub + δsus
[0, 1] if vb − cs = δbub + δsus,
0 if vb − cs < δbub + δsus.
(C.5)
q˜bs =

1 if vb − cs > δbub + δsus,
[0, 1] if vb − cs = δbub + δsus,
0 if vb − cs < δbub + δsus.
(C.6)
Since the middleman is maximizing her discounted aggregate profit when deciding which
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link to pick from G,
piM (G)
=(1− δM )λmax
b,s
max{qbs[α+ β
1− α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (qbsγ + 1− qbs)δMpiM (G),
qsb[
α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] +
(
qsbγ + 1− qsb
)
δMpiM (G)}
+ (1− δM )(1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij [q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j}) + (q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)δMpiM (G)],
where
wbs + wsb > 0⇒ piM (G)
=(1− δM )λmax{qbs[α+ β
1− α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (qbsγ + 1− qbs)δMpiM (G),
qsb[
α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] +
(
qsbγ + 1− qsb
)
δMpiM (G)}
+ (1− δM )(1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij [q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j}) + (q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)δMpiM (G)].
This yields:
piM (G)/(1− δM )
= max{max
b,s
λqbs[
α+β
1−α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qbsγ + 1− qbs)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)
. . . ,max
b,s
λqsb[
α+β
1+β
(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qbsγ + 1− qsb)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij) }
Let gij(u) =
α+β
1−α (δjuj + cj) if i ∈ B, j ∈ S, and gij(u) = α+β1+β (vij − δjuj) if i ∈ S, j ∈ B.
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f(u,q, q˜)
={(u′,q′, q˜′)|q˜′bs = q˜′sb = 1(0) if vbs − cs > (<)δbub + δsus,
and q˜′sb, q˜
′
bs ∈ [0, 1] if vbs − cs = δbub + δsus,
q′sb = q
′
bs = 1(0) if vbs −
1 + β
1− α (δsus + cs) > (<)δbub, and q
′
sb, q
′
bs ∈ [0, 1] otherwise ;
∃w ∈ ∆, s.t.
∑
i,j∈B∪S
wij ≤ 1, and
{ij|wij > 0}
⊆
λqij [gij(u) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qijγ + 1− qij)− (1− λ)δM
∑
k,l∈B∪S
pkl(q˜klγ + 1− q˜kl) ;
u′b =
∑
s
λwbsqbs max{vb − 1 + β
1− α (δsus + cs), δbub}+ (1− λ)pbsq˜bs max{vb − (δsus + cs), δbub}
+
∑
s
(
(λwbs(1− qbs) + (1− λ)pbs(1− q˜bs)
)
δbub
+
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)δbub(G0 	 {j, k}) + (λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj))δbub
u′s =
∑
b
λwsbqsb max{1− α
1 + β
(vb − δbub)− cs, δsus}+ (1− λ)psbq˜sb max{vb − δbub − cs, δsus}
+
∑
b
(
(λwsb(1− qsb) + (1− λ)psb(1− q˜sb)
)
δsus
+
∑
b
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs)δsus
+
∑
j,k 6=s
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δsus(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δsus]}
First need to show that f has fixed point. Let v¯ = maxb,s(vbs − cs).
Lemma C.1.1. f : [0, v¯]B∪S × [0, 1]E × [0, 1]E → [0, v¯]B∪S × [0, 1]E × [0, 1]E has a fixed
point.
Proof.
Claim 1. ∀q, q˜,u, f(u,q, q˜) is non-empty and convex.
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Proof of Claim 1: It’s easy to see that f(u,q, q˜) is non-empty.
∀u,q, q˜, and (u′,q′, q˜′), (u′′,q′′, q˜′′) ∈ f(u,q, q˜), η ∈ [0, 1],
ηq˜′bs + (1− η)q˜′′bs = ηq˜′sb + (1− η)q˜′′sb = 1(0) if vbs > (<)δbub + δsus.
ηq′sb + (1 − η)q′′sb = ηq′bs + (1 − η)q′′bs = 1(0) if vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) > (<)δbub, and ηq′sb +
(1− η)q′′sb, ηq′bs + (1− η)q′′bs ∈ [0, 1] otherwise.
Suppose w′,w′′ are corresponding ws in the mapping that maps to u′,u′′,
then supp(w′), supp(w′′) all belong to
arg max
i,j
λqij [gij(u) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qijγ + 1− qij)− (1− λ)δM
∑
k,l∈B∪S
pkl(q˜klγ + 1− q˜kl) ,
hence {ij|ηw′ij + (1− η)w′′ij > 0} belong to the set
arg max
i,j
λqij [gij(u) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qijγ + 1− qij)− (1− λ)δM
∑
k,l∈B∪S
pkl(q˜klγ + 1− q˜kl) .
Therefore (ηu′ + (1− η)u′′, ηq′ + (1− η)q′′, ηq˜′ + (1− η)q˜′′) ∈ Γ(u,q, q˜)
Claim 2. f has closed graph.
Proof of Claim 2: For any (xn,yn, zn) ∈ f(un,qn, q˜n), where
(un,qn, q˜n)→ (u,q, q˜), (xn,yn, zn)→ (x,y, z).
If vbs − cs > δbub + δsus, there exists some n1 > 0, s.t.
vbs − cs > δsuns + δbunb , ∀n > n1
thus znsb = z
n
bs = 1, ∀n > n1,and zbs = zsb = 1.
If vbs − cs < δbub + δsusj, there exists some n2 > 0, s.t.
vbs − cs < δbunb + δsuns , ∀n > n2,
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and znbs = z
n
sb = 0, ∀n > n2, thus zbs = zsb = 0.
If vbs − cs = δbub + δsus, zbs, zsb ∈ [0, 1] is trivial. Similarly, we can prove that
ysb = ybs = 1(0) if vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) > (<)δbub, and ysb, ybs ∈ [0, 1] otherwise .
Next let
ζij(u,q, q˜) =
λqij [gij(u) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qijγ + 1− qij)− (1− λ)δM
∑
k,l∈B∪S
pkl(q˜klγ + 1− q˜kl) .
It’s obvious that for each (un,qn, q˜n), the corresponding wn satisfies the following
wnij( max
i,j∈B∪S
ζij(u
n,qn, q˜n)− ζij(un,qn, q˜n)) = 0,∀n, i, j ∈ B ∪ S.
Suppose that a subsequence wnk converges to w. Since max ζij(·), ζij(·) are all continuous,
let k →∞, we have
wij( max
i,j∈B∪S
ζij(u,q, q˜)− ζij(u,q, q˜)) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ B ∪ S.
Thus {ij|wij > 0} ⊆
arg max
ij
λqij [gij(u) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qijγ + 1− qij)− (1− λ)δM
∑
k,l∈B∪S
pkl(q˜klγ + 1− q˜kl) .
Notice that xn is a continuous function of (un,qn, q˜n,wn), hence (x,y, z) ∈ f(u,q, q˜).
Claim 3. Γ maps the compact set [0, v¯]B∪S × [0, 1]E × [0, 1]E to itself ( given that ∀i, j,
ui(G	 i, j) ∈ [0, v¯])
Therefore by Kakutatni’s fixed point theorem, f has a fixed point
(u,q, q˜) ∈ f(u,q, q˜).
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At the begining of the subgame ht when no one has reached an agreement, given u the
players’ expected payoff starting at t, f computes agents’ best response q, q˜ to u and
middleman’s best response w to agents’ strategies q, and the corresponding new expected
payoff u′ since they depend on the strategy of the middleman. Formally,
Lemma C.1.2. u∗ is a Markov Perfect equilibrium payoff vector if there exists a collection
of subgame consistent MPE of the game {Γα+β(G)}G⊂G0 with payoffs {u∗(G)}G⊂G0 and
q, q˜∗, such that (u∗,q∗, q˜∗) ∈ f(u∗,q∗, q˜∗).
Proof. Suppose that the collection of subgame consistent MPE of the game {Γα+β(G)}G⊂G0
has payoffs {u∗(G)}G⊂G0 . If (u∗,q∗, q˜∗) ∈ f(u∗,q∗, q˜∗), then there exists w∗, s.t.
(i) q, q˜ satisfies Eq(C.3), (C.4), (C.5), (C.6).
(ii) w is middleman’s best response to q, q˜, proposals and responses. given σ∗(G),∀G ⊂
G0.
(iii) u satisfies Eq(C.1), (C.2) , that is, u are the corresponding continuation payoffs (ex
ante payoffs for network G0).
Then we construct the following strategy profile and prove it is an MPE with corresponding
MPE payoff u∗. First define the strategies for histories ht along which no agreement has
occurred. Recall that G(ht) denotes the network induced by the players remaining after
the ex post history ht. Construct time-t strategy of each player according to the time-
0 behavior specified by σ∗(G0).1 For histories along which no agreement has occurred,
σ∗(G(ht)) specifies that
• Middleman choose matching pair (i, j) with probability w∗ij .
• For buyer b, when chosen by the middleman to propose to seller s, he offers a bid-
price p = min{ cs+δsus1−α , vbs−δbub1+β }. If chosen by nature to propose to seller s, he offers
1Formally, (σ(G))i(ht; i → j) = (σ(G))i(h0; i → j), (σ(G))j(ht; i → j, x) = (σ(G))i(h0; i → j, x), where
h0 = ∅, G = G(ht).
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p = min{cs + δsus, vbs − δbub}.
• Similarly, for seller s, when chosen by the middleman to propose to buyer b, he offers
an ask-price p = max{ cs+δsus1−α , vbs−δbub1+β }. If chosen by nature to propose to seller s, he
offers p = max{cs + δsus, vbs − δbub}.
• When buyer b responds to the offer p from seller s: if intermediated by the middleman,
he accepts any offer s.t., p < vbs−δbub1+β , and rejects any p >
vbs−δbub
1+β , and accept an offer
of p = vbs−δbub1+β with probability q
∗
sb; if intermediated by nature, he accepts any offer
s.t., p < vbs − δbub, and rejects any p > vbs − δbub, and accept an offer of p = vbs − δbub
with probability q˜∗sb.
• Similarly, when seller s responds to the purchase offer p from buyer b: if intermediated
by the middleman, he accepts any offer s.t., p > cs+δsus1−α , and rejects any p <
cs+δsus
1−α ,
and accept an offer of p = cs+δsus1−α with probability q
∗
bs; if intermediated by nature, he
accepts any offer s.t., p > cs + δsus, and rejects any p < cs + δsus, and accept an offer
of p = cs + δsus with probability q˜
∗
bs.
Given the collection of subgame consistency guarantees that under (σ∗(G))G⊂G0 the ex-
pected payoffs of any subgames are u(G).
Lemma C.1.3 (Mailath & Samuelson (2006) Proposition 5.7.1). A strategy profile is sub-
game perfect in a dynamic game if and only if there are no profitable one-shot deviations.
Based on the definition of f , everyone is best responding at period t: there is no profitable
deviation for all players in this stage game. It’s then easy to verify that u∗ are indeed the
equilibrium payoff by the strategy profile conditional on ht.
We now need to show that Lemma C.1.2 implies the existence of MPEs. We prove a sub-
game consistent collection of MPEs for the game {Γα+β(G)}G⊆G (n), where G (n) denotes the
subset of subnetworks in G with at most n vertices. The proof proceed by induction on n.
For n = 0, 1 it’s trivial. Suppose we proved the statement for all values smaller than n, and
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proceed to proving the case n. By induction hypothesis, there exists a subgame consistent
collection of MPEs (σ∗(G′))G′∈G (n−1) of the corresponding games {Γα+β(G)}G⊆G (n−1). Fix
a network G ∈ G (n) \ G (n − 1), S(G) = {G′ : G′ ⊂ G} ⊆ G (n − 1). Therefore there exist
MPEs (σ∗(G′))G′∈S(G) for the games {Γα+β(G)}G′∈S(G) that are subgame consistent, hence
we can use their MPE payoffs to define f . Suppose now that f has a fixed point (u∗,q∗, q˜∗),
with induced σ∗(G) of the game Γα+β(G) so that (σ∗(G′))G′∈G (n−1)∪{G} is subgame con-
sistent. If we append all MPE σ∗(G) of G ∈ G (n) \ G (n − 1) to (σ∗(G′))G′∈G (n−1), the
resulting collection of MPEs (σ∗(G′))G′∈G (n) is also subgame consistent. The the collection
of subgame consistent Markovian strategy profile are a MPE of the game Γα+β(G).
C.2. Proof of Theorem 3.4.1 under the choice “α or β”
This time:
b propose to s: (vbs − (1 + β)p, p− cs)
s proposes to b: (vbs − p, (1− α)p− cs).
ub =
∑
s
λwbsqbs(vb − (1 + β)(cs + δsus)) + (1− λ)pbsq˜bs(vb − (δsus + cs))
+
∑
s
(
(λwbs(1− qbs) + (1− λ)pbs(1− q˜bs)
)
δbub
+
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δbub]
(C.7)
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us =
∑
b
λwsbqsb((1− α)(vb − δbub)− cs) + (1− λ)psbq˜sb(vb − δbub − cs)
+
∑
b
(
(λwsb(1− qsb) + (1− λ)psb(1− q˜sb)
)
δsus
+
∑
b
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs)δsus
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δsus(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δsus]
(C.8)
and
qbs =

1 if vbs − (1 + β)(cs + δsus) > δbub
[0, 1] if vbs − (1 + β)(cs + δsus) = δbub,
0 if vbs − (1 + β)(cs + δsus) < δbub.
(C.9)
And qbs = Pr(‘Y es
′|(ht;1M = 1; b→ s; p)) where p = min{cs+ δsus, vbs−δbub1+β }. Similarly we
have,
qsb =

1 if (1− α)(vb − δbub)− cs > δsus
[0, 1] if (1− α)(vb − δbub)− cs = δsus,
0 if (1− α)(vb − δbub)− cs < δsus.
(C.10)
where qsb = Pr(‘Y es
′|(ht;1M = 1; s → b; p)) where p = max{ cs+δsus1−α , vbs − δbub}. When
nature selects bargaining pair,
q˜sb =

1 if vb − cs > δbub + δsus
[0, 1] if vb − cs = δbub + δsus,
0 if vb − cs < δbub + δsus.
(C.11)
q˜bs =

1 if vb − cs > δbub + δsus,
[0, 1] if vb − cs = δbub + δsus,
0 if vb − cs < δbub + δsus.
(C.12)
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From the middle man’s perspective: the middleman must maximize its total discounted
payoff: that is
piM (G)
=(1− δM )λmax
b,s
max{qbs[β(δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (qbsγ + 1− qbs)δMpiM (G),
qsb[α(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] +
(
qsbγ + 1− qsb
)
δMpiM (G)}
+ (1− δM )(1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij [q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j}) + (q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)δMpiM (G)],
And
wbs > 0⇒ piM (G) =λqbs[β(δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + λ(qbsγ + 1− qbs)δMpiM (G)
+ (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij [q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j}) + (q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)δMpiM (G)]
wsb > 0⇒ piM (G) =λqsb[α(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + λ(qsbγ + 1− qsb)δMpiM (G)
+ (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij [q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j}) + (q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)δMpiM (G)]
This yields:
piM (G)/(1− δM )
= max{max
b,s
λqbs[β(δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qbsγ + 1− qbs)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)
. . . ,max
b,s
λqsb[α(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qbsγ + 1− qsb)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij) }
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Let gij(u) = β(δjuj + cj) if i ∈ B, j ∈ S, and gij(u) = α(vij − δjuj) if i ∈ S, j ∈ B.
f(u,q, q˜)
={(u′,q′, q˜′)|q˜′bs = q˜′sb = 1(0) if vbs − cs > (<)δbub + δsus,
and q˜′sb, q˜
′
bs ∈ [0, 1] if vbs − cs = δbub + δsus,
q′bs = 1(0) if vbs − (1 + β)(δsus + cs) > (<)δbub, and q′bs ∈ [0, 1] otherwise ;
q′sb = 1(0) if (1− α)(vbs − δbub) > (<)δsus + cs, and q′bs ∈ [0, 1] otherwise ;
∃w ∈ ∆, s.t.
∑
i,j∈B∪S
wij ≤ 1, and
{ij|wij > 0} ⊆
λqij [gij(u) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})] + (1− λ) ∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qijγ + 1− qij)− (1− λ)δM ∑
k,l∈B∪S
pkl(q˜klγ + 1− q˜kl) ;
and u′b =
∑
s
λwbsqbs max{vb − (1 + β)(δsus + cs), δbub}+ (1− λ)pbsq˜bs max{vb − (δsus + cs), δbub}
+
∑
s
(
(λwbs(1− qbs) + (1− λ)pbs(1− q˜bs)
)
δbub +
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)δbub(G0 	 {j, k}) + (λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj))δbub
u′s =
∑
b
λwsbqsb max{(1− α)(vb − δbub)− cs, δsus}+ (1− λ)psbq˜sb max{vb − δbub − cs, δsus}
+
∑
b
(
(λwsb(1− qsb) + (1− λ)psb(1− q˜sb)
)
δsus +
∑
b
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs)δsus
+
∑
j,k 6=s
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δsus(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δsus]}
By similar argument, one can show that
Lemma C.2.1. f : [0, v¯]B∪S × [0, 1]E × [0, 1]E → [0, v¯]B∪S × [0, 1]E × [0, 1]E has a fixed
point (u,q, q˜) ∈ f(u,q, q˜).
By the definition of Γ, there exists w, s.t.
1. q, q˜ satisfies Eq (C.9), (C.10), (C.11), (C.12).
2. w is middleman’s best response to q, q˜ and proposals.
3. u satisfies Eq(C.15), (C.16) , that is, u is the corresponding continuation payoff vector.
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C.3. Proof of Proposition 3.2.2
Since the middleman is maximizing her discounted aggregate profit when deciding which
link to pick from G,
piM (G)
=(1− δM )λmax{qbs[α+ β
1− α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (qbsγ + 1− qbs)δMpiM (G),
qsb[
α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] +
(
qsbγ + 1− qsb
)
δMpiM (G)}
+ (1− δM )(1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij [q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j}) + (q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)δMpiM (G)].
For each pair of (b, s), if vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) > δbub, the difference ∆ between selecting
b→ s and selecting s→ b is,
∆ =qbs[
α+ β
1− α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (qbsγ + 1− qbs)δMpiM (G)
− qsb[α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})]−
(
qsbγ + 1− qsb
)
δMpiM (G)
=
α+ β
1− α (δsus + cs)−
α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)
<0
If vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) = δbub, ∆ = (qbs − qsb)[α+β1−α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})−
(1− γ)δMpiM (G)].
If vbs − 1+β1−α(δsus + cs) < δbub, ∆ = 0, qbs = 0
In any of the situations, we have
wbsqbs(vbs − δbub − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs)) = 0.
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Therefore
ub =
∑
s
λwbsqbs(vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs)) + (1− λ)pbsq˜bs(vbs − (δsus + cs))
+
∑
s
(
(λwbs(1− qbs) + (1− λ)pbs(1− q˜bs)
)
δbub +
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δbub]
=
∑
s
λwbsqbs(vbs − δbub − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs)) + (1− λ)pbsq˜bs(vbs − δbub − (δsus + cs))
+
∑
s
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs
)
δbub +
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δbub]
=
∑
s
(1− λ)pbsq˜bs(vbs − δbub − (δsus + cs))
+
∑
s
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs
)
δbub +
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δbub]
(C.13)
Now suppose (1 − λ)pbs(G) = 0, ∀s,G ⊆ G0. We prove by induction on n the number of
vertices of the subnetwork that
ub(G) = 0, ∀G ⊆ G0, s.t. b ∈ G.
For any subnetworks G ⊆ G0 of n ≤ 3, ub(G 	 {j, k}) = 0, ∀j, k 6= b. Suppose ub(G) =
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0,∀G ⊆ G0 with at most n− 1 vertices. For n, by Eq(C.13), we have
(1− . . .)ub =
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k}) = 0,
where 1− . . . ≥ 1− δb. Therefore, ub(G) = 0.
C.4. Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Suppose that λ = 1 and by Proposition 3.2.2, ub = 0, let
N1 = {(b, s) : vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) > 0},
N2 = {(b, s) : vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) = 0},
N3 = {(b, s) : vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) < 0}.
From the previous argument in Proof of Proposition 3.2.2,
∀(b, s) ∈ N1, qbs = qsb = 1, wbs = 0.
∀(b, s) ∈ N1, qbs, qsb ∈ [0, 1].
∀(b, s) ∈ N3, qbs = qsb = 0.
Hence, each time middleman is selecting the pair (b, s) such that,
piM (G)
=(1− δM ) max{qbs[α+ β
1− α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (qbsγ + 1− qbs)δMpiM (G),
qsb[
α+ β
1 + β
(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] +
(
qsbγ + 1− qsb
)
δMpiM (G)}
=(1− δM ) max{
max(b,s)∈N1 [
α+β
1+β vbs + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})]
1− γδM ,
max
(b,s)∈N2
max(qbs, qsb)(
α+β
1+β vbs + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s}))
1− δM + (1− γ)δM max(qbs, qsb) }
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The last inequality is due to ∂∂q [
q(α+β
1+β
vbs+(1−γ)δMpiM (G	{b,s}))
1−δM+(1−γ)δM q ] > 0 as long as vbs > 0, δM < 1.
us =
∑
b
wsbqsb(
1− α
1 + β
vbs − cs − δsus) +
∑
j,k 6=s
wkjqkj(1− γ)δsus(G0 	 {j, k})
+ [
∑
b
(
wsb + wbs) +
∑
j,k 6=s
(
wkjqkjγ + wkj(1− qkj)
)
]δsus
(C.14)
Assume γ = 1:
(1− δs)us =
∑
b
wsb|1− α
1 + β
vbs − cs − δsus|
piM (G) =
α+ β
1 + β
max( max
(b,s)∈N1
vbs, max
(b,s)∈N2
max(qbs, qsb)vbs),
where
N1(s) = {b ∈ N(s) : vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) > 0},
N2(s) = {b ∈ N(s) : vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) = 0},
N3(s) = {b ∈ N(s) : vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) < 0}.
Notice that, if vbs ≤ 1+β1−αcs,∀b ∈ N(s), we have N1(s) = ∅. Moreover,
N1(s) = ∅ ⇒ us = 0⇒ vbs ≤ 1 + β
1− αcs,∀b ∈ N(s).
If N1(s) 6= ∅, maxb∈N(s) vbs = maxb∈N1(s) vbs, and
[1− δs(1−
∑
b∈N1(s)
wsb)]us =
∑
b∈N1(s)
wsb(
1− α
1 + β
vbs − cs) = (
∑
b∈N1(s)
wsb)(
1− α
1 + β
max
b∈N(s)
vbs − cs)
Let
N1 = {s : ∃b ∈ N(s), s.t. vbs > 1 + β
1− αcs},
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N2 = {s : vbs ≤ 1 + β
1− αcs, ∀b ∈ N(s), and ∃b ∈ N(s) s.t. “=” holds}
Hence,
piM (G) =
α+ β
1 + β
max
s
( max
b∈N1(s)
vbs, max
b∈N2(s)
max(qbs, qsb)vbs)
=
α+ β
1 + β
max(max
s∈N2
(
max
b∈N(s)
(qbs, qsb)vbs
)
,max
s∈N1
max
b∈N(s)
vbs)
Notice that, in any MPEs where qbs, qsb ∈ {0, 1}, in particular, qbs = qsb = 1, ∀s ∈ N2, b ∈
N2(s) we have
piM (G) =
α+ β
1 + β
max
vbs≥ 1+β1−α cs
vbs
= max
vbs−cs≥α+β1+β vbs
α+ β
1 + β
vbs
= max
b,s
vbs − cs
Assume that
max
b,s
vbs − cs = vb∗s∗ − cs∗ .
Then, for sufficiently small  > 0, we can find α, β, s.t., vb∗s∗ − cs∗ −  = α+β1+β vb∗s∗ , and one
can easily verify that
vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs) > 0 ⇐⇒ vbs −
1 + β
1− αcs > 0,
hence qb∗s∗ = qb∗s∗ = 1 and give such choice of α, β,
vb∗s∗ − cs∗ ≥ piM (G) ≥ vb∗s∗ − cs∗ − 
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Assume γ = 0:
piM (G) =(1− δM ) max{ max
(b,s)∈N1
[
α+ β
1 + β
vbs + δMpiM (G	 {b, s})],
max
(b,s)∈N2
max(qbs, qsb)(
α+β
1+β vbs + δMpiM (G	 {b, s}))
1− δM + δM max(qbs, qsb) }
us =
∑
b
wsbqsb(
1− α
1 + β
vbs − cs − δsus) +
∑
j,k 6=s
wkjqkjδsus(G0 	 {j, k})
+ [
∑
b
wsb +
∑
j,k 6=s
wkj(1− qkj)]δsus
Hence,
(
1−(
∑
b
wsb(1−qsb)+
∑
j,k 6=s
wkj(1−qkj))δs
)
us =
∑
b
wsbqsb(
1− α
1 + β
vbs−cs)+
∑
j,k 6=s
wkjqkjδsus(G0	{j, k})
1− α
1 + β
vbs − cs − δsus
=
1− α
1 + β
vbs − cs −
δs
∑
bwsbqsb(
1−α
1+β vbs − cs) + δs
∑
j,k 6=swkjqkjδsus(G0 	 {j, k})
1− (∑bwsb(1− qsb) +∑j,k 6=swkj(1− qkj))δs
=
(1− δs + δs
∑
j,k 6=swkjqkj)(
1−α
1+β vbs − cs)− δs
∑
j,k 6=swkjqkjδsus(G0 	 {j, k})
1− (∑bwsb(1− qsb) +∑j,k 6=swkj(1− qkj))δs
=
(1− δs)(1−α1+β vbs − cs) + (δs
∑
j,k 6=swkjqkj)(
1−α
1+β vbs − cs − δsus(G0 	 {j, k}))
1− (∑bwsb(1− qsb) +∑j,k 6=swkj(1− qkj))δs
Denote by MB,S be the collection of possible matching outcomes, i.e.,
MB,S = { a sequence of buyer-seller pairs: (b1s1, b2s2, . . . , bT sT ) s.t., vbtst − cst ≥ 0, ∀t },
Π : G → R is the mapping from a bipartie subnetwork G to its maximum discounted
surplus,
Π(G) = (1− δM )
∑
δtMvbtst
For each (b, s) pair, one can show by induction that if any subnetwork G′ ⊂ G, δsus(G′) ≤
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1−α
1+β vbs − cs, then δsus(G) ≤ 1−α1+β vbs − cs. And for the initial state G′, either us(G′) = 0,
or {(j, k) : j, k 6= s} = ∅, which yields us(G′) =
∑
bwsbqsb(
1−α
1+β vbs − cs − δsus(G′)) +∑
bwsbδsus(G
′). Hence δsus(G′) ≤ 1−α1+β vbs − cs ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ 1−α1+β vbs − cs, and in any MPEs
where qbs, qsb ∈ {0, 1}, in particular, qbs = qsb = 1,∀s ∈ N2, b ∈ N2(s).
piM (G) =(1− δM ) max
vbs≥ 1+β1−α cs
[
α+ β
1 + β
vbs + δMpiM (G	 {b, s})]
=
α+ β
1 + β
Π(Gα,β)
where Gα,β is a subnetwork of G0 where the set of links Eα,β = {(b, s) : vbs ≥ 1+β1−αcs}.
Assume that
α∗, β∗ = arg max
α+ β
1 + β
Π(Gα,β).
By a similar  argument, one can show that even if qbs = qsb < 1, ∀s ∈ N2, b ∈ N2(s), one
could find α′, β′, s.t., {(b, s) : vbs ≥ 1+β
∗
1−α∗ cs} = {(b, s) : vbs ≥ 1+β
′
1−α′ cs + }. Therefore for
some bounded C > 0
piM (G0) ≥ α
′ + β′
1 + β′
Π(Gα′,β′) ≥ α
∗ + β∗
1 + β∗
Π(Gα∗,β∗)− C,
which concludes the proof.
C.5. Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
ub =
∑
s
λwbsqbs(vb − (1 + β)(cs + δsus)) + (1− λ)pbsq˜bs(vb − (δsus + cs))
+
∑
s
(
(λwbs(1− qbs) + (1− λ)pbs(1− q˜bs)
)
δbub
+
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δbub]
(C.15)
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us =
∑
b
λwsbqsb((1− α)(vb − δbub)− cs) + (1− λ)psbq˜sb(vb − δbub − cs)
+
∑
b
(
(λwsb(1− qsb) + (1− λ)psb(1− q˜sb)
)
δsus
+
∑
b
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs)δsus
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δsus(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δsus]
(C.16)
piM (G)/(1− δM )
= max{max
b,s
λqbs[β(δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qbsγ + 1− qbs)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)
. . . ,max
b,s
λqsb[α(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qsbγ + 1− qsb)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij) }
For λ = 1:
ub =
∑
s
wbsqbs(vb − (1 + β)(cs + δsus)) +
∑
s
wbs(1− qbs)δbub +
∑
s
wsbδbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[wkjqkj(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k}) +
(
wkjqkjγ + wkj(1− qkj)
)
δbub]
us =
∑
b
wsbqsb((1− α)(vb − δbub)− cs) +
∑
b
wsb(1− qsb)δsus +
∑
b
wbsδsus
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[wkjqkj(1− γ)δsus(G0 	 {j, k}) +
(
wkjqkjγ + wkj(1− qkj)
)
δsus]
piM (G) =(1− δM ) max{max
b,s
qbs[β(δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})]
1− δM (qbsγ + 1− qbs) ,
max
b,s
qsb[α(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})]
1− δM (qsbγ + 1− qsb) }
For γ = 1,
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(1− δb)ub =λ
∑
s
wbsqbs(vbs − (1 + β)(cs + δsus)− δbub) + (1− λ)pbsq˜bs(vbs − δbub − δsus − cs)
(1− δs)us =λ
∑
b
wsbqsb((1− α)(vbs − δbub)− cs − δsus) + (1− λ)psbq˜sb(vbs − δbub − cs − δsus)
piM (G) =λmax{max
b,s
qbsβ(δsus + cs),max
b,s
qsbα(vbs − δbub)}
If β1+β < α, which is
β
α < 1 + β <
1
1−α , then for any pair (b, s),
β(δsus+cs) ≥ α(vbs−δbub) ⇐⇒ vbs−δbub ≤ β
α
(δsus+cs) < min((1+β),
1
1− α)(δsus+cs),
thus qbs = qsb = 0. Thus
β
1+β ≥ α, which is equivalent to βα ≥ 1 + β ≥ 11−α . Let:
B1 = {b ∈ B : ∃s ∈ N(b), s.t. wbs > 0}
B2 = {b ∈ B : ∀s ∈ N(b), s.t. wbs = 0}
S1 = {s ∈ S : ∃b ∈ N(s), s.t. wsb > 0}
S2 = {s ∈ S : ∀b ∈ N(s), s.t. wsb = 0}
For any b ∈ B2, s ∈ S2, ub = 0, us = 0, and
∀b ∈ B1, ub =
∑
swbs(vbs − (1 + β)(cs + δsus))+
1− δb + δb
∑
swbs
=
∑
swbs(vb − 1+ββ piM )+
1− δb + δb
∑
swbs
∀s ∈ S1, us =
∑
bwsb((1− α)(vbs − δbub)− cs)+
1− δs + δs
∑
bwsb
=
∑
bwsb(
1−α
α piM − cs)+
1− δs + δs
∑
bwsb
∀s ∈ S1, δsus + cs =
δs
∑
bwsb
1−α
α piM + (1− δs)cs
1− δs + δs
∑
bwsb
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∀b ∈ B1, vbs − δbub =
δb
∑
swbs
1+β
β piM + (1− δb)vb
1− δb + δb
∑
swbs
Claim: For any optimal choices of α, β under Γα+β(G), let α′ = α+β1+β , β
′ = α+β1−α , choose
α or β instead, then the middleman can achieve as much as the revenue from Γα+β(G).
Under Γα+β(G),
ub =
∑
s
λwbsqbs(vbs − 1 + β
1− α(δsus + cs)− δbub) + (1− λ)pbsq˜bs(vbs − (δsus + cs)− δbub)
+
∑
s
(
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs
)
δbub +
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δbub]
us =
∑
b
λwsbqsb(
1− α
1 + β
(vbs − δbub)− cs − δsus) + (1− λ)psbq˜sb(vbs − δbub − cs − δsus)
+
∑
b
(
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb
)
δsus +
∑
b
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs)δsus
+
∑
j,k 6=s
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δsus(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δsus]
piM (G)/(1− δM )
= max{max
b,s
λqbs[
α+β
1−α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qbsγ + 1− qbs)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)
. . . ,max
b,s
λqsb[
α+β
1+β
(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qbsγ + 1− qsb)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij) }
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Let
1 + β
1− α = 1 + β
′,
1− α
1 + β
= 1− α′.
Then under the choice of α′, β′ and in the Γα/β(G) game,
ub =
∑
s
λwbsqbs(vb − 1 + β
1− α (cs + δsus)− δbub) + (1− λ)pbsq˜bs(vb − (δsus + cs)− δbub)
+
∑
s
(
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs
)
δbub +
∑
s
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb)δbub
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δbub(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δbub]
us =
∑
b
λwsbqsb(
1− α
1 + β
(vb − δbub)− cs − δsus) + (1− λ)psbq˜sb(vb − δbub − cs − δsus)
+
∑
b
(
(λwsb + (1− λ)psb
)
δsus +
∑
b
(λwbs + (1− λ)pbs)δsus
+
∑
j,k 6=b
[(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)(1− γ)δsus(G0 	 {j, k})
+
(
(λwkjqkj + (1− λ)pkj q˜kj)γ + λwkj(1− qkj) + (1− λ)pkj(1− q˜kj)
)
δsus]
pi′M (G)/(1− δM )
= max{max
b,s
λqbs[
α+β
1−α (δsus + cs) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qbsγ + 1− qbs)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij)
. . . ,max
b,s
λqsb[
α+β
1+β
(vbs − δbub) + (1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {b, s})] + (1− λ)
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij q˜ij(1− γ)δMpiM (G	 {i, j})
1− λδM (qsbγ + 1− qsb)− (1− λ)δM
∑
i,j∈B∪S
pij(q˜ijγ + 1− q˜ij) }
Therefore pi′M (G) ≥ piM (G).
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C.6. Proof of the existence of MPEs under fixed commission fee
I provide a characterization of MPE payoffs and strategies. Suppose agent of type i has
discounting factor δi ∈ (0, 1).
We use a fixed point argument to (implicitly) prove the existence of MPEs σ∗ of Π(δ, v,G).
Denote v(G, σ) the vector of equilibrium payoff induced by an Markov strategy profile σ of
the game Π(δ,v, G). By definition, any MPE σ∗ of Π(δ, v,G) must belong to a subgame
consistent collection of MPEs σ|G′ of the respective games (Π(δ, v,G′))G′∈G . In particular,
when Π(δ,v, G) is played according to MPE σ∗(G), every player 1 ≤ i ≤ N has ex ante
payoffs vi(G, σ
∗(G)) before any pairs are selected, and vk(G 	 {i, j}, σ∗(G 	 {i, j}) at the
beginning of any subgame before which only i and j reached an agreement (k 6= i, j).
Fix a history ht along which no agreement has been reached, that is G(ht) = G0. In the
subgame with active middleman, middleman M first picks a bargaining pair e ∈ E. After
the matched pair is realized, suppose is (i, j), with i being the proposer, in the subgame
following (ht; i → j, x), it must be that the strategy (σ(G0))j(ht; i → j, x) specifies that
player j accepts any offer x > δjvj(G0, σ
∗(G0)), and reject any offer x < δjvj(G0, σ∗(G0)),
and may accept with positive probability offers of δjvj(G0, σ
∗(G0)). Then by subgame
perfection, player i does not offer more than δjvj(G0, σ
∗(G0)), i.e., (σ∗(G0))i(ht, i → j) ≤
δjvj(G0, σ
∗(G0)).
Let qij be the probability ( conditional on (ht, i → j)) of the joint event that i offers
δjvj(G0, σ
∗(G0)) to j and the offer is accepted. The payoff of player k 6= i, j at the beginning
of the next period conditional on (ht; i → j) is qijδkvk(G0 	 {i, j}, σ∗(G0 	 {i, j})) + (1 −
qij)δkvk(G0, σ
∗(G0)).
Case 1. δivi(G0, σ
∗(G0)) + δjvj(G0, σ∗(G0)) < vij − β.
Conditional on (ht; i → j), it must be that in any equilibrium, qij = 1 . To see this, if
qij < 1, then i’s expected payoff conditional on offering x = δjvj(G0, σ
∗(G0)) is qij(vij −
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β − x) + (1 − qij)δivi(G0, σ∗(G0)) < (vij − β − x), while it is more profitable to offer
x = δjvj(G0, σ
∗(G)) + η(η > 0) with payoff vij − β − δjvj(G0, σ∗(G0)))− η, for sufficiently
small η > 0. And it’s obvious that offers smaller than δjvj(G0, σ
∗(G0)) are not optimal for i
since they are rejected with certainty and yields δivi(G0, σ
∗(G0) < vij−β−δjvj(G0, σ∗(G0)).
Hence i has no best response to j’s equilibrium strategy when qij < 1, a contradiction. Hence
qij = 1. Moreover Pr(‘Y es?|(ht; i→ j) = qij = 1.
Case 2. δivi(G0, σ
∗(G0)) + δjvj(G0, σ∗(G0))) > vij − β.
By the similar fashion, one could show that qij = 0 = Pr(‘Y es
′|(ht; i→ j)) since i’s offer is
no more than vij − β − δivi(G0, σ∗(G0)) < δjvj(G0, σ∗(G0)).
Case 3. δivi(G0, σ
∗(G0)) + δjvj(G0, σ∗(G0))) = vij − β.
When i is chosen to propose to j, whether the bargain reach an agreement or not, the
payoff for both agents are δivi(G0, σ
∗(G0)) and δjvj(G0, σ∗(G0)). The subgame perfection
conditional on (ht, i→ j) allows any value qij ∈ [0, 1]. Since i and j are indifferent between
any x ≤ δjv∗j (G0, σ∗),WOLG assume that qij = Pr(‘Yes’|(ht; i→ j)).
Hence given any probability distribution w over matched pair Am, the continuation payoff
{vi(G0, σ∗(G0))} satisfy,
vi =
∑
j
(λwijqij(vij − β − δjvj) + (1− λ)pijqij(vij − δjvj) + (λwij + (1− λ)pij)(1− qij)δivi]
+
∑
j
(λwji + (1− λ)pji)δivi
+
∑
j,k 6=i
(λwjk + (1− λ)pjk)[qjkδivi(G0 	 {j, k}, σ∗(G0 	 {j, k})) + (1− qjk)δivi]
(C.17)
Since the continuation payoff does not depends on the current matchmaking state (whether
matched by the middleman or nature), so one can assume that the agent behaves the same
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under both cases. However, it’s worth notice that, when varying λ, the threshold would
change, so agents have different expectations for their continuation payoff. and
qij =

1 if δivi + δjvj < vij − β
[0, 1] if δivi + δjvj = vij − β,
0 if δivi + δjvj > vij − β.
(C.18)
And qij = Pr(‘Y es
′|(ht; i→ j)).
From the middle man’s perspective: its ex ante payoff at subnetwork G is,
pi0(G) =λ
∑
ij
wij [qij(β + δ0pi0(G	 {i, j})) + (1− qij)δ0pi0(G)]
+ (1− λ)
∑
ij
pij [qijδ0pi0(G	 {i, j}) + (1− qij)δ0pi0(G)]
Since the middleman is maximizing it’s discounted profit when deciding which link to pick,
pi0(G) =λmax
ij
[qij(β + δ0pi0(G	 {i, j})) + (1− qij)δ0pi0(G)]
+ (1− λ)
∑
ij
pij [qijδ0pi0(G	 {i, j}) + (1− qij)δ0pi0(G)],
where
wij > 0⇒
qij(β + δ0pi0(G	 {i, j})) + (1− qij)δ0pi0(G) = max
k,s
qks(β + δ0pi0(G	 {i, j})) + (1− qks)δ0pi0(G)
This yields:
pi0(G) = max
i,j
λqijβ + δ0
(
λqijpi(G	 {i, j}) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pksqkspi(G	 {k, s})
)
1− δ0
(
λ(1− qij) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pks(1− qks)
)
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Define the following mapping Γ(v,q). Γ : [0, v¯]|V | × [0, 1]2|E| → [0, v¯]|V | × [0, 1]2|E|.
Γ(v,q) ={(v′,q′)|q′ij = 1(0) if vij − β > (<)δivi + δjvj ,
and q′ij ∈ [0, 1] if vij − β = δivi + δjvj ,
∃w ∈ ∆, s.t.{ij|wij > 0}
⊆ arg max
ij
λqijβ + δ0
(
λqijpi(G	 {i, j}) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pksqkspi(G	 {k, s})
)
1− δ0
(
λ(1− qij) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pks(1− qks)
) ,
and v′i =
∑
j
[λwijqij max{vij − β − δjvj , δivi}+ (1− λ)pijqij max{vij − δjvj , δivi}
+ (λwij + (1− λ)pij)(1− qij)δivi]
+
∑
j
(λwji + (1− λ)pji)δivi
+
∑
j,k 6=i
(λwjk + (1− λ)pjk)[qjkδivi(G0 	 {j, k}, σ∗(G0 	 {j, k})) + (1− qjk)δivi]
First need to show that Γ has fixed point.
Lemma C.6.1. Γ : [0, v¯]N × [0, 1]E → [0, v¯]N × [0, 1]E has a fixed point.
Proof. Claim 1. ∀q,v,Γ(v,q) is non-empty and convex.
Proof: It’s easy to see that Γ(v,q) is non-empty. ∀v,q, and (v′,q′), (v′′,q′′) ∈ Γ(v,q),
η ∈ [0, 1], ηq′ij + (1 − η)q′′ij = 1(0) if vij − β > (<)δivi + δjvj , and ηq′ij + (1 − η)q′′ij ∈ [0, 1]
for any pair of (i, j). Suppose p′,p′′ are corresponding ws in the mapping, then p′,p′′ have
the same support, hence
ηp′+(1−η)p′′ ∈ arg max λqijβ + δ0
(
λqijpi(G	 {i, j}) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pksqkspi(G	 {k, s})
)
1− δ0
(
λ(1− qij) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pks(1− qks)
) .
Thus (ηv′ + (1− η)v′′, ηq′ + (1− η)q′′) ∈ Γ(v,q)
Claim 2. Γ has closed graph.
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Proof: For any (xn,yn) ∈ Γ(vn,qn), where
(vn,qn)→ (v,q), (xn,yn)→ (x,y).
If vij − β > δivi + δjvj , there exists some n1 > 0, s.t.
vij − β > δivni + δjvnj , ∀n > n1,
and ynij = 1, thus yij = 1.
If vij − β < δivi + δjvj , there exists some n2 > 0, s.t.
vij − β < δivni + δjvnj , ∀n > n2,
and ynij = 0, thus yij = 0.
If vij − β = δivi + δjvj , yij ∈ [0, 1] is trivial.
Next let
γij(q) =
λqijβ + δ0
(
λqijpi(G	 {i, j}) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pksqkspi(G	 {k, s})
)
1− δ0
(
λ(1− qij) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pks(1− qks)
) .
It’s obvious that for each (vn,qn), the corresponding wn satisfies the following
pnij(max
ij
γij(q
n)− γij(qn)) = 0
Suppose that a subsequence wnk converges to w. Since max γij(·), γij(·) are all continuous,
let nk →∞, we have
wij(max
ij
γij(q)− γij(q)) = 0.
Thus
{ij|wij > 0} ⊆ arg max
λqijβ + δ0
(
λqijpi(G	 {i, j}) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pksqkspi(G	 {k, s})
)
1− δ0
(
λ(1− qij) + (1− λ)
∑
k,s pks(1− qks)
) .
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Notice that xn = g(vn,qn,wn) where g is a continuous function of (w,q). Hence
x = lim xnk = lim g(vnk ,qnk ,wnk) = g(v,q,w)
Hence
(x,y) ∈ Γ(v,q).
Claim 3. Γ maps the compact set [0, v¯]|V | × [0, 1]2|E| to itself.
Therefore by Kakutatni’s fixed point theorem, Γ has a fixed point
(v,q) ∈ Γ(v,q).
By the definition of Γ, there exists w, s.t.
1. q satisfies Eq(C.18).
2. w is middleman’s best response to q.
3. v satisfies Eq(C.17), that is, v is the corresponding continuation payoff.
At the begining of the subgame ht when no one has reached an agreement, given v the
players’ expected payoff starting at t, Γ compute agent’s best response q to v, along with
the payoff v′ induced by q, and middleman’s best response w to agents’ strategies q, and the
corresponding new expected payoff v′ since they depend on the strategy of the middleman.
Formally,
Lemma C.6.2. v∗ is a Markov Perfect equilibrium payoff, if there exists a collection of
subgame consistent MPE of the game {Γ(δ,v, G)}G⊂G0 with payoffs {v∗(G)}G⊂G0 and p∗,
such that (v∗,q∗) ∈ Γ(v∗,q∗).
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Proof. Suppose that the collection of subgame consistent MPE of the game {(δ,v, G)}G⊂G0
has payoffs {v∗(G, σ∗(G))}G⊂G0 . If (w∗,v∗) ∈ Γ(w∗,v∗), then there exists q∗, s.t.
(i) q∗ satisfies (C.18).
(ii) w is best response to q given σ∗(G), for any G ⊂ G0.
(iii) v∗ is the corresponding ex ante payoff for network G0.
Then we construct the following strategy profile and prove it is an MPE with corresponding
MPE payoff v∗. First define the strategies for histories ht along which no agreement has
occurred. Recall that G(ht) denotes the network induced by the players remaining after
the ex post history ht. Construct time-t strategy of each player according to the time-
0 behavior specified by σ∗(G0).2 For histories along which no agreement has occurred,
σ∗(G(ht)) specifies that
• Middleman choose matching pair (i, j) with probability p∗ij .
• when i is chosen to propose to j, he offers min(vij − β − δiv∗i , δjv∗j ).
• when i responds to the offer x, he accepts any offer x > δiv∗i , and rejects any x < δiv∗i ,
and accept an offer of δiv
∗
i with probability q
∗
ij .
Given the collection of subgame consistency guarantees that under (σ∗(G))G⊂G0 the ex-
pected payoffs of any subgames are v(G, σ(G)).
Lemma C.6.3 (Mailath & Samuelson (2006) Proposition 5.7.1). A strategy profile is sub-
game perfect in a dynamic game if and only if there are no profitable one-shot deviations.
Based on the definition of Γ, everyone is best responding at period t no profitable deviation
for all players in this stage game. It’s then easy to verify that v∗ are indeed the equilibrium
payoff by the strategy profile conditional on ht.
2Formally, (σ(G))i(ht; i → j) = (σ(G))i(h0; i → j), (σ(G))j(ht; i → j, x) = (σ(G))i(h0; i → j, x), where
h0 = ∅, G = G(ht).
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We now need to show that Lemma C.1.2 implies the existence of MPEs. We prove a subgame
consistent collection of MPEs for the game (δ, v,G)G⊆G (n), where G (n) denotes the subset
of subnetworks in G with at most n vertices. The proof proceed by induction on n. For
n = 0, 1 it’s trivial. Suppose we proved the statement for all values smaller than n,and
proceed to proving the case n. By induction hypothesis, there exists a subgame consistent
collection of MPEs (σ∗(G′))G′∈G (n−1) of the corresponding games (Π(δ, v,G′))G′∈G (n−1). Fix
a network G ∈ G (n) \ G (n − 1), S(G) = {G′ : G′ ⊂ G} ⊆ G (n − 1). Therefore there exist
MPEs (σ∗(G′))G′∈S(G) for the games (Γ(δ, v,G′))G′∈S(G) that are subgame consistent, hence
we can use their MPE payoffs to define Γ. Suppose now that Γ has a fixed point p∗,v∗, with
induced σ∗(G) of the game Π(δ, v,G) so that (σ∗(G′))G′∈G (n−1)∪{G} is subgame consistent.
If we append all MPE σ∗(G) of G ∈ G (n) \ G (n − 1) to (σ∗(G′))G′∈G (n−1), the resulting
collection of MPEs (σ∗(G′))G′∈G (n) is also subgame consistent.
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